It’s oft repeated that the U.S. Army fights and wins the nation’s wars, but this shorthand is not quite accurate. Armies—almost always as part of a joint force, and usually part of a combined force—do fight and win battles and campaigns. Nations, however, win wars. Why is that? At least for the following four reasons.

First, war is a political instrument, meaning wars are fought to achieve political purposes. Armies don’t set war aims; political leaders do. (Note: War powers in the U.S. are designed to be shared between the executive and legislative branches. So, “political leaders” means the appropriate leaders of both branches.)

Senior military leaders provide input on strategic aims during a proper, and usually extended, civil-military dialogue. Senior military leaders—most commonly in coordination with senior political leaders—also set military objectives for campaigns; objectives for battles are usually left to military leaders—but not always.

If a battle is large enough or has direct impact on the war’s strategic aims, however—like the battles in Normandy, France, in World War II, or Inchon during the Korean War, or the battle for Mosul, Iraq, in 2016–17—political leaders will be involved in structuring objectives even at the tactical level. War is always a political instrument.

Second, military campaigns are necessary but insufficient to win a war. All elements of national power are involved in achieving national strategic objectives. Diplomatic, economic, fiscal, informational and industrial—all are examples of non-military campaigns that are necessary to win a war.

This is true today, as it was true for America’s War for Independence, the Civil War, both world wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the post-9/11 wars and every other war America has fought. Because military and non-military campaigns cost money, congressional leaders will be involved in the process of campaign development, as they have been in every war. Armies, or militaries, alone cannot win wars.

Campaign Coordination

Third, since winning a war requires strategic, political objectives as well as a set of military and non-military campaigns, some kind of national decision-making body is required to govern planning and orchestrate execution. In the U.S., campaigns are planned and executed by executive branch departments. That introduces a level of complexity. Each campaign must be integrated with the others. If they are not, the nation’s effort may become unfocused, possibly leading to failure to achieve the strategic aims set or at least prolonging the war effort unnecessarily.

We have experienced this failure. Coordination and integration of military and non-military campaigns in pursuit of the nation’s war aims is the responsibility of the National Security Council. Again, because war powers and responsibilities are divided, the National Security Council’s responsibilities normally will include proper coordination with Congress, or at least selected members of Congress. The NSC also has the responsibility—with other senior political and military leaders—to adapt American policies as a war unfolds and bring the war to an end.

War is the realm of uncertainty, made more so because the enemy deliberately tries to thwart plans—and sometimes does. That means decisions made at one time may no longer be appropriate at a later time because conditions have changed. Adaptation is not just a military requirement in war; it is a political requirement as well. Adaptation is required of all departments executing campaigns in support of war, and it is a requirement for the body that integrates military and non-military campaigns.

Every war has a beginning, a middle and an end. America’s past seems to suggest that it is better at beginnings and middles, less good at a war’s end. America’s Army—as part of a joint force and usually with allies or partners—can end major combat operations by winning campaigns and battles.

That does not, however, always result in winning wars—Vietnam and Afghanistan are two clear examples. Even if the fighting ends, all elements of national power are as necessary in the post-major combat operations phase of a war as they are during it.

Too often, U.S. leaders believe that when the fighting is over, the war is over. History says otherwise. There is no “mission accomplished” in a war until the strategic and political aims are achieved. And that means having a set of integrated, post-fighting military and non-military plans.

Domestic Support

Last, winning a war requires legitimacy, i.e., the support of the American people. Creating and sustaining that support is a complex effort. Of course, militaries can contribute to building and sustaining popular support by winning on the battlefield and making progress toward achieving the war’s strategic aims. But, as before, military progress is only a component. Legitimacy in the U.S. means general, popular belief that the war is legitimate, that America’s war aims are achievable and are being achieved, and that the costs of the war in treasure and blood are “worth” the purposes of the war.

When one or more of these beliefs gets called into question, or a sizable portion of the American people starts to disbelieve what they’re being told, public support starts to erode, as does legitimacy. A wide-ranging, fact-based information campaign designed to maintain support of America’s citizenry is as necessary to win a war as are successful battles and campaigns. Such a campaign is not just a military responsibility.

In sum, waging and winning a war requires fighting as part of an integrated and sustained national effort focused on clear, achievable, strategic, political aims. Armies and militaries do fight the wars; alone, they can neither wage nor win them.

Use of the shorthand “the Army fights and wins the nation’s wars” may be convenient, but being clear about the Army’s part in winning wars is important.

Internally, keeping a clear focus on the Army’s responsibility to win battles and campaigns provides the proper context for readiness, training and professional development of Army leaders.

Externally, continuing to emphasize the limits of military action and the necessity that military action be part of a national effort reminds both senior political leaders and the American citizenry that waging and winning a war is a shared, military-political-social responsibility—not solely a military one.

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Lt. Gen. James Dubik, U.S. Army retired, a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army. He holds a doctorate from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and is the author of Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory.