Introduction

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While international attention was focused on the debacle of Russia’s stalled columns north of Kyiv, in just 48 hours, Russia penetrated deep into southern Ukraine and crossed the Dnieper River. By 27 February, Russia had seized Mykolaiv, and by 2 March, it had eliminated resistance in Kherson. Within three weeks, Russia had occupied territory equivalent to the entire area of Estonia and Latvia.

Russia revealed that the infamous 2016 RAND wargames on a Russian invasion of the Baltic, which predicted that their forces could reach Tallinn or Riga in 60 hours, were not so fanciful.^[1] In every war it has initiated since 1939, Russia has attempted to exploit strategic surprise to rapidly defeat its opponents before they could mobilize an effective resistance. With varying degrees of success, it tried this approach in Finland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.

For NATO to defend the Baltic, it needs to be prepared to counter a Russian attempt at exploiting strategic surprise to achieve a fait accompli. Time will be essential. NATO cannot assume that it will have weeks to mobilize combat power before Russian aggression. It needs to be ready to break the initial tempo of a Russian surprise attack on the shield of the Baltic Defense Line. It needs permanently forward-deployed mechanized forces to act as a sword to parry any breakthroughs. For its defense to be effective, NATO needs to conduct large-scale exercises to refine techniques to be ready to defend with minimal notice, and NATO should develop an operating concept optimized for defeating Russia in the Baltic.

In deterring and defeating Russia, NATO must be ready to counter its aggression at the onset of a war and with only hours of forewarning. Too often, NATO scenarios assume there will be “indicators and warnings” leading to a period of escalation and crisis before a conflict. These convenient assumptions allow NATO to mobilize the forces to fight how it desires, but Russia may not be so kind as to provide weeks of preparation time. While it is true that Russia invested months into building combat power before invading Ukraine, that deliberateness was an anomaly. Russia used that time to attempt to extract concessions and did not concern itself with Ukraine’s relative rate of mobilization.

Putin Would Gamble on a Short War

Some experts, including the former Joint Chief of Staff, have recently argued against the illusion that wars can be short;^[2] however, we also need to worry about the fantasy that all wars will be protracted just because the Russo-Ukrainian War has been. After World War I, France fell into the protracted war delusion. It believed that a future war would resemble the attritional battles of the Western Front; it thought it would have time to mobilize overwhelming force. It placed little emphasis on maintaining readiness to fight a high-tempo fight and sidelined reformers like Charles de Gaulle who pushed for a mobile, high-readiness force.^[3]

We need nuance in balancing between the short war illusion and the protracted war delusion. Aggressors make the decision to initiate a conflict based on the hope of a short war. They do not wish to risk a long war of exhaustion. Russia invaded Ukraine because it mistakenly believed that Volodymyr Zelensky’s regime was fragile and that Ukrainians would not mobilize to defend it. Russia gambled on war because Vladimir Putin believed it would be short.

History provides many examples of short wars where aggressors have exploited strategic surprises, more efficient mobilization rates, and higher readiness of their armed forces to achieve policy objectives. These examples include the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Balkan Wars, the Battles of Poland and France, the Six-Day War, the Russo-Georgian War, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and the Nagorno-Karabakh War. With so many examples, aggressors are clearly not irrational in hoping for a short war. But of course, in addition to the Russo-Ukrainian War, there are numerous examples of aggressors miscalculating that a war could be won quickly; notable examples include World War I, Operation Barbarossa, the Korean War and the Iran-Iraq War.^[4]

In those examples, both successes and failures, aggressors believed in their superior capability to win a war swiftly and at a reasonable cost because they perceived advantages over less ready adversaries. The lesson for those on the strategic defense, like NATO, is that deterring an opportunistic adversary like Vladimir Putin requires demonstrating a clear readiness to defeat an initial invasion force and prevent a cheap fait accompli.

Recognizing the Problem of Strategic Surprise

Fortunately, the countries most at risk of invasion—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—recognize Putin’s opportunism and that only by demonstrating the capability to defeat an initial fait accompli will they deter Russia.^[5] Furthermore, witnessing Russia’s atrocities in occupied Ukraine, they have little interest either in allowing Russia to occupy their country or in hoping for an eventual liberation by NATO. In early 2024, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas criticized NATO’s defense plans for emphasizing a counterattack to liberate the Baltic rather than attempting to prevent Russia from seizing Estonia’s land at the outset of a conflict. She argued NATO’s plans would “allow [the Baltic states] to be overrun before liberating them after 180 days,” resulting in the “complete destruction” of the countries.^[6] At the Vilnius Summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg provided support to Kallas and the Baltic states by dedicating NATO to “defend every inch of NATO territory.”^[7]

While the overall risk of a war with Russia is low (after all, there is no NATO territory that has the centrality to Putin’s vision of a greater Russia in the same way that Ukraine does), there is still the risk of Putin exploiting strategic surprise and NATO unpreparedness in the Baltic. His mind is opaque, but he may harbor a dream of regaining Peter the Great’s Baltic conquests. He could “liberate” the Russian people in the Baltic states. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians migrated to the Baltic states after the Soviet Union occupied them; today, a significant portion of them speak Russian and listen to Russian media. In Estonia, 80,000 people carry only a Russian passport.^[8] Putin could certainly manufacture a reason to “come to these Russians’ defense.”

As with the Russo-Georgian War, he would probably time an invasion with a large-scale exercise, most likely the quadrennial Zapad series, which, before the invasion of Ukraine, regularly involved over 100,000 soldiers. In this way, he could mass forces while minimizing the risk of a corresponding NATO mobilization. Previous exercises have placed units on NATO’s eastern flank on alert, but they have not resulted in deployments of additional brigades.

NATO responses to the previous Zapad exercise demonstrate the difficulty in defining the threshold to initiate a mobilization of NATO’s forces. As noted above, NATO should not assume it will have a clear warning before an attack. A telling example can be found in Egypt and Syria’s strategic surprise of Israel at the outset of the Yom Kippur War. A few months before the attack, Egypt conducted exercises, which led Israel to mobilize its reserves in expectation of an attack. The costly mobilization was pilloried in the press. When Egypt conducted another exercise on the eve of the Yom-Kippur holiday, Israel decided—to their peril—that it was not worth mobilizing against.^[9]

Similarly to Egypt, as the conflict initiator, Putin can toy with NATO. He can hold snap exercises to test the threshold for a NATO mobilization and experiment with what force level he can mass without resulting in either the mobilization of the reserves of the Baltic states or the deployment of additional brigades to the Baltic.

He would only gamble on a conflict if he were assured of strategic surprise and NATO unpreparedness. He would hope to seize Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius and reach the coast so that he would then have a relatively narrow front to defend against a NATO counterattack from Poland. His forces could then establish a defense in depth with far more troop density than the Surovikin Line that defeated Ukraine’s attempted 2023 spring counteroffensive. Employing multiple lines of defense behind a thousand meters of mines, over-watched by ten thousand drones, Russia could soon create a defense that NATO would not be prepared to penetrate.^[10] With the threat of nuclear escalation in the background, Putin would keep the war limited to the Baltic and hope that NATO would lack the collective willpower for a campaign of attrition to bleed through Russia’s lines of defense. He would bet that a ceasefire would solidify his fait accompli.

NATO’s primary mission is to ensure that Putin does not see an opportunity for this gamble. NATO can learn from Ukraine’s shortfalls in its southern defenses. When Russia invaded, Ukraine had accepted risk in the south with an economy of force. Only three platoon strong points covered the crossing points between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine.^[11] In peacetime, according to Major General Andrii Sokolov, the commander of the southern forces, his command should have had two brigades. In case of war, they would be augmented by two Territorial Defense Force brigades. However, throughout his theater, he only had one brigade and one separate battalion at half strength. The units had rotated into the region only a few months before the invasion and so had little time to plan and rehearse their defense. Further limiting their preparedness, until a full-scale war, they could not dig fighting positions on private land, emplace mines on roads or destroy bridges.^[12]

When Russia invaded, it exploited its surprise and tempo to seize bridges and easily bypassed hastily created defenses in the open terrain of the Ukrainian steppe. Russia’s initial victories in the south have set much of the strategic context for the rest of the war.

The Shield: The Baltic Defense Line

The Baltic states have recognized their vulnerability and are committed to not suffering the same fate as southern Ukraine. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are establishing a series of defensive lines, collectively known as the Baltic Defense Line, within the first 15 to 20 km of their borders with Russia and Belarus. They are focusing their efforts on the limited avenues of approach through the lakes and rivers of Estonia and the forests and bogs of Latvia and Lithuania.

While the frontage to defend can seem daunting, certain measures—taking advantage of the restrictive terrain on the Baltic borders and prioritizing preventing a penetration along the roads and railways that Russia will need to sustain a mechanized thrust—make the problem become manageable. Estonia has a 339 km border with Russia, but Lake Peipus provides an obstacle that limits avenues of approach to either Narva in the north or two major roads and a rail crossing in the south. Latvia has a 284 km border with Russia and a 172 km border with Belarus. It has two major roads and a railway crossing with both countries. Lithuania has a 679 km border with Belarus and an additional 266 km border with Russia’s exclave in Kaliningrad. It has five major road crossings with Belarus and two with Kaliningrad. Additionally, it has two rail crossings with both. Taking into account this terrain, two brigades in Estonia, three brigades in Latvia and four brigades in Lithuania are needed to provide a covering force sufficient to delay the first echelon of a Russian invasion on the eastern avenues of approach.

To block these avenues of approach, the Baltic countries plan a mix of obstacles and bunkers to create engagement areas. For example, Estonia plans to build 600 bunkers, which will be manned by reserve forces who will rehearse their mission at least twice a year. While Estonia only has an active duty force of 4,200, it has 38,800 in a “permanent readiness” status and 230,000 citizens with some form of “military obligations.”^[13] If it can mobilize this force to man its defenses, it has the potential to parry a Russian attempt at a rapid fait accompli.

To have time to mobilize such reserves, the Baltic states will need to have obstacles prepositioned to rapidly block an advance. They have been planning engineer resource parks (ERPs) to stockpile ammunition, mines and dragon’s teeth to rapidly block avenues of approach. Lithuania has plans for 27 ERPs.^[14] To quickly emplace mines, even behind enemy lines, Ukraine has been employing drones. The Baltic ERPs should include a store of drones that could be pre-programmed to drop mines to seal likely Russian avenues of approach at the first indication of Russian aggression. Antitank mines have proven critical to grinding a mechanized advance to a halt. In 2023, Ukraine, armed with NATO equipment, could not counterattack through Russian minefields. Similarly, in 1940, France’s shortfall in antitank mines made it difficult to establish a defense against Germany’s Panzers.^[15] And in 1951, South Korea’s lack of antitank mines allowed North Korean T-34s to overrun its positions.^[16]

Baltic states have already begun creating obstacles to canalize a potential Russian attack along roads that could be quickly blocked. Latvia is digging antitank ditches and expanding existing drainage canals to make them impassable by armor.

These initiatives are all positive developments. Deep and dense obstacles will corner Russia into massing forces to breach. As Colonel Tarmo Kundla, head of the Estonian Defense Forces General Staff’s operations department, recognized, “There is no such thing as an impenetrable defense, but the price an adversary has to invest to penetrate that defense is still significantly higher than he would have to pay now. Also, the preparations that he will have to make to break through that line of defense are much more visible to us than what is the case now. Perhaps the opponent’s preparation will also work as a forewarning for us.”^[17] While the Baltic Defense Line will not be impenetrable, Russia will have to mass more forces and will see a reduction in its ability to achieve strategic surprise. If it attacks, it will be difficult to conceal massed forces for a successful breach—just as it has experienced in Ukraine. NATO will be able to target those forces with drones and artillery.

As they build their defenses, the Baltics risk over-investing in bunkers to serve as fighting positions overwatching engagement areas. Such frontline bunkers will likely be identified by Russia. As one Ukrainian battalion commander remarked on the problems with their defense in the south when Russia invaded, “They had our positions marked on their maps.”^[18] The Baltic should not expect to use bunkers as fighting positions. During World War I, Germany realized that its prepared fighting positions provided easy targets for the Allies to synchronize effects against. Its soldiers learned to hide in bunkers to survive artillery barrages but would then hastily reposition to shell holes to surprise Allied forces.^[19]

NATO forces should dig thousands of survivability positions with counter-drone and camouflage netting to hide infantry, artillery, command posts and decoys. If Russia can detect such positions, the positions should require Russia to commit a significant amount of firepower to reduce them, which will reveal Russian artillery for counter-fire. To cloud its decisionmaking, Russia should worry that it is revealing its artillery just to strike decoys.

The Baltic states should be emboldened in this approach by the fact that, with proper camouflage techniques, Ukraine maintains artillery and command posts in the same positions for months.^[20] In fact, relocating command posts produces more risk since they are more likely to be detected by drones while moving.^[21] Additionally, the Baltic states should hardwire communications to the positions to provide assured communications with a minimal electromagnetic signature. They should also adopt best anti-drone practices from Ukraine, such as acoustic listening systems to detect drones and stockpiles of first-person view drones to intercept Russian drones. With these efforts, all viable within the limitations of current spending and technology, the Baltic Defense Line will ensure the survivability of Baltic capabilities even if Russia can initially mass superior forces.

The Sword: The Counterattack

NATO must be ready for Russia to penetrate the Baltic Defense Line. Estonia’s General Martin Herem explained, “The idea, of course, is not to stop the Russia[n forces]. . . . The idea is actually to shape [the invasion].”^[22] NATO will not be able to create and consistently man an impenetrable line of defense.

Instead, NATO should employ an elastic defense. Russia may be able to break through sections of the frontier defenses, but NATO needs mechanized forces ready to rapidly counterattack to reseize the initiative and defeat any penetrations before they can expand or establish a coherent defense. When Germany developed the elastic defense in World War I, it recognized that speed was its essence. Field Marshall Erich Ludendorff wrote on the elastic defense that “the immediate counterattack acquires decisive importance. . . . It is the most effective and the most economical method, both of human lives and of ammunition, of restoring the situation quickly and decisively.”^[23] Given a few hours, an attacking enemy that had culminated could begin establishing a coherent defense. NATO forces will need to counterattack Russian breakthroughs before they reorganize, dig in, emplace obstacles, establish command posts and bring forward reserves. If NATO forces wait, they will trade time for blood. Ukraine has been successful in offenses against unprepared Russian forces in Kharkiv and Kursk. But, when Russia establishes a defense-in-depth, it has proved costly to dislodge.

In each Baltic state, at least one mechanized brigade should be positioned to rapidly counterattack any breakthroughs. It will need to maintain a high state of readiness and regularly rehearse its mission. In 1940, France had an opportunity to defeat Germany’s overstretched Panzer units by counterattacking their flank with its 2nd Armored Division. However, the plan for the attack was hastily issued and unrehearsed. Scattered on different trains, the division arrived disorganized and piecemeal. Instead of changing the course of the Battle of France, it disintegrated.^[24]

NATO can prevent such a fate for its counterattack forces by transitioning from rotational to permanent units in the Baltic. Permanent units can repeatedly rehearse their roles to ensure their readiness. Until recently, NATO had relied on rotational Enhanced Forward Presence battalions to augment each Baltic state. Germany has led the way in increasing readiness in the Baltic by establishing the 45th Panzer Brigade in Lithuania. NATO needs similar formations in each Baltic state to provide the backbone for counterattack forces.

Additionally, NATO will need units ready to react to Russian air assaults. In its campaign in the south, Russia effectively landed forces by helicopter to seize bridges and other key terrain, most notably the Antonivka bridge of the Dnieper River.^[25]

Refine Plans

To ensure that the Battle Defense Line and counterattack forces are properly employed, NATO needs to continue to refine its regional plan to defend the Baltic to provide a unity of effort between all forces. Units should all know their area of operations to ensure no gaps in the Baltic Defense Line and to facilitate adjacent unit coordination. They need to rehearse branch plans to ensure readiness to counter different Russian courses of action.

Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) should move beyond command post exercises and lead large-scale force-on-force exercises that incorporate Baltic divisions and brigades to identify and alleviate the friction of commanding and controlling multiple nations. During the Cold War, NATO conducted such exercises, but now it relies on sterile and controlled simulations. With permanent units such as the 45th Panzer Brigade participating in such exercises, MNC-NE could solidify techniques for how it and subordinate units will fight, particularly around command and control structures, intelligence, fires and sustainment; too often, in current exercises, simulations allow these issues to be handwaved or approached conceptually, without validating the details and practicality of solutions.

In southern Ukraine, Sokolov did not have time to conduct large-scale training before Russia’s invasion; this meant that his units lacked a common understanding of how they would fight.^[26] Only by establishing clear standard operating procedures will MNC-NE and units in the Baltic be ready to defeat Russian forces that attempt to exploit strategic surprise. Units should understand their role so well that Russian cyber or electronic warfare attacks should not disrupt the execution of NATO’s plans.

Beyond MNC-NE, NATO needs to ensure that all members of the alliance understand their responsibilities in a fight over the Baltic. NATO should establish detailed mobilization and deployment timelines for members to outpace the rate of Russian reinforcement, to maintain momentum of counterattacks, and to establish a sufficient force density to deny Russia an opportunity to achieve a breakthrough. Unfortunately, alternative regional and national defense plans distract members from planning and rehearsing to employ forces in the Baltic. Members too often train against fanciful scenarios instead of preparing to deploy to defend against NATO’s most likely flashpoint.

Develop an Appropriate Operating Concept

As NATO refines its plans and learns from large-scale exercises in the Baltic, it will be able to develop a new operating concept for how it will fight Russia. After the U.S. Army adopted Active Defense in 1976, General Donn Starry, the commander of V Corps in Central Europe, recognized that Active Defense failed in two ways. It neither addressed how the Warsaw Pact would employ its second echelon forces, nor did it provide a means to threaten the Soviet Union with a counterattack that could liberate its satellite states.^[27] Starry initially developed Central Battle as an alternative concept for how V Corps would fight, using a detailed understanding of Warsaw Pact mobilization rates. When he assumed command of Training and Doctrine Command, he imported the ideas of Central Battle, which eventually became AirLand Battle.

Similarly, NATO should establish its doctrine based on an operating concept optimized to defend the Baltic. The U.S. Army’s current doctrine of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is not grounded in such a specific context.^[28] While the initial development of the concept focused on how to counterattack against Russian aggression, it focused on the problem of anti-access / area denial (A2/AD), which was a preoccupation of the U.S. Navy in a war with China.^[29] It was never a concept of how Russia would fight.^[30] To overcome A2/AD and enable a counterattack, MDO focused on achieving convergence.

MDO provides little guidance on how to deny an initial enemy victory or to counterattack at a tempo that prevents an enemy from establishing a coherent defense. NATO needs to develop an operating concept that supports how to fight in the Baltic to prevent a fait accompli. For example, instead of the 72–96 hour targeting process employed by the U.S. Army to meet U.S. Air Force requirements, NATO needs a quicker, more flexible process to blunt Russia’s initial thrusts and support rapid counterattacks on an initially fluid battlefield. While the U.S. Army has centralized fires assets in divisions, which might increase efficiency, this approach comes at the cost of responsiveness.^[31] NATO should instead follow Ukraine’s example. Ukraine has decentralized fires, placing most systems in direct support of brigades and battalions, to achieve artillery response times of under three minutes. With an appropriate operating concept informing the doctrine of how NATO will fight in the Baltic, NATO forces from across its member states can contribute to denying a Russian fait accompli.

Conclusion: A Viable, Economic Defense

Ukraine was able to blunt Russia’s invasion in the north and east, but in the poorly prepared south, Russia made rapid advances that have set the context for the past more than three years of war. With a couple more brigades and an increased investment in obstacles, Ukraine likely could have parried Russia’s deep thrusts.

Learning from Ukraine, with the right, cost-effective investments, NATO can deny Putin any potential payoff that would come from exploiting strategic surprise in the Baltic. NATO can conduct an effective defense of the Baltic using existing technologies and by reprioritizing current forces. With continuing investments into the Baltic Defense Line, the establishment of high-readiness counterattack brigades, and regular large-scale exercises, NATO will be well postured to deter, and if necessary, to defeat any gamble Putin would make in the Baltic.

★  ★  ★  ★

Author Biography

Major Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, commands Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He was an inaugural Lieutenant General (Ret) James M. Dubik Writing Fellow and holds an undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and graduate degrees from Harvard University and, as a Gates Scholar, from Cambridge University.

• [1] David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.
• [2] Jim Garamone, “Milley Dispels ‘Myths of War,’” DoD News, 9 August 2019, https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1930799/milley-dispels-myths-of-war/.
• [3] Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–39 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985).
• [4] I am focusing on interstate war and not accounting for insurgencies.
• [5] John R. Deni, “NATO’s in denial about deterrence by denial,” Politico, 8 July 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-us-army-chinese-government-defense-war-europe-allies-cold-war-russia-poland/.
• [6] Marta Kepe, “From Forward Presence to Forward Defense: NATO’s Defense of the Baltics,” RAND Corporation, 14 February 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/02/from-forward-presence-to-forward-defense-natos-defense.html.
• [7] Jens Stoltenberg, “Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the joint meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) followed by an exchange of views with Members of the European Parliament,” NATO, 7 September 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_218172.htm.
• [8] Wendell Steavenson and Maris Hellrand, “Putin’s next target,” 1843 Magazine, The Economist, 13 June 2024, https://economist.com/1843/2025/06/13/putins-next-target.
• [9] Edward N. Luttwak and Eitan Shamir, The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the Israel Defense Forces (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2023), 6.
• [10] Robert Rose, “Biting Off What it Can Chew: Ukraine Understands its Attritional Context,” War on the Rocks, 26 September 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting-off-what-it-can-chew-ukraine-understands-its-attritional-context/.
• [11] Sonia Lukashova and Yevhen Budersatskyi, “Major General Andrii Sokolov was in charge of the defence of Ukraine’s south. An interview covering Chonhar, Kherson and Melitopol,” Ukrainska Pravda, 18 September 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/18/7420200/.
• [12] Sonia Lukashova, “Reconstructing chronology of how Ukraine’s Armed Forces prepared to defend the south, mined Chonhar and fought for Kherson Oblast,” Ukrainska Pravda, 21 September 2023,
• https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2023/09/21/7420733/.
• [13] “Estonian Defence Forces,” Joint Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces, 10 September 2024, https://mil.ee/en/defence-forces/.
• [14] Lukas Milevski, “The Baltic Defense Line,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2 February 2024, https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/02/the-baltic-defense-line/.
• [15] Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990), 122.
• [16] T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1963), 67.
• [17] “Estonia to build 600 bunkers along Russian border,” ERR News, 19 January 2024, https://news.err.ee/1609227386/estonia-to-build-600-bunkers-along-russian-border.
• [18] Lukashova, “Reconstructing chronology of how Ukraine’s Armed Forces prepared to defend the south.”
• [19] G.C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West 1915-1917 (Uckfield, UK: The Naval & Military Press Ltd., 1940), 113–125.
• [20] United24, “Two Days with an Artillery Unit of the 154th Mechanized Brigade. 2S1 Gvozdika near Vovchansk,” 20 December 2024, video, 19:13, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NxNkMrt44zI&t=30s.
• [21] In interviews with Ukrainian battalion commanders, they noted that they had only jumped command posts once throughout 2024. An instructor on command posts at Ukraine’s National Defense University echoed their comments.
• [22] Lee Ferran, “Baltic defensive bunker line not meant to stop Russian attack, but ‘shape’ it: General,” Breaking Defense, 1 July 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/baltic-defensive-bunker-line-not-meant-to-stop-russian-attack-but-shape-it-general/.
• [23] Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 155–156.
• [24] Doughty, The Breaking Point, 335–356.
• [25] Lukashova, “Reconstructing chronology of how Ukraine’s Armed Forces prepared to defend the south.”
• [26] Lukashova, “Reconstructing chronology of how Ukraine’s Armed Forces prepared to defend the south.”
• [27] Donn A. Starry, “Extending the Battlefield,” Military Review (March 1981), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/online-publications/documents/1981-mr-donn-starry-extending-the-battlefield.pdf.
• [28] Robert G. Rose, “Returning Context to Our Doctrine,” Military Review (October 2023), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2023-ole/returning-context-to-our-doctrine/.
• [29] John Richardson, “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson: Deconstructing A2AD,” The National Interest, 3 October 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chief-naval-operations-adm-john-richardson-deconstructing-17918.
• [30] Michael Kofman, “It’s Time to Talk about A2/AD: Rethinking the Russian Military Challenge,” War on the Rocks, 5 September 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge/.
• [31] I participated in a “Division in the Dirt” rotation at the National Training Center, which revealed that centralizing fires assets and targeting processes yielded response times that were far too slow for a fluid battlefield. During the interwar years, France also centralized artillery in its doctrine of “Methodical Battle,” which impeded agile artillery support to counter German’s maneuver warfare.