During a potential amphibious invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. will have to outthink Chinese deception tactics, according to the author of a new paper published by the Association of the U.S. Army.

“The history, theory and doctrine of Chinese deception aligns with current U.S. Army deception theory and doctrine,” Maj. Thomas Haydock writes. “This means Chinese deception in support of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan can be anticipated. Knowing this, perhaps the deceived can become the deceiver.”

In “Defeating Deception: Outthinking Chinese Deception in a Taiwan Invasion,” Haydock, the strategic plans and policy officer for the Washington Army National Guard and a 2024 graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, contends that China will deploy deception against the strategic and operational issues it would face should it invade Taiwan.

Haydock defines deception as “fundamentally a mental game between opponents” and argues that “there is no distinct ‘Chinese way of war,’ ” citing an article from the Army War College journal Parameters. “Although many have claimed that there is a distinct Chinese way of war, the evidence strongly shows there is not,” Haydock writes.

There are multiple ways that China could use deception at the strategic and operational levels.

“China could use deception to delay American support or to deny American bases in Japan. ... China could use deception to provide other means for landing equipment on beaches, bypassing Taiwan’s seaports,” Haydock writes. “On the air side, … China could use deception to increase the size of early air insertions.”

The U.S. must carefully weigh any response to potential Chinese deception tactics. “China may conduct feints, demonstrations and similar activities to draw Taiwanese attention to amphibious landing sites that are either false or not the main effort,” Haydock writes. “But if we fail to closely monitor an effort for fear it is a deception, China could exploit the opportunity and turn a feint into a real attack.”

U.S. leaders also must look out for indicators, including “macro-level indicators” like China building its resiliency ahead of economic sanctions prior to an invasion of Taiwan, and “near-term indicators” including a freeze on foreign financial assets within China, stockpiling emergency supplies and prioritizing inputs for military production.

Should China conduct an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, it would be “the most complex military operation since D-Day in 1944,” Haydock writes.

“We have the advantage,” he writes. “We just need to realize it by understanding, predicting and identifying deception—outthinking Chinese deception to find the signal in the noise. Once we have that advantage, we can defeat their deception by reversing roles so that, if China invades Taiwan, it will be China that experiences both situational and fundamental surprise.”

Read the full paper here.