Introduction

Kinetic drone (KD) strikes (dropped or loitering munitions), as observed in open-source media, have hit more vehicles than any other type of weapon system in the Russo-Ukrainian War.^[1] The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), which collates this data from open-source feeds, states that from 24 February 2022 to 31 July 2024, KD strikes accounted for 42.47 percent of all combat damaged vehicles where the weapon could be identified, followed by artillery at 24.28 percent; armored fighting vehicle main gun/cannon accounted for only 1.09 percent of vehicle hits.^[2] The dawn of tactical drone warfare is here. Keen observers during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) foresaw the advent of trench warfare that would come to fruition a mere decade later in World War I. The Russo-Ukrainian War clearly displays the advent of KD warfare, and it behooves the U.S. Army to make critical changes today. The U.S. Army must lead this effort and integrate tactical KDs at scale before the next major conflict. This paper serves to use the Japanese Navy’s transition from the battleship to the aircraft carrier (in the Kidō Butai) as an analogical case study; to consider current drone technologies, capabilities and usage (primarily in Ukraine); and to provide recommendations for the integration of KDs into the combined-arms battalion (CAB).

Parameters and Rebuttals

The arguments against drone warfare are plenty. From ethical concerns to misplaced nostalgia, the U.S. Army is familiar with challenges and obstacles associated with integrating new technologies in a timely manner. Whatever the arguments are against the full and rapid integration of drone technology and concepts at scale, leaders must understand that the lack of urgency can have devastating consequences. The U.S. Navy’s inability to understand the transition from the battleship to the aircraft carrier resulted in 2,304 killed in action and 19 ships destroyed at Pearl Harbor.

Parameter #1: This paper focuses solely on the integration of kinetic drones. Kinetic drones are defined as low-cost, weigh less than 75 lb. (this disqualifies the Iranian Shahed-136) and are fitted with payloads for the purpose of destroying enemy capabilities. The thought experiment stays away from using drones as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or fire-support assets. The structure in exploring and adapting kinetic drones at scale can easily be transferable to ISR or fire-support capabilities.

Parameter #2: The paper acknowledges that the U.S. Army faces personnel and funding challenges. It will provide a force construct that is not additive but net equal. It will not exceed the force structure of a CAB as provided by the U.S. Army’s Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.

Parameter #3: The integration of unmanned kinetic vehicles into the combat force structure is inevitable. The integration of unmanned tanks is outside the purview of this paper, but one can easily imagine replacing manned tanks with unmanned tanks, therefore answering manning challenges and decreasing risk to our nation’s Soldiers.

Rebuttal to Argument: Drone warfare is an evolution, not a revolution, in warfare; its impact will be incremental. The nature of war has not changed and will not change.

Reluctance to integrate new technologies happens every interwar period. Misplaced nostalgia is the antithesis to innovation. For the U.S. Army, adoption is difficult and slow. This paper is less concerned with how we label drone warfare: “revolution,” “innovation,” “evolution,” etc. This paper assumes that drones will flood the skies in the U.S. Army’s next significant conflict. It is easy to dismiss the advent of drone warfare as many believe that it will not fundamentally change how battles are fought. But that belief only remains until our Soldiers begin to die in droves during the next conflict. This paper errs on the side of caution and looks to mitigate this dire consequence.

Rebuttal to Argument: Although drones will be part of future conflicts, they do not fundamentally change the focus or purpose of U.S. Army formations at the tactical level. Combined-arms warfare, as currently practiced, can mitigate the risk.

The U.S. Army is too slow in integrating low-cost drones at scale. Providing quadcopters to reconnaissance formations and fire observers is great, but it is not sufficient. Senior leaders are cognizant of the integration of kinetic drone capabilities in current conflicts. Adapting the “React to Air” contact battle drill is not a sufficient answer to address the future threat. This paper forces serious consideration of full-scale integration by replacing significant force structure in a CAB with a drone formation.

Rebuttal to Argument: Drones cannot fly in adverse weather conditions.

This is a legitimate concern but one that has not discouraged the integration of kinetic drones in current conflicts. Drone warfare can be observed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. While weather conditions are a critical obstacle, the dismissal of integrating drones at full scale because of it is an ineffective argument. Many first-person view drones in use today can function in extreme weather.

Rebuttal to Argument: Electromagnetic warfare (EW) countermeasures negate drone effectiveness.

The notion that EW capabilities negate drone usage is a moot point. While EW is a concern, it has not impeded the effectiveness of drones in current conflicts. Technological advances and the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) has mitigated the effectiveness of EW countermeasures. Jamming occurs in two ways: (1) transmitting strong signals that override original satellite signals (preventing their reception) or (2) transmitting deceptive signals (spoofing) that provide false information to the drone’s receptor, leading it to believe it is in a different location.^[3]

Two companies have developed innovative solutions to address EW countermeasures. Asio Technologies produced the AeroGuardian,a vision-based navigation system drone, that is low weight (as low as 90 g.), all-weather capable and cannot be interrupted or jammed.^[4]

Auterion, a Switzerland-based company, developed a drone that uses a compact, low-cost chip called the Skynode S, which enables drones to bypass EW countermeasures. Already used in the Russo-Ukrainian War, it integrates AI and computer vision applications at scale to provide swarm control, fully autonomous flight and the ability to bypass loss of GPS and radio frequencies.

Analogical Case Study: Kidō Butai

The transition from the battleship to the aircraft carrier, and the development of the aircraft carrier group as the focal point of sea operations, revolutionized naval warfare. This fundamental change was most clearly seen on the morning of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor. Jonathan Parshall and J. Michael Wenger, in their article “Pearl Harbor’s Overlooked Answer,” write,

The most important facet of the Japanese attack—the thing that made it so stunning—was the sheer number of aircraft involved. The Japanese did not just assault Pearl Harbor; they simultaneously hit every major airfield across the breadth of Oahu—Ewa Mooring Mast Field, Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and others. . . . Simultaneously hitting so many targets required massive numbers of planes—183 and 171 in the two attack waves. That was unprecedented.

In fact, Kido Butai [Japan’s carrier force] was a truly revolutionary weapon system for its time because it embodied the conceptual leap from single-carrier to coordinated multicarrier operations.^[7]

What aviation brought to naval warfare was the ability to strike enemy ships and bases from the sea (increase range) and gain information about the enemy.^[8] The transition from battleship to carrier is most clearly seen from 1942 to 1948. Table 1 depicts the U.S. Navy’s active ship force levels during this period.

Table 1

U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1942–1948^[9]

Lieutenant Commander Minoru Genda spearheaded the development of concepts and doctrine for the Kidō Butai after seeing a newsreel of U.S. aircraft carriers on TV. Through a series of efforts, he influenced Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, who in turn created the First Air Fleet on 1 April 1942. For the first time in history, there existed a carrier force comprised of enough aircraft to attack enemy fleets and enemy bases. This was revolutionary. The speed of change caught the U.S. military off guard. Parshall and Wenger describe the emergence “of an enemy carrier force whose capabilities in late 1941 were mutating almost overnight. The Kidō Butai of December 1941 was entirely different from the force that began exercising together in the summer of that year.”^[10]

In modern U.S. Navy carrier air operations, a carrier strike group normally consists of one aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, two antiaircraft warships and one to two antisubmarine destroyers or frigates.^[11] There are several key learning points from this case study. First, drone technology may shift the structure of tactical land warfare. Although combined-arms warfare may not change, the tools available to close-in with and destroy the enemy will. Second, the development of the Kidō Butai force structure and its accompanying doctrine is a relevant case study on the integration of new technologies into a force. The U.S. CAB force structure is heavily organized around the M1 Abrams Tank, the U.S. Army’s “battleship.” What would the CAB construct look like if half of its tanks were replaced with KDs? How must the U.S. Army adjust its doctrine, organization, training and personnel to adapt to this change? Perhaps there is great value, even as a thought experiment, in considering replacing a tank company with a KD company. Finally, the speed with which the Japanese Navy transitioned doctrine, personnel, training and equipment to support the Kidō Butai construct ought to be studied. There was a holistic approach pushed with urgency from senior leaders in order to produce innovative change. The Army must look into the integration of kinetic drones at scale in the CAB.

Kinetic Drone Technology and Usage

Although technology develops at incredible speeds, it is important to have a snapshot in time to build an analytic framework. It is human nature to flippantly dismiss nuanced and complex concepts when uninformed. It is feasible to create a kinetic combat drone formation with existing technologies today. The following are examples of KDs currently in use, with a focus on the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Russo-Ukrainian War

Drone warfare has increased and evolved throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War. Both Russia and Ukraine have successfully used loitering munitions. China has been closely keeping watch on the use of kinetic drones. The RAND Corporation reported in November 2023 that an article titled “The Little Pests that Patrol the Battlefield,” from the Chinese military periodical Weapons, enumerates the lessons that Chinese strategists have learned. In the article, a Chinese analyst states, “despite their small size, loitering munitions have achieved big results in the Ukrainian large-scale war of attrition.”^[12]

The NGIC produces monthly threat reports tracking combat incidents involving armored fighting vehicles, equipment and personnel in the ongoing conflict. All data is collated from open-source social media and news platforms. Figure 1 shows their trend analysis of the number of vehicles hit per identified weapon system from 24 February 2022 to 31 July 2024.

Figure 1

Number of Vehicles Hit per Weapon System, February 2022–July 2024^[13]

The data makes clear the significance of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) strikes on vehicles. While armored fighting vehicle main gun/cannon hit 78 vehicles, UAS had 3,028 strikes. Of the number of vehicles struck by identified weapons, the largest percentage were hit by UAS (42.47 percent), followed by artillery (24.28 percent). July 2024 had the highest monthly total number of observed vehicles damaged by drones since the conflict began. Trends in loitering munition (LM) and dropped munition strikes against vehicles show operators are consistently striking moving vehicles and are almost certainly growing in capability and confidence to do so.^[14]

The NGIC report further highlights that Ukraine has outpaced Russia in the number of UAS dropped munitions and LM incidents targeting vehicles since July 2023. There are two types of KD attacks: dropped munitions and loitering munitions. When compared against each other, the number of LM strikes against vehicles (3,045) is significantly greater than the number of UAS dropped munition strikes targeting vehicles (584) since the start of the conflict. The NGIC notes that the capability of LMs gives UAS operators a cost-effective and more manageable approach to target both stationary and moving vehicles across the battlefield. Of the LMs, the Russian Lancet, equipped with a KZ-6 demolition (shaped) charge, was the most identified LM, accounting for 13 percent of LM incidents targeting vehicles.^[15]

The Russian website LostArmour collects and analyzes videos of Lancet drone strikes from Telegram feeds.^[16] As of September 2024, the site documented 2,368 Lancet drone strikes, of which 127 hit moving targets and 336 used thermal imaging cameras (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Lancet Drone Strikes Analysis, September 2024 ^[17]

As shown in Table 2, of the strikes, artillery platforms accounted for the top three spots, followed by tanks and light armored vehicles.^[18]

Table 2

# of Vehicle Types Hit by Lancet Strikes^[19]

KD Capabilities and Usage

KD capabilities have improved drastically and quickly because of real-world demands. The United States, Russia, Ukraine, Iran and Israel, among others, have quickly developed and integrated KDs in local and global conflicts. Unlike the Shahed or Gray Eagle, these are lower-cost drones, weighing less than 75 lb., that are used as tactical direct-fire weapon systems. Table 3 provides a snapshot of current KD platforms, including the Russian Lancet-3, Ukrainian PD-2, Israeli Mini Harpy and the U.S. Altius 600M, Switchblade 600 and CyberLux K8. From these examples, one can get a sense of KD capabilities that exist today (operational range and altitude, loiter time, weight, payload, endurance, etc.).

Table 3

KD Specifications

Recommendations

KDs enhance the capability to conduct combined-arms warfare and mitigate several risks seen on the battlefield today. Primarily, the integration of KDs at the tactical level mitigates the max effective range of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and allows the commander to better set conditions for armored formations to seize terrain or destroy the enemy.

Recommendation #1: Replace a tank company with a KD company in the CAB

The main battle tank (MBT) will remain the centerpiece of land warfare for the foreseeable future. However, the environment from which it operates is shifting. The max effective range of the M1 Abrams Tank is 2.5+ km.^[20] There are direct-fire capabilities on the battlefield, primarily ATGMs and KDs, that exceed this range and present significant risk to the MBT. For example, the 9M133 Kornet-EM has an operational range of 10 km.^[21] ATGMs and KDs must be addressed. In order to set conditions for the MBT to seize terrain or close-in with the enemy to destroy, the tactical commander needs solutions with greater direct-fire range.

It is difficult to recommend additive force construct changes. Ideally, one would keep the current force structure of a CAB and just add a KD company. However, given the realities of manpower and funding struggles, this paper recommends replacing a tank company with a KD company in the CAB. Simply creating a single company for the brigade (much like the heavy weapons company for a Stryker brigade) or integrating a specialty KD platoon in the CAB is insufficient; KD capabilities demand greater force structure integration. With the recommended change, the CAB transitions to the construct shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

Task Organization Replacing 1 Tank Company with 1 KD Company

---

• HHC: Headquarters and headquarters company
• Tank CO: Tank company
• Mech IN: Mechanized infantry
• FSC: Forward support company
• KD CO: Kinetic drone company

 

The KD company would be comprised of a headquarters element (company commander, executive officer and first sergeant) and three platoons, each consisting of four KD launch and command and control (C2) platforms (Figure 4).

Figure 4

Platform Breakdown of KD CO

This totals 14 launch/C2 platforms, each comprised of six Altius 600 or Switchblade 600–like capsule launch KDs. According to Anduril, the Altius provides a multi-domain launch capability across air, land and sea. Its drones can leverage various standardized launch systems and can integrate onto a variety of platforms and vehicles, such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Minus the payload, the Altius 600M weighs 27 lb. and can loiter for up to 4 hours.^[22]

The Switchblade 600 loitering munition features high-precision optics, more than 40 minutes of loitering time and can be set up and operational in less than 10 minutes. It is deployed through tube-launch, has a range of 24.9 miles and reaches speeds up to 115 mph.^[24]

In 2022, the Army’s culminating display for Experimental Demonstration Gateway Exercise (EDGE 22) was the deployment of a 28-drone swarm (all Altius 600 drones) controlled by a single operator.^[26] Providing each launch/C2 platform with six KDs allows the platoon to deploy three waves of 28 drones, or 84 drones total. Each launch platform has C2 capability where the drone operator can control the drones launched from its tubes. C2 can be consolidated in any of the C2 platforms, providing redundancy and the flexibility to coordinate attacks. An example of a launch/C2 platform is the Rheinmetal Mission Master Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) system based out of Germany.

Providing a commander 14 launch/C2 platforms that control 84 KDs with payloads offers greater firepower and flexibility than the traditional 14-tank company. The CAB should replace one of its tank companies with a KD company. This change comes with second- and third-order effects. Does the Army need a new military occupational specialty (MOS)? Currently, Army aviation (15 series) owns the drone fight—and rightfully so, given the focus on operational drones (Shadow and Gray Eagle). The Armor Branch must create a new MOS, 19U Kinetic Drone Operator, to fill this requirement. The difference in training required of an ISR drone operator versus a KD operator is too great. Getting trained Soldiers will be one of the most challenging obstacles as the Army considers doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities implications.

Replacing a tank company with a KD company greatly enhances the CAB’s ability to destroy the enemy. With the change, the CAB would possess the weapon systems shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

Major Weapon Systems, Max Effective Range ^[27]

Recommendation #2: Resource scout platoons to win the counter-small unmanned aerial system (CUAS) fight

The Army decided to inactivate cavalry squadrons in U.S.-based Stryker and infantry brigade combat teams.^[28] This move is significant and conveys a substantial decrease in the Army’s need for or belief in ground reconnaissance units. The adjustment does not come as a surprise as unmanned ISR capabilities have improved exponentially over the past decade. However, the Army decided to keep scout platoons in the CAB. The scout platoon is critical to the CAB mission set, because they determine conditions for the battalion fight, primarily answering priority intelligence requirements and reducing enemy combat power.

The next conflict will have drones flooding the skies. With the emergence of KDs, it is important for the CAB to possess counter-small UAS (CUAS) capabilities. This fight must be the responsibility of the scout platoon. A scout platoon armed with a combination of ISR drones, KDs and CUAS drones will allow the commander to set conditions to mass firepower on the battlefield. DoD published its Counter-Small UAS (CUAS) Strategy in 2021 with three objectives: (1) enhance the joint force through innovation and collaboration to protect DoD personnel, assets and facilities in the homeland, host nations and continency locations; (2) develop materiel and non-materiel solutions that facilitate the safe and secure execution of DoD missions and deny adversaries the ability to impede our objectives; and (3) build and broaden relationships with allies and partners to protect our interests at home and abroad.^[29]

KDs present a unique challenge as it exists in the gap between air defense, force protection and airspace control.^[30] The following are two examples of CUAS drones that can be implemented into the scout platoon.

Anduril Anvil

The Anvil seeks and destroys enemy drones. It navigates autonomously to intercept potential drone threats and provide visual feedback for positive identification by a human operator. The Anvil-M is a munition variant that can increase effectiveness against KDs.^[31]

Lockheed Martin Morfius

The Morfius is a reusable, loitering and tube-launched interceptor equipped with an onboard seeker and a compact, high-power microwave effector to execute non-kinetic defeat of drones, including complex swarms.^[32]

 

In a CAB, the scout platoon is responsible for reconnaissance and security operations, observing named areas of interest, anticipating and informing battalion decisions, reporting battlefield effects, reducing the fog of war for companies, countering enemy combat power and leading transitions. Given this mission set, the scout platoon is best tailored to execute the CUAS fight.

Recommendation #3: Integrate KDs to mitigate the effectiveness of ATGMs

U.S. armored formations must regain the direct-fire standoff (DFSO) advantage. The discrepancy in the max effective range of an MBT and a shoulder-fired ATGM (Figure 6) remains a significant risk to armored formations on the battlefield. KDs allow U.S. armored formations to regain the DFSO advantage and enable commanders to set conditions before massing firepower.

Figure 6

ATGM Direct-Fire Standoff Advantage, Max Effective Range ^[33]

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Missile and Space Intelligence Center open-source database, more than 1,300 ATGM firings have been observed in Ukraine since February 2022.^[34] Russian ground forces have adjusted their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) by moving ATGM teams away from large- to low-signature vehicles (pickup trucks, ATVs, etc.) and have displayed salvo fire launchers and TTPs where multiple ATGMs are fired near simultaneously at the same target. There has also been an increase of newer ATGM technologies like the 9M127 Vikhr’-1 (AT-16 Scallion) and Article 305 (LMUR), which are fired from rotary and fixed-wing aircraft.^[35] The Vikhr’-1 is a Russian laser beam–rider ATGM that can be launched from aircraft like the Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters and Su-25T fixed-wing ground attack aircraft. The missile is designed to engage small ground targets, including armored targets fitted with built-in and add-on explosive reactive armor, at a range of up to 10 km.^[36] The Article 305 (LMUR) is a command terminal homing ATGM that can strike targets with a 25 kg. warhead at ranges in excess of 20 km. It provides a radio frequency data link between the operator and missile, which allows for midflight target changes.^[37]

The ATGM is a critical threat to armored formations and platforms. As the max effective range of ATGMs increase, armored platforms are challenged to close-in with and destroy the enemy. There are numerous soft (e.g., laser warning systems) and hard-kill (e.g., armor protection systems) capabilities that are being developed to combat this threat. KDs must be considered when developing a solution to combat the ATGM threat.

Recommendation #4: Augment KDs with AI to gain comparative advantage

AI KDs have carried out attacks in Ukraine.^[38] Private and military formations have integrated AI to execute three primary tasks: (1) AI-assisted visual identification, (2) AI-assisted navigation and (3) AI-assisted autonomous strikes. Integrating AI removes the need for connection between the operator and the KD during the engagement phase, therefore negating jamming measures. Once the AI tracking system takes over, the drone can cut its signal between itself and the operator. The Saker company, founded in 2021, develops drone-equipped, AI-assisted target modules to help operators spot vehicles concealed by vegetation or camouflage.^[39] Saker’s software is based on machine learning and can recognize up to 64 different types of military objects, including tanks and personnel carriers.^[40] The software is also capable of visual navigation using known landmarks; a drone can find its way even without GPS.^[41]

Operationalizing neural networks at the kinetic level allows for AI-assisted target lock, therefore increasing the speed of a system’s “kill-chain” mechanism at machine-level speeds. An AI enabled ISR drone can serve as the “hunter” proponent with KD drones to create significant hunter-killer capabilities. AI can identify a target and automatically lock itself or another KD drone to the objective, at which point an operator can approve the strike. Furthermore, AI can completely remove human interaction from the loop, positively identifying the target and placing a kinetic strike on the objective.^[42]

Conclusion

Autonomous KDs are inevitable. This is a problem set that U.S. Army formations will face in the next major conflict. Not leveraging or adapting to this capability will have dire consequences. Autonomous direct-fire capabilities will be leveraged in multiple domains, and the U.S. Army must integrate these systems at scale to prepare for future operations. History has shown that it is easy for military leaders to miscalculate advancements in technology. In his thesis, “Lessons Learned from the Use of the Machine Gun During the Russo-Japanese War and the Application of Those Lessons by the Protagonists of World War I,” Lieutenant Commander Daniel J. Kenda, USN, writes,

Certainly, all of the military leaders between 1862 and 1914 were doing their utmost to properly man, train and equip their armies for success in future conflicts. They were diligent, professional and dedicated to the service of their nations. None of the armies in this study intentionally stifled internal debate nor did they willfully embark upon a course of action with regard to the machine gun that they knew was faulty. However, despite the impact of the Russo-Japanese War, the combination of their prevalent military tactical culture, bureaucratic pragmatism and logistic concerns led these leaders to all arrive at a conclusion that was different in the details but broadly similar in sum. This conclusion was that the machine gun might be worth having in the inventory, but effective as it could be under the proper set of circumstances, it would in no way alter the fundamental calculus of land warfare and thus was not a top priority for funding or the development of doctrine for its application.^[43]

Interwar periods provide a complex combination of priorities and mission sets bound by cognitive bias and skewed frameworks. It is the responsibility of Army leaders to be aware of these shortcomings and develop a clear vision for future warfare. Current global conflicts give us valuable insights to the shifting nature of the operational environment. What the U.S. Army cannot afford to do, because the well-being of its Soldiers hangs in the balance, is to be surprised by the significant impact of drones in the next conflict.

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Author Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Kim currently serves as an Operations Planner for the Joint Planning Support Element, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Prior to his current position, he served as the Battalion Commander for the 2d Battalion, 70th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division. He was commissioned as an officer in the United States Army upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 2005. He holds a Master of Military Arts and Science (Art of War Scholar) from the Command and General Staff College and Master of Engineering in Systems Engineering from Cornell University.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Dean Nowowiejski for his mentorship and guidance. My experience as an Art of War Scholar under his leadership at the Command and General Staff College encouraged me to explore, question and share warfighting concepts. Sir, congratulations on an incredible career of service and best wishes to you and your family. I would also like to thank MAJ Shawn Scott (Defense Intelligence Agency/Missile and Space Intelligence Center) and Mr. Jeffrey Ickes (National Ground Intelligence Center/Combat Analysis Branch) for their inputs and assistance in my quest to analyze the kinetic drone problem set.

 

Notes