Teams of Leaders in U.S. European Command: A Soft-power Multiplier

by Frederic J. Brown

As the 21st century unfolds and we face a continually engaged and networked world, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is leveraging a Teams of Leaders (ToL) approach to build strong relationships with long-standing allies and to build new ones with emerging partners. For example, in addition to traditional missions like humanitarian assistance, other challenges also exist—such as the flow of energy, financial turbulence and threat of pandemic disease—that require innovative expertise and experiences to mitigate them before a crisis develops.

Teams of Leaders draws upon the interacting effects of Information Management (IM), Knowledge Management (KM) and leader team-building, which when applied in coordination, generate actionable understanding to resolve challenges facing leader teams within EUCOM. To build the synergistic soft-power multiplier, these three effects must work in mutual support of one another. This can be envisaged as a stool with three essential legs—all must work together with equal importance to maintain balance.

Furthermore, these teams may be peer or hierarchical, quick-response or enduring, virtual or grouped. They may be joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational (JIIM) across the area of responsibility (AOR) of the command. The policy or program issues addressed are unlimited in scope. Without exception, their resolution involves the initiation and sustainment of successful interpersonal, inter- and intra-team relationships. The purpose of this essay is to describe how ToL has been implemented effectively in EUCOM in 2008–09.

The current mission guiding development of ToL in EUCOM is: “EUCOM will further enable and expand a Teams of Leaders (ToL) culture to generate actionable understanding through the shared trust, intensive collaboration and networked expertise among leaders in order to support operations and missions of the command.”

EUCOM headquarters today comprises many separate and interrelated teams of leaders, often nested with one another, that are growing rapidly more joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational. While the focus here is the current EUCOM headquarters example (including some lessons learned), the ToL policies/programs and practices discussed appear equally applicable across most existing military or civil, governmental or nongovernmental organizations.

The central ToL vision anticipates intensive collaboration among leader teams (see figure 1). These teams share data and information, generating shared knowledge and actionable understanding as well as shared skills, knowledge, attributes (SKA) of team leadership—shared trust (attribute), shared vision...
Teams of Leaders Coaching Guide

EUCOM Vision

This guide is designed to help every member of the EUCOM Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) Leader-Team to achieve a higher level of performance.

The purpose of applying the Teams of Leaders (ToL) approach at EUCOM is to establish a culture of shared trust, intensive collaboration, and networked expertise among horizontal (peer) and vertical (hierarchical) high-performing leader-teams. These three components together facilitate a continuous collaborative environment, leader-team building, and shared trust, which enable joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations to make and execute decisions while rapidly sharing what they have learned.

Today, leader-teams exist throughout the organization, both informally and formally, and are naturally occurring. As we plan, develop, and execute operations, especially those that require individuals to reach across the boundaries of division or branch, organization, level, function, or culture, the need for leader-teams becomes evident. Some leader-teams are obvious, such as the Operational Planning Teams (OPT) and the command’s standing Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG). Other teams are more informal or less noticeable, but are just as important to achieving operational success within a JIIM environment. For example, the diverse leader-teams supporting the State Partnership Program in Reserve Affairs (ECRA) or capacity building (IS5) or supporting the Office of Defense Collaboration (ODC) Chief supporting the Country Team All leaders within EUCOM participate on leader-teams, and all leader-team members are expected to demonstrate leadership of their functional areas. In turn, they support JIIM leader-teams, which are facilitating broader EUCOM missions.

The applications of easy to use, web-enabled information management tools and deliberate knowledge management processes with effective leader-team exercises combine to enable the conditions for improved communication and intense collaboration. Applied correctly and collectively, these tools arm leader-teams with a way of thinking, understanding, and acting more across boundaries. This shared situational understanding and collaborative environment will help us work more effectively with our national and international partners. Use this guide to enable your diverse leader-team members to observe, listen, stimulate, and support operational missions and generate shared, actionable-understanding from the bottom up, drawing on their practices and expectations. This ToL Coaching Guide is designed for all leader-team members, not just the individual designated to lead the team; more often by JIIM, to bring equal leaders of equivalent position together for common purpose. The ToL methodology is the basis for transforming a traditional team across the boundaries of function, level, organization, or culture into a high-performing team of leaders.

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Figure 1 - EUCOM Vision
(knowledge), shared competence (skill) and shared confidence (attribute). All combine to generate high performance when supported through a team-building process of Leader Team Exercises (LTXs).

The individual leader and leader team SKA combine to establish an essential framework of shared consensus for generating “soft power,” i.e., national capability secured through consensus with respect to policy or program execution within leader teams. The engine of hard power is solid training to task, condition and standard (TCS). In contrast, the engine of soft power is building relationships. The two are not mutually exclusive; inevitably, building relationships can support training to TCS, and relationship-building can be supported by shared training. However, there is a fundamental difference in purpose and development between hard and soft power. ToL is soft power.

More than leader team consensus or capabilities is expected. The objective is shared actionable understanding within the multiple leader teams with respect to the EUCOM policy or program issues being addressed by the teams. Teams lead (not follow) events, initiating (not responding), and are absolutely success-oriented whether the leader teams are applying hard or soft power as the situation requires. All of this is achieved as action officers range globally, informally, stimulating more high-performing leader teams.

Furthermore, by the nature of organizations with limited human resources, these teams are often nested with one another. As leaders within these leader teams engage one another, they not only apply their experiences and expertise to the problem at hand, but also transfer and share what they have learned and applied within other teams they have engaged. This spontaneous sharing in turn creates subsequent unpredictable levels and locales of actionable understanding to address new challenges with frequent favorable results—a solid but unpredictable multiplier.

Full-spectrum military readiness consists of both individual and collective task training and relationship-building among and between individuals, teams and organizations/units. Task training builds hard power. Relationship-building builds soft power—often starting at the lowest common denominator of consensus in JIIM teams within the EUCOM AOR. Therefore, by building high-performing leader teams, improved JIIM leader consensus with respect to military purpose can generate notable increases in military readiness to address the issue/problem at hand.

Teams—peer and hierarchical teams (right, left, up, down)—“govern” events. The action officer mindset must be to think teams from the start, a new perspective for many. All effective operational decisions at every organizational level from the Office of Defense Cooperation up are made and executed by individual leaders performing as members of teams. Therefore, a very early essential step in decisionmaking is to define the team within the EUCOM AOR that will determine the outcome of the issue/problem at hand.

There are likely to be both formal and informal leader teams associated with any issue/problem. Formal teams exercise mandated decision authorities and responsibilities. Equally important, informal teams can establish shared actionable understanding that can accelerate formal decision processes through extensive informal collaboration (“Are you aware? Look at ___.”) and then assemble from the EUCOM enterprise toolbox IM and KM support for those teams sufficient to enable a collaboration culture that is generating value-added for each of the leader team members. User value-added is the fuel for expanding ToL, then building that leader team to high performance using ToL team-building processes, particularly LTXs described in the EUCOM Teams of Leaders Coaching Guide. And ToL “energizers”—drawing on common accepted practices—are really helpful.

ToL is best introduced and then expanded in the context of the old song refrain “doing what comes naturally,” i.e., applying in an organizational environment the practices that one uses daily and exploit routine, “natural” practices, expectations and incentives to stimulate accelerated team-building. For
example, (consciously, or often unconsciously) we all are accustomed to finding “workarounds” ranging from figuring out a better, faster way to do something, to the commonplace, such as developing a different route when traffic blocks a highway. Life is friction—workarounds are essential. If executing the workaround requires expertise you don’t have at hand, you go to your Rolodex or instant messaging address book to find out to whom to go for advice or counsel. The more experienced we are, the larger is our Rolodex. If we don’t have a direct connection, we go to a friend who consults his/her Rolodex, then we ask them to introduce us.

We all share many expectations. We all hope not to be surprised. We will give “heads up” hoping to receive the same in return. If we are on top, there is enormous advantage in knowing actual “ground truth.” If we are on the bottom, it is really useful to get advance notice of what may be coming down from “on high.” “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”—such is the lifeblood of introducing Teams of Leaders. This is really nothing new, just putting common practices to focused purpose.

Collaborative building of leader teams across boundaries of level, function, organization or culture offers the highest ToL return, since normal collaboration across boundaries is often weak to nonexistent. There can be near instant value-added as collaboration to shared purpose replaces nonexistent coordination or perhaps prior personal or institutional animosity. Mutually reinforcing interactions of ToL—IM, KM and team building—allow the crossing of various boundaries without regard to time or distance (time = zero and distance = zero). Virtual teams can interact virtually, globally; physical separation becomes irrelevant (distance = zero). Similarly, when subject matter expertise or prior experience can be important to issue resolution across boundaries, there are no physical limits to assembling experts over a period of years to counsel or serve as members of leader teams (time = zero).

ToL in EUCOM has developed through the execution of several command pilots—focusing ToL development into lead staff directorates addressing important current issues. Performance in crisis action operations is EUCOM “bread and butter” proficiency. So ToL provided interagency support to Austere Challenge ‘09—actually the initial Geographic Combatant Command and Joint Task Force (JTF) support operation of the State Department Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). ToL application insights were improved by shared experiences and follow-on improvements stimulated by prior crisis action operations for Georgia and Gaza—crises that occurred early in the processes of introduction of ToL in EUCOM headquarters. As it was improved, ToL was applied in successive crisis action operations. The operations focus of Austere Challenge was complemented by selection of ToL pilot support of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as an area of highly complex multi-echelon and multi-functional joint operational planning addressing important and timely defense of the EUCOM AOR, including Europe and Israel. Essential hard-power national military capabilities improved as leader relationships matured in the BMD ToL pilot.

The soft-power orientation of ToL pilots addressing EUCOM capability was expressed as intensified assistance to the more than forty Offices of Defense Cooperation working within U.S. Country Teams; of capacity building in “new NATO” countries; of the Reserve Forces State Partnership Programs led by the National Guard and a complex U.S./NATO effort to demilitarize highly unstable residual Soviet munitions still in the Balkans (particularly but not exclusively Albania). Each pilot was led by a different EUCOM headquarters staff directorate. All directorates were represented. Those with no command-directed pilot—manpower and personnel (J1), intelligence (J2), logistics (J4)—selected their own pilot areas.

In each case, ToL pilot results were helpful—the observation lens of very different application experiences improves ToL practices. Practical ToL value observed by the chain of command stimulates broadening EUCOM applications of ToL. As support to ODCs expands, ToL collaboration in support of Country Teams increases—win-win for the Departments of Defense and State.

While all ’09 pilots proceed, embedded in EUCOM and ODC staff leader actions and expectations, now the ToL focus moves to a more strategic/operational level addressing Whole of Government and reflecting
specific concerns of the current administration. There are three Whole of Government ToL application dimensions—perhaps presaging a national broadening of ToL applications across novel boundaries.

First and best understood are U.S. federal interagency interactions—the common perception of the scope of Whole of Government, i.e., all departments and agencies of the U.S. federal government. This dimension is reflected in ToL support to S/CRS (Reconstruction and Stabilization) development for Austere Challenge ’10 and continuing support to the Department of State-led ammunition demilitarization effort in the Balkans.

The second dimension is also Whole of Government but in a different form—U.S. federal-state-local—that extends the superb support provided by National Guard and other reserve forces to capacity building in partnership countries. This is an extension of the post-Cold War Partnership for Peace but with much greater emphasis on advantaging ToL to encourage state and local support of national partnership programs, engaging the full range of support available from state and local levels. For example, as it is desirable to provide agricultural advice and assistance to Afghan agriculture, why stop with the support of the U.S. Department of Agriculture? In the case of Hungary, which provides a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to support the International Security Assistance Force, the state partner is Ohio. Why not engage the Ohio state agriculture bureaucracy as well as Ohio State University academic support and volunteering Ohio farmers?

A third dimension—a multinational “Wholes of Governments” pilot program—should provide ToL to improve performance of the decision bureaucracies of U.S. allies supporting shared multinational policies and programs. The collaboration processes of ToL can transcend national boundaries as that national bureaucracy wishes. ToL can be molded to enhance collaboration whatever the local jurisdictional boundaries, reinforcing important allies’ collaboration as they draw on ToL to improve the effectiveness of their support to NATO. Likely the ToL focus will be support to national decision processes as allies prepare their national PRTs for service in Afghanistan.

The purpose of the ’10 ToL pilots is to portray the variety of Whole of Government teaming possibilities available across boundaries, thereby multiplying soft-power relationships as high-performing leader teams proliferate. Continuing application of ToL building relationships to supplement hard-power training to TCS is built into the robust EUCOM crisis action exercise program and reinforced by actual crisis actions as they occur. For both, ToL practices evolve within an appropriately secure environment.

As ToL spreads EUCOM Whole of Government, governance should be kept to an absolute minimum so that local adaptation can flourish. The purpose of governance is to ensure ease of application across the various boundaries to unforeseen audiences, applying unpredictable workarounds to expanding Rolodex audiences across the full range of JIIM. It seems likely that this governance will apply primarily to IM and KM; it should be minimal since most successful IM and KM must be globally applicable to prosper commercially.

Proliferating ToL will be disorderly and essentially unpredictable. Leaders seeking orderly governance—to some the proper, responsible “military” mindset of EUCOM—will need to continue practicing restraint (“tactical patience”) as ToL proliferation multiplies, often drawing on rapidly expanding social networking KM practices.

Such is a tough challenge of ToL proliferation. Accelerated, expanded leader team-building should be tolerated—in fact, encouraged—as clear value added stimulates use. But at the same time EUCOM is a serious national organization making life and death military decisions and governing precious national resources. Conservative governance is an important national expectation. With who, where, when and in what capacity can action officers collaborate without compromising essential responsibilities of the chain of command or coordination? The answer in EUCOM is the Commander’s Collaboration Guidance (figure 2). This document is the product of full, detailed EUCOM staff coordination. If and as readers of this essay intend to implement ToL, the full hierarchical leader team needs to review the document and modify
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Commander’s Collaboration Guidance

1. Reference, Teams of Leaders (ToL), 16 Mar 09, subject: EUCOM Teams of Leaders Coaching Guide version 1.0.

2. In order to support a culture of shared trust, intensive collaboration, and networked expertise among horizontal (peer) and vertical (hierarchical) high-performing leader-teams the following Commander's Guidance is provided:

   a. Collaborate! Sharing knowledge is more powerful than owning knowledge. Share, share, share!

   b. Leaders, supervisors and decision makers are responsible for making collaboration a natural method of accomplishing staff actions and informing juniors and seniors of ongoing efforts. Mentoring, training, and personal example are critical to establishing a collaborative environment.

   c. Using knowledge obtained through informal collaboration with everyone involved is the operating principal. This is especially important when collaborating across boundaries of organization, level, function, or culture where acceptable use of knowledge shared may not be as well understood.

   d. The use of informal collaboration and coordination should never circumvent the formal decision authorities and formal decision processes, but it is the methodology we will use to enable those authorities to take well informed actions to accomplish their executive responsibilities.

   e. Knowledge shared through informal collaboration builds solutions in a quick, effective manner, but should not be perceived as a formal position, decision or policy of the Command.
ECCC
SUBJECT: Commander's Collaboration Guidance

f. When coordinating informally, everything must be marked or referenced (as simple as stating at the beginning of a teleconference) as pre-decisional. Add the following language to email exchanges when collaborating across boundaries or an environment where trust has not been established.

"Views or opinions expressed are not to be interpreted as EUCOM command positions. This is informal sharing of content so that all can be more fully informed when necessary formal decision processes are exercised."

g. Absolutely ensure the collaborative environment meets the appropriate classification and information security requirements. Classification levels are not a barrier to effective collaboration, but they remain necessary protection of information and knowledge that provides us freedom of action.

h. When collaboration is abused or misused, restrict or deny access to the individual or group until trust is re-established. The goal, however, is to return the individual or group back into a trusted status as soon as the abuse/misuse is indentified and resolved. In the interim, ensure you notify others who may be surprised or impacted by the violation.

4. The USEUCOM Staff, Service Components, and external agencies operating in the European theater will employ this guidance to facilitate their use of informal and formal collaboration in support of missions and operations.

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USEUCOM Directors
it as appropriate to their own organization. All leaders, from action officer to branch/division/directorate head, need to develop the command collaboration guidance as a critical collaborative product.

The catalytic agent for actually building ToL for all applications is the ToL Coaching Guide *inter alia* describing how to conduct an LTX-building SKA of shared trust, vision/purpose, competence and confidence, generating the relationships associated with high-performing teams of leaders. The Coaching Guide, too, must be read carefully. Here, too, there needs to be early understanding and user consensus. Building ToL is *not* task training; ToL is relationship-building. The after-action review (AAR) is to task training as the LTX is to relationship-building—two different objectives! (See figure 3.) The Army has been tardy in recognizing the difference, to the detriment of Army leader team preparation for JIIM operations.

The LTX role in building relationships is comparable to the AAR role in stimulating highly successful training to TCS. Each triggers desired outcomes as part of a larger—and more complex—performance development model. For effective training to TCS, the Army training paradigm (observer/controller, instrumentation system, opposition force, after-action review) was created and fielded in the combat training centers in the early 1980s. While Army leaders rightfully bask today in the shared pride of an important shared professional culture of AARs, introduction of the AAR was a very difficult transition perceived widely as unnecessary—“We already do that.” In fact, as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Training responsible for implementing the Army training paradigm, I was counseled by a Vietnam mentor—then the commander of U.S. Army Forces Command—that if I permitted bottom-up implementation of the AAR I “would lead the Army to ruin.”

Now I propose the LTX, triggering a new, wholly complementary, relationship-building paradigm *inter alia* by increasing effective communication and stimulating improved collaboration. The new...
complementary paradigm is IM, KM and team-building interaction stimulated by LTXs to generate high-performing leader teams practicing actionable understanding.

Once again I hear comments that a new paradigm (ToL, the LTX) is unnecessary—“We already do that.” Perhaps the top 10 percent do—that is why they are where they are. They instinctively build the SKA of high-performing leader teams. But the 50 percent below average in any group (bell curve) engaged as ToL expands do not understand. They need help that is not provided in current doctrinal documentation. For example, the new Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, properly emphasizes the importance of developing relationships: “Success in developing FSF [Foreign Security Forces] often depends more on relationships and personalities at the unit level than any other factor.” Yet there are few, if any, processes provided for how to build satisfactory relationships amid excellent discussions of how to train to standard. Case rests. **ToL is as unprecedented and strategically important to generating soft power as the Army Training System was in the 1980s and has proven subsequently for the generation of hard power across the Department of Defense.**

ToL fielding applies these ToL enablers to accelerate use applications. Fielding draws on shared “Yankee initiative.” Americans seek what is to be done but object to being told how to do it. ToL expansion occurs through deliberate co-option targeting from the bottom up, drawing on LTX practice (building the SKA of high-performing leader teams) stimulated by social networking but with added incentives to stimulate co-option. EUCOM current practice to stimulate co-option is to allow potential users to modify the Coaching Guide for their use (adding their own logos if desired) with the proviso that they let EUCOM know how/why the guide has been modified (a central feature of ToL evaluation). ToL spreads by word of mouth and social networking support of processes that are clearly more effective than the status quo. Good news spreads. This is exactly how Army Knowledge Management’s Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) was fielded. Largely unfunded originally, it was left to the responses and support of actual users—from the bottom up. Such a distribution model is reinforced by the appreciation of “digital natives” for the value of shared knowledge over own knowledge—accelerating ToL fielding “on the street.”

But all must realize that bottom-up proliferation drawing on shared practices and expectations is essentially highly disorderly and profoundly unpredictable. As a myriad of hierarchical and peer leader teams are co-opted and champion “their ToL,” they inevitably seek to improve the value added accrued to that leader team by adopting ToL. The good news is that through this co-option stimulating increased value added, ToL expanded without additional resources from EUCOM, i.e., the value added stimulates local resources—manpower and funds—to support ToL implementation. But EUCOM had to “let go” and did so effectively by institutionalizing ToL, as did the Army in fielding the Battle Command Knowledge System.

Such a fielding strategy presents challenges in evaluation. Successful ToL results from an interactive combination of IM, KM and leader team-building relationships. So there are multiple uncontrolled variables generating performance—a bit like predicting when water will boil. You know it when you see it, but predicting bubbles is impossible—and all low-country boiling point calculations differ in the high country due to altitude. How to evaluate individual components? Which caused what? Better to look at the ToL “whole”—to continue the analogy, to look at the whole pot of water?

The fielding strategy essentially co-opts the user to “ownership” and then encourages “fixes” to one’s own uses—providing feedback of those ToL integrated-application best practices within and across various boundaries. Best practices include local IM/KM applications that increase shared understanding through improved communication and collaboration among leader teams. The user describes what was changed and why. Should that information not be available to all—a ToL “good ideas” wiki?*

Under these circumstances of stimulated revision through intensive collaboration, evaluation is different. What are appropriate measures of effectiveness? Is rate of spread important? Is there user modification of received best practices (what, why)? Other potential measures are included in the ToL Coaching Guide. As long as ToL is growing with effective feedback to provide continuing responsiveness
to expanding user requirements—to the extent that these requirements can be foreseen looking top down from EUCOM headquarters—what other evaluation is required?

The next ToL step in EUCOM is the institutionalization that is currently underway. This is work in progress, accelerated to forestall loss of cultural understanding during normal summer leader turnover at every level of command.9

We have found that extensive documentation is necessary given the complexity of organization and jurisdictions of EUCOM and the command AOR:

- ToL is led by the commander through his or her guidance (Commander’s Collaboration Guidance, pages 6-7).

In addition EUCOM is actively pursuing:

- developing ToL orientations for incoming personnel. For new directors there will be Senior Mentor-facilitated workshops with division chiefs describing past, present and planned future ToL applications. This approach, developed and employed originally for Army BCKS introduction, was used to introduce ToL to EUCOM headquarters.
- encouraging collaboration: reaching forward prior to assignment, reaching back to draw on past experience, both within headquarters and to various U.S. Missions in the AOR (ODCs).
- extending known ToL pilots to additional program areas within each EUCOM headquarters directorate.
- increasing EUCOM and interagency participation in crisis action operations (actual crises and Austere Challenge ’10).
- including ToL in professional education—military, Whole of Government and “Wholes of Governments”—wherever there are receptive audiences.

ToL rapidly expands—it works! “Wholes of Governments,” NATO institutions and other international organizations seem to be likely expansion opportunities. Clearly there are many requirements for better integration of hard power and soft power both multi-echelon and multi-function. ToL is novel, expanding rapidly and (desirably) somewhat “out of control,” as new JIIM teams discover one another across boundaries. Opportunities seem practically unlimited, teaming across boundaries—particularly from the bottom up.

The one critical enabling stimulant to EUCOM ToL success is the absolute support of the senior leadership, led by Commander EUCOM; the Office, Chief of Staff EUCOM; the leaders at ODCs, headquarters directorates, divisions and branches; and the action officers who drive ToL through their innovative collaboration. ToL in EUCOM is their ToL.

In sum, ToL is new, although for those who practice collaboration naturally, routinely, as well as the 10 percent who thrive on IM and KM and who collaborate routinely from the bottom up in teams to share and develop actionable understanding, much may not seem new both to train to standard and to build relationships. But the rest of us, the vast majority, need the support of Teams of Leaders.
Endnotes


2 This essay consists of personal views and should not be represented as the positions of U.S. EUCOM, the Institute for Defense Analyses or the Association of the United States Army.


6 Exactly this issue was raised and accepted by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army when (as Senior Mentor) I briefed Army Knowledge Management’s Battle Command Knowledge System for execution decision in 2003.


8 A wiki is a website that uses wiki software, allowing the easy creation and editing of any number of interlinked (often databased) Web pages, using a simplified markup language (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki).

9 EUCOM practice is offered as a way to generate ToL in complex hierarchical organizations—others will apply and improve.

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