Introduction

Modernization is moving quickly. And rightfully so. With wars of varying scope and scale raging in Ukraine, Gaza and Syria, including many other places across the globe, the Army must stay attuned to evolving threats, tactics and technologies. Add to the mix the elements of strategic competition with powers like China and Iran, and the Army has many challenges for 21st century war for which it must not only keep pace with its adversaries but also must decidedly outpace those opponents.

The 2021 Army Modernization Strategy (AMS) provides for five focal areas: future vertical lift (FVL), long-range precision fires (LRPF), network, next-generation combat vehicle and Soldier lethality.^[1] In September 2024, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth stated that the Army is addressing its modernization strategy in three-time frames: (1) the here and now, (2) ten years out and (3) the 2040 period.^[2] The long-awaited Army Warfighting Concept for 2040 (AWC 2040), which has been in the works for more than three years, is the primary way that the Army intends to communicate how it foresees organizing, equipping and operating in accordance with the AWC for 2040.^[3]

General Randy George, Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA), has built upon Wormuth’s statements by emphasizing that networks are the Army’s top modernization priority.^[4] According to George, the move to make the network the Army’s number one priority is because of its central position across each of the Army’s other five modernization areas.^[5] In addition to asking if the Army possesses a new piece of battlefield kit seen on some far away battlefield, Army modernization can be gauged in relation to how well it aligns—or does not align—with what is winning and losing on contemporary battlefields. Setting aside the hype surrounding certain abilities such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), LRPF and network-centric warfare, and instead examining how land forces fight and win on the battlefield, is another tool for cross-checking Army modernization. This article takes a bit from each of those buckets—institutional modernization programs and battlefield success and failure—and provides a brief update on the status of Army modernization.

Army modernization, according to an array of reporting, had a rough 2024. For example, the Army cancelled several of its key programs across many lines of modernization. In addition, the Army took a big bite out of its force structure, and in doing so, cut significant portions of its long-standing competencies, as well as new capabilities. According to multiple analysts, constriction is the exact wrong thing that the Army should be doing, considering the wide array of threats, theaters and challenges that the U.S. military must address, or might have to address, in relative short order.^[6] This article examines Army modernization in 2024 specifically by looking at two of the AMS’ five focal areas: FVL and LRPF. Furthermore, considering the magnitude of the Army’s 2024 force reductions, this article also looks at elements of proposed Army force structure modernization that were either overtly eliminated, or that just quietly went away. Lastly, this article looks at modernization from the position of ongoing conflicts. Yet, in doing so, it does not join the consensus of many of the thoughts pertaining to UAS and other seemingly novel features of 21st century battlefields. Instead, it looks at why land forces exist and offers that as a lens through which to gauge Army modernization. This article closes with a handful of recommendations for policymakers and senior military leaders involved in modernizing the Army.

Highlights from On-Going Army Modernization

Force Structure

The Army is in the process of transitioning from a land warfare centric force, composed of self-sufficient brigades and divisions, to a force geared to protect and support the joint force and coalition partners with an emphasis on artillery and drones. Taking perhaps the wrong lessons from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, the belief underwriting most force structure thinking today is that, combined, long-range fires, drones and an unblinking eye that links battlefield surveillance, target acquisition and munition delivery are the magic elixir that delivers battlefield victory.^[7] Tanks, infantry and other close-combat forces vigorously fighting along the front lines are a relic of the past; today, they can easily be swept aside by quadcopter UAS with a few grenades and supporting long-range fires.^[8] This change in force structure has not come about overnight. How has it happened?

In late 2021, the Army announced a set of new types of divisions to help differentiate the new from the old. The “WayPoint” force of 2028 and the Army 2030 were concepts created to help illustrate a gradual change from the existing force structure to an army of the future.^[9] There are five “new” divisions (1) the standard light, (2) the standard heavy, (3) the penetration, (4) the joint force entry air assault and (5) the joint force entry airborne divisions.^[10] The Army’s 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd Infantry Divisions test-piloted this endeavor.^[11]

The penetration division is instructive. It was one of Army 2030’s main structural changes. To bring this concept to reality, the Army: (1) plussed-up the engineer capability within the penetration division, (2) placed the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) within the formation, (3) replaced the brigade combat teams’ (BCTs) cavalry squadrons with a hefty division armored cavalry squadron and (4) added Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) and Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) to their division aviation brigades.^[12] The 1st Cavalry Division completely restructured to support this requirement and reorganized 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment to form the Division Cavalry Squadron.^[13]

Yet, in February 2024, the Army released a white paper on forthcoming force structure changes. These changes gutted engineer and ground reconnaissance capabilities across the Army. As the white paper notes, the Army will deactivate all the cavalry squadrons except for one of its Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) and all the cavalry squadrons in its Infantry BCTs (IBCTs).^[14] By July 2024, the Army had already deactivated most of these formations. For example, in late July 2024, Mary Shinn of The Colorado Springs Gazette reported that the Army cased the colors of the 4th Infantry Division’s 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment and 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.^[15] While the loss of IBCT and SBCT cavalry squadrons does not prevent the Army from supporting concepts such as the penetration division, the loss of engineers does. The white paper articulates the removal of BCT-level engineers and the consolidation of engineer capability at the division-level, allowing the Army to create personnel overhead by reducing its number of engineers. Doing so all but gutted the force structure required to bring the penetration division to fruition and to provide the armored and motorized BCTs with the general mobility, counter mobility and survivability tools that they need to subsist in large-scale combat operations against peer competitors. Moreover, the losses of vertical lift—discussed in the next section—also contribute to the weakening of future division-level force structure.

To the outsiders looking in, the loss of enabling capabilities might make them walk away scratching their heads. What is the space being made for? The Army has carved out cap space to further grow its defensive, fires-centric preference for warfare by growing its artillery backbone—at the expense of its close-combat forces. The Multi-Domain Task Force, or MDTF, is where most of the Army’s forthcoming growth will be. According to the Army’s white paper, it is looking to complete the building out of its five MDTFs.^[16] The MDTF is a theater-level formation that is:

Designed to increase the depth and scale at which Army forces can protect Joint and Coalition forces, conduct intelligence gathering and synchronization, deliver non-kinetic space and cyber effects to shape operations, and deliver long-range fires in support of joint force maneuver.^[17]

The rise of the MDTF, and it’s stated purpose, has facilitated—at least in part—the Army’s move to replace combined-arms reconnaissance formations, such as cavalry squadrons, with UAS and other types of sensors. A similar idea was attempted in the mid-2000s. The Army eliminated the Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) at the time because they were too heavy, too expensive and too lethal for the brief period of insurgency and counterinsurgency in which the Army found itself. In their place, the Army reconfigured three military intelligence brigades into battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSBs). The thinking was that BfSBs would basically do everything an ACR could do, at a fraction of the cost—and from the sky. It took only a few years to realize that the BfSB was not an effective force structure update; they were all quietly shuttered. While the Army has not tried to recreate the BfSB as such, many of the MDTF’s requirements do echo those of the BfSB.

The LRPF cross-functional team (CFT) is helping the Army to realize its MDTF plan. Jen Judson reports that the Army is reshuffling and reflagging some of the MDTF’s component units, but otherwise, the plan is on track.^[18] Judson notes that, during the coming year, one can expect to see an MDTF activated in Germany, with several of its subordinate units located in Fort Drum, New York.^[19] Judson’s reporting supports the noted force structure changes announced by the Army on 27 February 2024 in a published white paper: Army Force Structure Transformation.^[20]

The Army’s announced force structure changes forecast a significant decrease in offensive land forces and an equally significant increase in stand-off capabilities, such as LRPF. This move reflects the same conceptual underwriting that animates Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine. MDO is an artillery-centric, stand-off doctrine that seeks to find and destroy adversaries from far off distances without having to truly engage in close combat. The joining of MDO and the force structure changes outlined in Army Force Structure Transformation demonstrates that the Army is reorienting from a movement-centric force that is built around the longstanding concept of closing with and destroying adversaries to an attrition-centric strategy anchored on the idea that stand-off LRPF can eliminate an enemy force—all but nullifying the need to close with and destroy an adversarial force. This subtle move is perhaps one of the most significant Army modernization updates of 2024.

Thus, the Army’s February 2024 white paper appears to be the death knell for many of the WayPoint and Army 2030 force initiatives. Moreover, if one reads between the lines and truly follows the logic of force structure, they will find that the Army has sacrificed forward-positioned close combat (and combat-enabling) capability for a rear-focused, defensive, fires-centric strategy. Put another way, the Army’s force structure changes—which have hit the close combat forces quite hard—demonstrate a preference for defensive, attritional warfare. The AWC 2040 should help make sense of this seeming incongruence between existing doctrine, Army culture and emerging force structure. However, the Futures and Concepts Center has been working on the AWC 2040 for upward of four years. When—or if—the Army ever publishes the AWC 2040, it is worth examining how the concept developers squared this circle.

Future Vertical Lift

The Army’s cancellation of the FARA program is the most notable update to Army modernization pertaining to FVL. The FARA program was canceled in February 2024. The Congressional Research Service reports that the Army cancelled the program because of an increase in sophisticated air defense systems and the proliferation of UAS, suggesting that the Army intends to shift its focus from manned aerial reconnaissance systems to UAS.^[21] FARA’s cancellation is another in a long and expensive string of terminated Army helicopter programs, which includes the Comanche and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs.^[22]

The intent behind the FARA program was to replace the Kiowa scout helicopter and serve as an auxiliary to the FLRAA.^[23] In addition, FARA and FLRAA were supposed to share many internal parts to make them a more modular package and one that is easier to sustain than two entirely unique systems.^[24]

This situation comes at the time in which the Army—most notably Futures Command and Training and Doctrine Command—is wrestling with how to appropriately address operations in the air-ground littoral (AGL). The AGL is the airspace from the ground to a few thousand feet above it.^[25] If FARA and FLRAA were U.S.-minded efforts at how to address this space, the cancellation of FARA and the impending shift to a UAS-centric approach shows a decidedly Eastern European mindset. Specifically, instead of relying on the might of a few expensive but rugged and sophisticated combat systems, the Army is looking to create a massive amount of cheap, unsophisticated, attritable UAS to compete in the AGL.^[26] Yet, at the same time, CSA GEN George has ruled out an Army drone corps, a concept proposed by Congress in the summer of 2024.^[27] In effect, George and the Army’s approach is piecemeal: patch UAS onto already over-taxed company commanders, and hope that they can handle maintaining and training their units on yet another battlefield system. Conversely, a UAS branch or corps would lessen the burden on tactical commands and increase UAS proficiency and expertise throughout the Army.

All of this also comes on the heels of a rough year for Army aviation. As Brigadier General Jon Byrom notes, to date, the Army has had 11 rotary-wing aviation “mishaps” this year alone.^[28] These helicopter crashes have resulted in the deaths of several Soldiers.^[29] Needless to say, FVL is in an interesting position. First, the Army cancelled one of FLV’s flagship programs. Second, FVL must address the increasingly popularity of the AGL. Third, Army helicopters are continuing to crash at an alarming rate. Fourth, the Army looks to UAS to cover many of FARA’s requirements. Fifth, FLV—and the Army as a whole—cannot count on an institutionalized drone corps to help make compensating for the loss of FARA and dominating the AGL a reality. Overall, it is quite the predicament. It is safe to assess that of all of the Army’s modernization efforts, FVL appears to have the most challenges. It will be interesting to see how the Army and the FVL CFT manage to overcome these roadblocks in the coming year(s).

Long-Range Precision Fires

In 2024, LRPF ran into many of the same challenges as FVL. The Army cancelled the Extended-Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program this year. ERCA was one of the LRPF’s flagship programs. It was intended to double the range of the Army’s conventional self-propelled artillery formations, and, with its autoloading capability, it would attain a rate of fire two to three times greater than a manned crew.^[30] The ERCA battalion was intended to support the Army’s “penetration division,” which, as was already noted, died on the cutting room floor somewhere between the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and in the bowels of the Pentagon.^[31]

Prior to ERCA’s cancellation, the Army had earmarked the 1st Armored Division to field the first ERCA battalion:^[32] It was supposed to be tested in 2023 at Fort Bliss and then put through a trial run at the National Training Center in the summer of 2024. However, it appears that the Army has quickly pivoted and is instead developing an ERCA-like artillery system that focuses on addressing the challenges that brought the ERCA program to its knees.^[33] Time will tell if the Army brings anything resembling an ERCA battalion to life, or if the program truly dies.

Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, is another of the LRPF’s key programs. PrSM is slated to replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).^[34] PrSM does not appear to be suffering from similar problems to that of ERCA. In fact, during the summer of 2024, the 3rd MDTF successfully hit a moving target at sea with two PrSM strikes as part of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s (USINDOPACOM) Valiant Shield 24 (VS24) exercise.^[35]

PrSM’s success in the field as part of USINDOPACOM’s VS24 is a promising development, but ATACMS successes in Ukraine against Russian forces should also force the Army to take pause before replacing it. Classified information aside, it is hard to argue with ATACMS’ success in the Russo-Ukrainian War. One of its most notable uses there occurred in April 2024, in Kuban, Ukraine.^[36] Russian forces had gathered there for training, when Ukrainian reconnaissance identified them and dialed up ATACMS to execute a strike;^[37] it killed upward of 116 Russian soldiers.^[38] Considering the success Ukraine seems to be having with U.S.-provided ATACMS, perhaps space exists within the LRPF universe for both PrSM and ATACMS.

Army Modernization Considering Ongoing Conflicts

In Iraq and Ukraine, U.S. adversaries have taken possession of the Army’s M1 Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). During the conflict against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, the Iraqi Army lost upward of 10 M1 Abrams tanks to the Iranian-aligned Shia militia groups, often referred to as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).^[39] A 2017 DoD Inspector General (IG) report to Congress stated that the PMF obtained these tanks from IS.^[40] IS, in turn, acquired these tanks following battlefield routes of the Iraqi Army earlier in the conflict. Considering that Iranian military officers, often from the Islamic Republican Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, led or combat-advised the PMF, as well as other Iranian proxies in the region, it is not a stretch to assume that some of these missing tanks made their way to Iran for technological exploitation.^[41] If not transported to Iran, it would be illogical to assume that Iranian intelligence and Quds force operatives did not exploit these tanks for as much technological information as they could possibly retrieve at any number of exploitation sites within Iraq. Further speculation might suggest that, if the price is right, Iranian intelligence could have very well shared all, or at least portions, of that intelligence to other state-based threats such as Russia, China and North Korea—although open-source reporting does not currently corroborate this assumption.

Similarly, in February 2024, Russia captured at least one BFV in Ukraine.^[42] The current whereabouts of this BFV are unknown, at least in open-source reporting, but one must assume that Russian intelligence and engineering specialists have exploited it to glean useful information about the combat platform’s capabilities, limitations and technological shortcomings. When it comes to armor and the main gun fire control system, the BFV does not possess the same technological innovations as the M1 Abrams tank, but this is nonetheless troubling for the United States.

Both the tank and the BFV—foundational components of the Army’s armored brigade combat team—are in the hands of threats eager to find any advantage against the United States. Despite being 40-year-old technology, and likely not as sophisticated as the variants in Army motor pools, the fact that these Army combat systems are in the hands of verifiable threats to U.S. national interests and U.S. national security requires the development of new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; the Army’s ABCTs must be able to regain their technological asymmetry against state-based threats.

Looking at Modernization Considerations Beyond Existing Programs and Strategies

The 2021 AMS uses the standard ends-ways-means strategy model to outline its plan for modernization. Its goal is to generate a modernized Army that is capable of conducting MDO as part of the joint force within a single theater by 2028.^[43] Moreover, the AMS seeks to further generate an Army that is capable of conducting MDO throughout multiple theaters by 2035.^[44] The means, or resources, that the Army possesses to accomplish this goal are (1) a realigned Army modernization enterprise, (2) prioritized resources and (3) operational feedback.^[45] The ways by which the Army seeks to use its means to accomplish these ends is also three-fold: focusing on (1) “How We Fight,” (2) “What We Fight With,” and (3) “Who We Are.”^[46] “How We Fight” consists of the concepts, doctrine, organizations and training the Army needs to fulfill the AMS’s intended endstate. Moreover, “What We Fight With” is the materiel solutions that the Army needs to meet the AMS’s endstate. These are the six modernization priorities that we discussed previously. Lastly, the “Who We Are” describes the leader development and talent management areas that the Army should account for to help the other two ways accomplish the AMS’s endstate.^[47]

In addition, an Army strategic guidance document, Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, states that by 2035, “The Army will enable the Joint Force to maneuver and prevail from competition through conflict with a calibrated force posture of multi-domain capabilities that provide overmatch through speed and range at the point of need.”^[48] The document continues to describe the force as “The Multi-Domain Army,” and asserts that the Army, “will set the conditions for the Joint Force to fight and win integrated campaigns necessary to defeat state actors.” Army Multi-Domain Transformation continues, positing that by 2035, the Army will transform how it fights to (1) sustain the fight, (2) expand the battlespace, (3) strike in depth across multiple domains, (4) gain and maintain decision dominance, (5) create overmatch and (6) prevail in large-scale combat, at scale and speed.^[49] Looking at these statements through a reductionist’s perspective, and removing as much of the jargon and empty signifiers as possible, Army Multi-Domain Transformation basically says that the Army—as one component of the joint force—exists to defeat hostile military forces.

Considering MDO’s centrality to the AMS and Army Multi-Domain Transformation’s sentiments, it is worth examining the concept. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, defines MDO as, “The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.”^[50] The MDO concept outlined in Operations dances around the Army’s actual requirements in land combat with mesmerizing illusions to synchronizing joint, space and cyberspace capabilities, creating advantages, seizing initiative and obtaining relative advantages.^[51] Despite the dazzling language, MDO speaks little to the logic of land wars, much less the requirements of land forces that are charged with fighting land wars.

When viewed collectively, the AMS, Army Multi-Domain Transformation and Operations should provide an airtight description of the Army’s warfighting requirements and how it will address those necessities. Yet neither on their own nor collectively do these three documents actually provide either of these. Instead, they comprise a self-referencing package of circular logic—that logic being that the Army exists to support the joint force, MDO is how the Army supports the joint force, and modernization seeks to enable the Army to engage in MDO for the joint force.

Furthermore, the AMS’s “How We Fight” should offer insight into the logic of land war and, within land wars, the things land forces will be called upon to do. Yet, “How We Fight” instead points to Army concepts and doctrine, both of which are aspirational documents. The problem with the aspirational character of Army concepts and doctrine is that they loosely describe how the Army wants to fight, not how it will inevitably have to fight.

Whether the Army is called upon to fight in eastern Europe against Russia, or if it is shipped across the Pacific Ocean to assist in guaranteeing Taiwan’s national and territorial sovereignty, it must fight for control—and fight to maintain control—of territory. That, in essence, is the logic of land war: Armies exist to fight other military forces (state and nonstate) for control of territory. Control requires land forces on the ground that can not only go toe-to-toe in direct close combat with a hostile force, but that, in doing so, can seal tactical and operational victories. Moreover, control requires land forces that do not culminate in the process of delivering tactical and operational victories. These forces must be sufficiently robust and must possess the depth of redundancy to weather the rigors of combat pursuant to control—and yet still retain the capacity to pursue and defeat an enemy or defend against a counterattack.

Fighting for control of territory is not an Army-centric point of view; rather, it is a position that equally considers the joint force and its needs. The joint force cannot (as easily) use airfields, build combat power on expeditionary battlefields, protect ports, or accomplish many other requirements without an Army that can defeat other land forces and control territory. Army modernization efforts must, consequently, be linked to the logic of land war.

Yet, the logic of land war—i.e., land forces operate to control territory, whether for their own ends or in support of joint force objectives—is not enough on its own to help guide modernization. Modernization strategy must also account for the activities that any Army must iteratively do in any land war—whether in eastern Europe, in the Pacific or in even the Middle East. Armies, to include the U.S. Army, must be (1) capable of taking and retaking territory, not just in support of joint force requirements, but as ends in and of themselves, (2) capable of clearing (i.e., systematically removing or eliminating) enemy forces from contested territory, (3) capable of holding territory against enemy attempts to retake that land, (4) capable of protecting populations, (5) capable of encircling hostile forces to facilitate their destruction or to put them in a position to negotiate a surrender and (6) capable of sealing boundaries against hostile forces.^[52] The Army would be well-served to take a step back and evaluate its modernization strategy against these requirements; the UAS and long-range fires centric modernization focal point does not reflect the wins and losses of 21st century armed conflict across the globe. Moreover, the UAS and long-range fires approach neither defeats an adversary in respect to the logic of land war, nor is it a strategy that puts the Army on closer footing to victory as it relates to the logic of land war.

Conclusion

2024 has been a challenging year for Army modernization. In this paper, we have only examined two of the Army’s five major lines of modernization—FVL and LRPF—and in each of those, we have found that the Army has canceled major projects. For FVL, the Army canceled its FARA program, while for LRPF, the Army canceled the ERCA program. Furthermore, we have also examined Army force structure modernization. We found that in 2024, the Army moved forward with reducing several long-standing formations within Army divisions, to include engineering and cavalry units, and in some cases, consolidated capabilities at the division level. In doing so, the Army eliminated some of the foundational formations associated with many of its “WayPoint Force” and Army 2030 initiatives. Many of the cuts to Army force structure in 2024 are making way for the MDTFs, a theater-level command that lacks close combat forces, operates far from the front and cannot inherently control terrain. The emphasis of the MDTF, at the cost of tactical forces that exist to help control territory, is a silent shift in how the Army will operate in 21st century wars. Instead of being built to fight mobile wars of maneuver, the Army’s reduction of mobility for its forces and replacing mobility with fires and UAS demonstrates a preference for a fires-centric attritional strategy for war.

To conclude, the Army should embrace the logic of land wars, which equally supports where and how the Army can support the joint force. The logic of land wars contends that armies just be able to control territory. Similarly, the Army must be organized and structured to successfully accomplish the six requirements of land forces. The logic of land war and the subordinate requirements of land forces are not just an Army-centric thought process but facilitate how the Army equally supports the joint force. Moreover, a land force can only be stretched in so many directions before it runs out of blood and money. Thus, if the Army is to accomplish its own mission, plus serve as the joint force’s key enabling service, it must not reduce its close combat forces, but rather must see them increased. The control of territory exists in an adversarial context; thus, the Army must have bigger—not smaller—close combat forces.

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Author Biography

LTC Amos C. Fox, USA, Ret., PhD, is a Professor of Practice in Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies. Amos is also a lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Houston. He hosts the Revolution in Military Affairs, Soldier Pulse and WarCast podcasts, and he serves as a senior editor with Small Wars Journal.

Notes