Despite “significant progress” in transforming its fires portfolio, the U.S. Army is not yet capable of overmatching potential adversaries in protracted large-scale combat operations at an acceptable degree of risk, according to a new paper by the Association of the U.S. Army.

“Fires for Effect: Implications for Large-Scale Combat Operations” describes the progress the Army has made in transforming its fires capability, as well as the challenges and implications for offensive and defensive fires and the acquisition system that enables it. The paper was written by retired Col. Daniel Roper, director of AUSA’s National Security Studies; Charles McEnany, a national security analyst for the association; and Maj. Young Joo, a strategic intelligence officer and an Army fellow at AUSA.

It is released as AUSA prepares to host a Hot Topic titled “Land-Based Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations.” The daylong event on Dec. 3 at the association’s headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, will feature keynote presentations by Maj. Gen. Winston Brooks, commanding general of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, and Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division.

Also slated to speak are Brig. Gen. Rory Crooks, director of the Long-Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team; Brig. Gen. William Parker, director of the Air and Missile Defense Cross-Functional Team; and Brig. Gen. Alric Francis, commandant of the Army Field Artillery School.

For more information or to register, click here.

“The Russo-Ukrainian War provides clear implications regarding the utility of long-range precision fires and shorter-range massed artillery and rocket fire; the insatiable demand for ammunition, most notably artillery; and the inability of the industrial base to support it,” the paper says.

The Army also must contend with survivability through dispersion, decoys and displacement; the apparent vulnerability of towed artillery; targeting with both military and civilian means; and the increased use of unmanned aerial systems, the paper says.

As it makes progress in fielding leap-ahead capabilities—such as the Precision Strike Missile—the Army also must rebuild its muscle memory on massing fires and large-scale combat operations, skills that atrophied during two decades of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the paper says.

“While modernized systems can deliver impressive effects, integration and synchronization are the secret sauce to achieving convergence and contributing to joint force overmatch of enemies on the battlefield,” the authors write.

While obstacles remain for the Army, “they are surmountable,” the paper says. The service faces “incredibly high demand” for air and missile defense soldiers, putting strain on the force, and the demand for new systems is increasing “much faster” than the defense industrial base can respond or force structure can support.

The Army and DoD also face “budgetary dysfunction” and a reliance on stopgap funding measures known as continuing resolutions that delay new program starts, the paper says. “More than five years of modernization have been lost to the cumulative [continuing resolutions] since 2011,” the paper says. “The [People’s Liberation Army] experienced no such delay.”

Moving forward, “the stakes are high for the Army and the joint force as the Army transforms its fires portfolio for [large-scale combat operations],” the paper says. “… The Army must modernize legacy systems even as it develops new systems to replace them. It cannot call a time-out.”

Read the paper here.