A Study of Post-Combat Urban Renewal

Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery from War. Russell Glenn. KeyPoint Press (An AUSA Title). 532 pages. Hardcover $34.99; paperback $24.99

By Col. Liam Collins, U.S. Army retired

While the war in Ukraine rages, it is never too early to consider how its cities can best recover after the war. At least, that is what Russell Glenn reminds us in Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us About Recovery from War.

By drawing on his 30-plus years as a security and urban studies researcher, Glenn offers insights into how Ukraine, and specifically its cities, could best recover from its current devastation. His insights are informed by examining the efforts of Berlin, Tokyo and Manila in the Philippines following World War II, and Sarajevo following the Bosnian War in the early 1990s. While cities like Berlin and Tokyo thrive, Glenn notes that their rebuilding efforts were far from perfect—they were, as is almost always the case, messy, inefficient and problematic affairs.

By examining these previous recovery efforts, Glenn offers best practices that should be applied in Ukraine. He provides recommendations on how to more efficiently and effectively distribute aid, planning considerations, leadership and management methods, best approaches for housing and other infrastructure recovery, health care considerations and the challenge of demining.

One overarching theme is that it will be too late to start planning for the rebuilding and recovery effort after the war is over. It takes time to plan a rebuilding effort that costs hundreds of billions of dollars and involves myriad domestic, international and nongovernment actors. Whether a plan exists, Glenn reminds the reader that rebuilding continues even while war rages. Kyiv started to rebuild as soon as the Russians withdrew from the area in April 2022.

Glenn also makes the important distinction that the recovery efforts of cities in the same war can be different. The Russians reached the outskirts of Kharkiv but never occupied it. Kherson was occupied for several months before being liberated, and Mariupol will have been occupied for years before it is liberated. Replacing Russian street signs with Ukrainian ones is an easy and more visible recovery effort. But cities like Mariupol face the daunting challenge of how to recover after having had its young people systematically educated with a Russian curriculum.

Glenn also spends a fair amount of time discussing the dark side of recovery and the challenges of corruption and the black market. He offers a more pragmatic view of the black market, recognizing it often is a necessary evil that can be dealt with later.

Despite his intensive look at recovery, Glenn overlooks one area. Multiple times he makes the point that “the end of (or pause in) Ukraine’s war will not be the cessation of conflict with Russia,” yet he fails to point out that part of Ukraine’s recovery effort should focus on rebuilding its cities to be more defensible from future attack. He misses the opportunity to discuss rebuilding efforts such as modern moats (steeped bank cement irrigation ditches), that make a city more defensible against future attacks.

Brutal Catalyst is a good read for anyone interested in understanding the challenges associated with post-conflict operations, or “Phase IV” as it is often known. It offers great insight into the messiness of recovery and ways recovery can be done better.

Col. Liam Collins, U.S. Army retired, is the former director of the Modern War Institute at West Point, New York. As a career Special Forces officer, he conducted multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. He holds a doctorate in public affairs from Princeton University, New Jersey.

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National Security Meets Silicon Valley

The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West. Alexander Karp and Nicholas Zamiska. Crown Currency. 320 pages. $30

By Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, U.S. Army retired

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools,” Thucydides wrote over 2,500 years ago. Alexander Karp and Nicholas Zamiska’s book provides a twist on this quote from the ancient Greek historian and general by substituting Silicon Valley software companies in the place of scholars. The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West is a full-throated call to arms to both the software elite and the military establishment to unite in America’s defense and, perhaps more importantly, to make a philosophical commitment to Western ideals.

This book is important at this moment in history for two reasons. First, Karp and Zamiska believe the advance of artificial intelligence will rapidly change warfare with the rise of swarming autonomous weapons. Second, they presage the current turning point in the relationship between these companies and the Pentagon.

The authors wade deeply into this current culture war, pointing out that the previous “purity” that separated the public and private sectors has come at a cost. They self-describe this book as a “political treatise” that endeavors to investigate the main principles of theory and action for America’s collective defense and, as such, is more philosophical than technical. For those inside the defense establishment, understanding that these software companies are built with an engineering culture, one focused on outcomes over process, will be beneficial to moderating a Pentagon bureaucracy too often obsessed with process.

Karp and Zamiska provide a brief history starting with what they call the “union of science and state” that built what we know today as Silicon Valley. They document how Silicon Valley came to focus on the individual at the expense of larger national needs such as medicine and defense, and make the case that software companies have “an affirmative obligation to support the state.”

Similarly, they posit that the government also must adapt because its systems and processes are based on distrust. Karp and Zamiska describe the state of artificial intelligence (AI) and how it is time for the U.S. to harness it to build AI weaponry to guarantee America’s future. Additionally, they posit that the rise of AI will transition the world away from atomic weapons as a means of deterrence and toward a new era where AI weaponry is the main means of deterrence. They call this the “software century.”

Perhaps the most important section of the book for military professionals is called “The Engineering Mindset.” The authors compare engineering to improvisational comedy and the need to abandon what one thinks “ought to work in favor of what does work.”

This polemic is timely given the changes occurring within the American government, military and society at large. The authors believe a commitment to free markets and collective experiences is essential to harnessing the powers of AI for America’s collective defense.

This book is not for everyone. It is a clear and concise road map of the ideological struggle the U.S. is engaged in, with a focus on defense technology and national security. One should read The Technological Republic with an open mind to understand where defense technological innovation is coming from in the next decade.

Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, U.S. Army retired, is a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. He served 32 years, including deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and during Operation Desert Storm.

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Green Beret Goes to War in Iraq in Gritty Memoir

Grit to Glory: A Green Beret’s Journey from West Virginia to the Streets of Baghdad. Darrell Utt With Lauren Ungeldi. Ballast Books. 296 pages. $29.99

By Lt. Col. Zachary Griffiths

Author Darryl Utt and I share much in common. We are both Green Berets who served in 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), he in Iraq and I in Afghanistan. Our detachments both earned the Larry Thorne Award, 10th Group’s highest honor, his in 2006 and mine in 2014. Though we have never met, I opened his book, Grit to Glory: A Green Beret’s Journey from West Virginia to the Streets of Baghdad, eager to learn more about 10th Group’s history in Iraq.

Grit to Glory generally succeeds in inspiring readers to maximize their potential by showcasing what Green Berets endure and achieve. Utt’s memoir, written with Lauren Ungeldi, sits alongside classics like James Rowe’s Five Years to Freedom: The True Story of a Vietnam POW and The Three Wars of Roy Benavidez, by Roy Benavidez and Oscar Griffin, but with a narrower focus—one team, one deployment. Written in plain, unvarnished prose and filled with candid, often profane, storytelling, Grit to Glory drops readers into the world of Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 043 in Baghdad.

Utt covers his 2006 deployment, bookended by a brief look at his background and a closing section on his personal leadership philosophy, “the Grit Code.” The first chapter describes his upbringing in rural Huntington, West Virginia, and how he found the U.S. Army and the Green Berets. From there, he details how his detachment overcame leadership skepticism to establish itself as a lethal force in Baghdad.

The book’s greatest strength is its stories of creative problem-solving in combat. One standout example comes in the chapter “Honey Trappin,’ ” where ODA 043 baited an insurgent leader called Omar out of the sanctuary of Sadr City with the promise of a tryst. Others showcase how Utt integrated “psychic intelligence” into his unit’s targeting, deceived the insurgents with civilian vehicles and undermined insurgent leaders by stealing cars. A strong section on innovation in the Grit Code reinforces these stories, leaving much for sometimes risk-averse military leaders to reflect on.

I also appreciated how Grit to Glory includes the less glamorous and sometimes outright confusing elements of counterinsurgency. In one chapter, Utt’s detachment battles ski mask-wearing insurgents who effectively bob, weave and counterattack—but neither Utt nor the reader ever determine who they are. While Utt’s team has its share of wins, other operations end in dry holes without capturing their target. Including these grittier stories leaves a stronger, more realistic impression that other books might exclude.

Unfortunately, Grit to Glory’s prose sometimes fails to immerse the reader. Humor and descriptions of practical jokes occasionally fall flat. In other places, copy-editing errors—such as referring to the M240 machine gun as “.240,” as if it were a caliber—can be jarring for military readers.

Still, the book delivers genuine emotional weight. One standout moment comes in Chapter 11, when Utt pauses in the middle of an operation to call his son for his birthday. For those of us who have served, the tension between duty and family is all too real. And while ODAs are tight, competitive brotherhoods, this book makes that camaraderie accessible even to readers with no military background.

Grit to Glory presents an important reflection on Utt’s experiences in Iraq. I recommend this book for those looking for recollections of the war in Iraq and for those trying to understand the Green Berets. Utt has another volume in the works covering his 2007 deployment. Give this copy a read so you’re ready for the next one.

Lt. Col. Zachary Griffiths commands 4th Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Carson, Colorado. Previously, he led The Harding Project in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. He deployed once to Iraq and twice to Afghanistan. He graduated in 2007 from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

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Well-Told Story Highlights End of WWII

Victory ’45: The End of the War in Eight Surrenders. James Holland and Al Murray. Atlantic Monthly Press. 288 pages. $28

By Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army retired

James Holland has delivered another well-told story, this time with the help of British comedian Al Murray, who also has published on World War II. Holland and Murray, who co-host the successful podcast We Have Ways of Making You Talk, unite to write the story of the end of World War II. Victory ’45: The End of the War in Eight Surrenders describes the ugly end of the uglier horror of World War II.

The surrender in Europe occurred in six regions: Berlin; Italy; northern Germany; southern Germany; in a formal surrender to the Western Allies at Reims, France; and to the Soviets in Berlin. The surrenders in Europe began in Berlin on May 2, 1945, with the last occurring on May 9. Japan informally capitulated in mid-August, then signed the official surrender on Sept. 2.

The book analyzes these events in the context of the doctrine of unconditional surrender that was arrived at and articulated by President Franklin Roosevelt, and accepted by the Allies. There would be no negotiating with the enemy.

The lurid end of Adolf Hitler’s dream for a “1,000-year Reich” is seen through the eyes of generals, soldiers and civilians. Despite the clarity of purpose shown by the Allies, in every surrender, the Germans sought to find a way to save themselves—and, in some cases, their soldiers—from the consequences of their actions.

In Italy, for example, two equally outrageous SS officers competed for the opportunity to surrender German forces in the hopes that doing so would curry favor with the victors. The one who lost went to the gallows, as both should have.

The book’s account of the end of the war in the Pacific should be read by anyone who wonders why the U.S. resorted to the atomic bomb. The fight for Okinawa—characterized by kamikazes, suicidal ground attacks and civilians leaping from cliffs—convinced American leaders that Japan would fight to the last man, woman or child on the home islands, leading to unimaginable casualties on both sides. The Potsdam Declaration issued in July 1945 promised “prompt and utter destruction” if Japan did not surrender, and soon.

Japan’s war cabinet deserved this threat, but it was Japanese civilians who bore the brunt of their policy. Even after Col. Paul Tibbets and the crew of the Enola Gay vaporized between 66,000 and 100,000 people in Hiroshima on Aug. 6, the book recounts, the cabinet remained divided on whether to continue the fight. On Aug. 9, the Americans killed 60,000 more Japanese at Nagasaki, the book says. Still, Minister of War Gen. Korechika Anami, as well as the army and navy chiefs, wanted to fight on. Finally, after a failed coup, the emperor accepted the inevitable and advised the nation of the surrender without using the word, stating that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.”

Victory ’45 is not an academic history. It adds little to the historiography of World War II. It will not satisfy the historians who find the Americans at fault for dropping not one, but two, atomic bombs on Japan. But it is a story well told and one that should be read.

Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army retired, commanded a tank battalion in Operation Desert Storm and an armor brigade in Bosnia. A former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, his most recent book is No Sacrifice Too Great: The 1st Infantry Division in World War II.