Integrating conventional forces with regular and irregular partner forces in large-scale combat operations is vital to success on the contemporary battlefield. In Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, both sides fight for advantage by synchronizing conventional and special operations forces.

To train for future battles, the U.S. Army’s I Corps in December 2024 conducted Warfighter 25-02 in conjunction with exercise Yama Sakura 87, primarily in Japan, and successfully integrated 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). Warfighter exercises train Army units in a simulated, multidomain, large-scale conflict against a peer-level threat. I Corps integrated 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB by operationalizing enduring relationships to conduct iterative training, integrating liaison officers into the corps battle rhythm and deliberately employing these unique units within the corps operational framework.

While conventional forces working alongside special operations forces is not a new phenomenon, all three U.S. Indo-Pacific Command-aligned headquarters, I Corps, 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB, prioritized training and synchronization for Warfighter 25-02 to generate a model for future integration. While both 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB are staffed, trained and equipped to work alongside partner forces, they provide different functions.

Special Forces units specialize in operating by, with and through irregular partner forces while operating independently in denied areas. SFABs train partnered conventional forces while coordinating with conventional Army forces. Both these formations offer an asymmetrical advantage to formations by synchronizing the effects of their partner forces.

Building Relationships

I Corps leveraged enduring relationships with 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB to begin successive training for Warfighter 25-02. All three Indo-Pacific Command-aligned units are collocated at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, which allows for habitual, face-to-face, formal and informal interactions to build relationships across echelon.

Proximity enables the three units to increase shared understanding, strengthen interdependencies and build mutual trust. At quarterly forward operations coordination and synchronization meetings on Joint Base Lewis-McChord, I Corps coordinates with other Indo-Pacific Command-aligned units, to include 5th SFAB and 1st Special Forces Group, to align efforts within the Indo-Pacific Command campaign plan and identify opportunities to collaborate.

Beginning in December 2023, I Corps undertook a comprehensive 12-month progression through the command post training tables in conjunction with existing Indo-Pacific Command exercises. I Corps’ training included five command post exercises, a staff exercise, a trilateral planning exercise and two separate weeks of academics.

The participation of 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB throughout these training events was critical to maturing relationships, understanding capabilities and refining standard operations procedures. Commanders from both 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB were personally involved in many of these events and emphasized the importance of training integration in their formations.

The command emphasis on participation and engagement at all levels assisted staff efforts to remove organizational barriers, quickly solve interoperability issues as they arose and contributed to a desire for a robust culture of liaison officer exchange. The collaborative training between I Corps, 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB was instrumental to the success of Warfighter 25-02.

Getting the Rhythm

Both 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB deployed liaison officers at the corps and division headquarters to integrate fully into the corps’ battle rhythm.

The 1st Special Forces Group headquarters collocated itself with the I Corps headquarters to streamline information sharing and command decision-making. I Corps created a “liaison officer academy,” an onboarding process to quickly teach incoming liaison officers about corps standard operating procedures. The liaison officers were present within the current operations cell, future operations cell and sustainment node to exchange up-to-date information and participate in battle rhythm events across warfighting functions to synchronize actions up to 96 hours in the future.

For intelligence inputs into the battle rhythm, both 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB provided knowledge of how the partner force fought and knowledge of the civilian populace that I Corps alone could not gather.

First Special Forces Group operated ahead of the forward line of troops and prioritized integrating intelligence, targeting and shaping for division operations in the corps close area. Group fires officers directly participated in the corps multidomain effects cell to synchronize special operations with lethal and nonlethal effects. I Corps also established a direct fires net with 1st Special Forces Group units of action to provide dedicated, responsive corps fires. First Special Forces Group established a separate special operations forces liaison element with the 11th Airborne Division and the 25th Infantry Division to offer the corps and group commanders flexibility and speed of synchronization between units.

Partner Coordination

For 5th SFAB, its partner force suffered extensive casualties before friendly U.S. forces arrived to aid it. Thus, the partner force was incapable of sustained unilateral combat operations. However, 5th SFAB was able to coordinate with its partners to secure rear areas, freeing up I Corps’ organic combat power to mass in the close area. With this security mission set, 5th SFAB was closely synchronizing with the I Corps deputy commander of protection and maneuver enhancement brigades fighting in the corps rear area. Incorporating 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB into the corps battle rhythm and emphasizing the most relevant warfighting functions allowed I Corps to synchronize these asymmetric effects with its maneuver units’ decisive points.

I Corps concentrated its organic combat power in the corps’ close area by employing 5th SFAB’s partner forces primarily in the corps rear area, while 1st Special Forces Group primarily operated in the corps deep area.

To maximize its autonomy, 1st Special Forces Group arrayed its forces ahead of the corps close area to disrupt the enemy’s rear areas. Keeping the preponderance of 1st Special Forces Group combat power in the corps deep area and reporting directly to I Corps headquarters with liaison officers at the divisions successfully reduced fratricide to special operations units.

Fifth SFAB’s partner unit started the exercise unable to mass combat power in the close area but did prove effective at securing corps support areas and ground lines of communication. Fifth SFAB also coordinated with its partner forces to screen maneuver units in the corps close area. Separating these units largely out of the corps close area reduced fratricide risk and simplified command and control to maximize each unit’s availability to fight free.

Friction Points

Although synchronization between I Corps, 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB was largely successful, some friction remained—primarily concerning command relationships.

During Warfighter 25-02, 1st Special Forces Group had a coordinating relationship with I Corps and thus, the corps could not directly task 1st Special Forces Group, as the group took orders from a higher special operations headquarters. One symptom of this relationship was mismatched high-priority target lists. In some instances, 1st Special Forces Group units fixed on a target of opportunity that was not executed because those units were not on I Corps’ high-priority target list at the time, only to be added later after the fix was lost.

Another command relationship friction occurred when 1st Special Forces Group planned operations in the corps close area with a division battlespace owner who requested tactical control of the special operations unit, which 1st Special Forces Group was unable to grant. From 1st Special Forces Group’s higher special operations headquarters perspective, further delegation of tactical control of the special operations unit of action would remove the group’s own ability to support and reposition to support the joint force commander’s priorities. Ultimately, the 1st Special Forces Group mission was canceled, and the division suffered more casualties seizing a crucial objective because of it.

Warfighter 25-02 provided an invaluable opportunity to capture lessons learned for conventional, special operations and security force assistance in large-scale combat operations.

Lesson 1: Enduring relationships and training are invaluable. Conventional and special operations units cannot simply show up to a warfighter exercise and prepare to integrate. I Corps used a 12-month training progression with 1st Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB in conjunction with existing exercises to prepare. Habitual and persistent engagement is required to build shared understanding and mutual trust.

Lesson 2: Liaison officers are critical to integration. To truly achieve integration, special operations units and SFABs must provide multiple liaison officers, ideally across war-fighting functions in 24-hour shifts. However, at a minimum, there should be a current operations-oriented liaison officer pair and future operations-oriented liaison officer pair. These liaison officers also should be the same personnel conducting the training progression before operational execution. I Corps created a liaison officer academy during the onboarding process to quickly teach incoming liaison officers about  corps standard operating procedures. Liaison officers at the corps and division level worked in this warfighter exercise as the primary conventional units of action. Possessing experienced liaison officers also mattered. First Special Forces Group and 5th SFAB both provided lieutenant colonels, post company command officers and senior NCOs at corps and division level.

Lesson 3: Special operations forces must be synchronized with other multidomain effects to best enable maneuver. The senior special operations headquarters in the area of operations should coordinate with the conventional headquarters directly responsible for the preponderance of targeting in the deep area—most likely a corps. This is the most direct path to synchronize effects and avoid fratricide. Special operations elements must coordinate at echelon throughout the battlefield framework to appropriately support the battlespace owner whose deep area it is, aligning special operations sensing with joint or land component targeting requirements.

Lesson 4: Understand the operational framework and command relationships. Although special operations forces and SFAB units have a greater degree of autonomy in corps rear and deep areas, they still can provide an asymmetrical advantage in the corps close area. However, operating in the close area requires greater degrees of synchronization at lower tactical echelons. Special operations units traditionally operate under a separate chain of command from conventional battle space owners who are responsible for security and clearing fires. This friction can be mitigated through liaison officers, integrated command and control networks and rehearsals.

Lesson 5: Conventional planners must budget longer lead times for partner force operations. Working with partner forces takes more time between receiving a mission and execution because of translation processes, diverging objectives and varying levels of influence over these forces. Conventional and special operations planners must tightly couple to anticipate and synchronize future operations with the minimum of a 96-hour time horizon.

Conventional force headquarters should apply these lessons with special operations and SFAB units to achieve greater interoperability during training to better prepare both forces to fight and win on the future battlefield.

Maj. Galen Dahl contributed to this article.

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Maj. Mark Thomas is a Special Forces officer serving as the deputy of future operations, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Previously, he was a student at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. He deployed twice to Afghanistan and once to Syria.

Maj. Brian Graham is a space officer serving in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Base Lewis-McChord.

Maj. Nathan Freeman is a psychological operations officer serving in 5th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne), 1st Special Forces Group.