The national security world is changing as dramatically as it did in the wake of the 9/11 attacks or the collapse of the Soviet Union, although this time in anticipation of a future event rather than in response to a current one.
The scope and scale of the changes were evident in Wiesbaden, Germany, on July 16 and 17 as the Association of the United States Army held its inaugural LANDEURO conference. Modeled on AUSA’s long-standing LANPAC conferences held in Hawaii every year, LANDEURO brought together more than 2,200 military officers, academics, diplomats and business leaders associated with national security in Europe to the German city that hosts the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. They came to discuss national security challenges the region’s countries face.
Refreshingly, and unusually, names were named: the threat to Europe is Russia and its partners.

Longtime Menace
That threat is not new; it has been clear since the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, likely in response to President George W. Bush’s announcement that Georgia and Ukraine would someday join NATO. Russia continued its assault on Central European democracies with an attack on Ukraine’s east in 2014 by “little green men” and, of course, showed the extent of its hunger for control of Ukraine with the open invasion of that country in February 2022. Ukraine’s courageous and inspiring resistance has led to the biggest war in Europe since World War II and has prompted some observers to suggest that this is more than a regional war and may mark the opening battles of another world war.
In fact, the opening panel at LANDEURO consisted of Finnish and Australian flag officers and myself debating just that question, whether “World War Next” already has begun.
The threat to Europe is not new. What is new, and what occasioned the first of what is likely to be many LANDEURO conferences, is that Europe collectively has decided to do something about the threat it faces. The recent decision by NATO to request its members to spend 3.5% of their GDP on defense, with an additional 1.5% on defense-related expenditures, such as bridges and railroads that can carry tanks east to confront Russia, is an extraordinary national security event.
It is comparable to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to begin arming America in 1939 prior to the onset of the Second World War. Just six months ago, many NATO members were uncertain about their commitment to spend the required 2% of GDP on defense.

(Credit: U.S. Army/1st Sgt. Luisito Brooks)
Resource Allocation
The proposed change in expenditures can be measured in the trillions of dollars over the next decade, and what to spend the dollars on was one of the main focal points of LANDEURO. A panel I chaired examined Ukrainian innovations in manned and unmanned ground, sea and especially air systems and provided a number of lessons for European observers about what works, what doesn’t, and what they should procure, how and how quickly.
The exhibit space was full and well attended. Speakers included U.S. Army Europe and Africa commander Gen. Christoper Donahue, who urged industry leaders to be more responsive to current demands and more innovative in their thinking, and Ukrainian representatives, who volunteered to let industry test their weapons systems in combat against Russian invaders.
The change was palpable. Thirty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the ahistorical belief that Europe was immune to the ravages of war, national security is again front and center in the region that spawned the two world wars and the Cold War that marred the last century.
Speakers agreed that Russia would not be content with eating and digesting Ukraine but would continue its aggression, likely against the Baltic nations. Donahue made news by warning Russia that it, too, could lose territory in a future war against NATO; Kaliningrad is geographically vulnerable should full-scale war erupt again in Europe. There was a consensus that defeating Russia in Ukraine is essential to deterring further Russian adventurism and the possibility of another global war.
Impossible to overlook during the discussion, looking over Europe’s collective shoulder, was another possible theater of war in Asia. For the past decade, America has spoken of a “pivot to Asia,” prioritizing the deterrence of China over other national security threats in Europe and the Middle East.
While it is undeniably true that the world’s second-largest economic power is pursuing an extraordinary defense buildup that threatens regional security and perhaps even the rules-based international order, it is not true that war with China is inevitable. Nor is it true that the U.S. cannot deter a great power war in Asia and Europe simultaneously, as it has for the past 75 years.
Deterrence of China
While the Pentagon proclaims China is America’s pacing challenge, at present China is a challenge and not a threat. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, including China’s mercantilist economy, its challenging domestic political situation, and even the terrain of Taiwan and weather in the Taiwan Straits, full-scale war between the U.S. and China is unlikely—and Europe is pivotal to not just preserving this state of affairs, but enhancing deterrence of China.
And the key is Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inability to conquer a smaller nation with which Russia shares a long contiguous land border—one that has little natural terrain to preempt the maneuver of armored vehicles—is sending a clear message to Beijing.
The extraordinary support of the international community for the fighters of Ukraine, and punishing economic sanctions the world has imposed on Russia for its flagrant violations of international law, have to date rendered Putin’s “special military operation” one of the biggest geopolitical miscalculations of modern times. Chinese President Xi Jinping has noticed and, despite his “unlimited partnership” with Putin, has so far refrained from openly engaging in combat with the West, likely because of well-justified fears of the economic repercussions of doing so and the resulting political risk in a country already facing trade headwinds.
China is a cautious country; it is unlikely to risk war to capture Taiwan, short of that nation declaring full independence, so long as the free world remains determined to defend freedom where it is most challenged. Today, the answer to that question is clear. Ukraine is fighting the only open war against the “Axis of Upheaval,” supported by NATO and dozens of other countries around the globe. The message of LANDEURO should be embraced by the free world: To deter China, defend Ukraine.
John Nagl is professor of Warfighting Studies at the U.S. Army War College, where he directs the Ukraine War Integrated Research Project.