Iraq was the last experience the U.S. Army had with large-scale combat operations and the transition from combat to stability operations. Iraq war veterans remember the long and fast march from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad. We remember the battle for Saddam International Airport and the Battle of Baghdad. In one or two generations, history may forget our decades-long battle to bring peace and stability to Iraq once we concluded major combat operations. It may forget that critical period that marked the transition from combat to stability operations.

However, the “what comes next” phase after combat is the most important part. If it’s bad, many people suffer, soldiers die and original war aims may not be achieved. Army commanders, planners and strategists must consider the transition from combat to stability operations as the decisive point in the war—any war. This is the critical point in time and space where the U.S. must surge national power, resources and attention to achieve strategic objectives and political aims. Actions at lower tactical and operational levels must align quickly and perfectly or else the post-combat transition to stability becomes fragile, like a house of cards or a powder keg.

Iraq, April 2003

Soon after U.S. forces rolled into Baghdad on April 7, 2003, the thunder of mechanized combat gave way to an eerie silence. The city was a mosaic of jubilation, uncertainty, fear and latent hostility. Baghdad was a city in shock.

It didn’t take long for lawlessness to intensify in the form of looting, arson and rampant violence. Critical infrastructure collapsed within days. Soldiers encountered civilians desperate for security and basic services, yet wary of foreign troops.

The adrenaline of high-intensity combat faded into the ambiguity of governance and law enforcement. The 3rd Infantry Division’s plans and orders, taking us from Kuwait to Baghdad, stopped here. The U.S.-led coalition needed to create a new plan quickly because Baghdad’s deteriorating conditions were worsening and spreading to other population centers across the country. Iran, Syria and foreign terrorist organizations saw opportunities to extend their influence and pursue their own ends.

At the time, there were many moving parts at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Tactical units—like the one I was assigned to—shifted into roles resembling police, security guards and civil administrators. We secured key sites, leveraged local leaders and maintained a persistent presence. Units improvised checkpoints, guarded hospitals and tried to restore order while preparing for residual enemy resistance. The Army also adapted at the operational level by quickly flowing additional forces into Iraq to secure key population centers.

The strategy for post-war Iraq also adapted. Congress quickly appropriated supplemental funding to resource the effort, and the U.S.-led coalition surged interagency resources to Iraq to address economic gaps and provide interim governance. The transition to stability operations saw pockets of success at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. However, the ambiguity following the rapid collapse of Iraq’s military and government inhibited clarity and synergy across the chain of command.

Changing Priorities

Directives pertaining to security, employment, critical infrastructure and public services were confusing, open to interpretation and changed frequently. Priorities changed time and again. It often resulted in too many soldiers assigned to unimportant tasks and too few soldiers or the wrong soldiers assigned to the important ones. Additionally, it meant the Army drew unit operating boundaries incorrectly, in ways that suboptimized stability efforts.

It took nearly a year to connect new political aims at the top to individual soldier actions at the bottom. This lack of vertical integration and unity of effort had consequences. The years 2003–2004 were decisive, but witnessed coalition inaction, delayed actions, overreactions and missed opportunities. Consequently, it set Iraq on a course of instability that would take more than a decade to resolve. Crime, sectarian violence, insurgency and international terrorism took root and quickly became the new norm.

When the Army conducts large-scale combat operations to overthrow a hostile government or save a friendly one, the transition itself becomes the decisive point, not the combat preceding it. Past experiences in places like Panama in 1989 demonstrate that transitions can be seamless when alternative leaders with legitimacy and popular support are installed quickly, and bordering countries avoid interference. Iraq had neither condition, and it was more complex than Panama.

Consequently, Army commanders, planners and strategists must take the long view when faced with complex post-war conditions like Iraq. Combat becomes one of many steps in a long journey to achieve political aims. We would need to think of war as a marathon, not a sprint. However, we can accelerate desired outcomes and minimize the burden by planning ahead and ensuring that the right actions and resources are applied to the right conditions in the days, weeks and months that follow the last shots fired in anger.

The Army can achieve stability quickly if done right, slowly if mistakes are made within the framework of a sound plan, or possibly never if a framework does not exist. Post-war actions matter in the days, weeks and months following major combat operations. Good transitions can result in minimal commitment and a swift exit. Conversely, bad transitions prolong and expand the commitment.

The combat phase of the Iraq War lasted less than a month, but its cost in blood and treasure was modest when compared to the following decades. Today, 23 years later, the Iraq scorecard is mixed. It maintains stability and a tenuous peace, and prosperity is trending in a positive direction. The benefit of going to war in Iraq relative to its cost will continue to be the source of much debate for years to come.

The stakes are higher now than in 2003. Post-conflict stability operations in Iraq would have been even more deadly and costlier today than two decades ago. The world lives in the age of social media, smartphones are everywhere. The explosion of “Internet of Things” technologies means people live under constant surveillance. 

Now, even the most unsophisticated adversary can gain access to commercial satellite imagery and low-cost, bomb-dropping commercial drones. Critical infrastructure would be more difficult to protect. Morale would be tougher to maintain because soldiers would have no respite from enemy contact. It could prompt an overreaction, resulting in undesirable outcomes inhibiting troops’ efforts to achieve stability. Kinetic effects on U.S. forces would be daunting but would pale in comparison to non-kinetic effects generated from the information domain. Winning hearts and minds would be harder—printed U.S. leaflets would compete against a barrage of internet memes and other forms of harmful clickbait our adversaries are free to post online.

Key Recommendations

Leaders and staff officers must clarify the operational plan’s desired end state at all levels early on, and the intended ways and means must pass the test for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability and completeness. That is fundamental. The best planning teams identify the complex pieces required to transition from combat to stability. Additionally, planners must determine how best to integrate the pieces together and should accurately and realistically determine the level of effort to complete the mission. Furthermore, planners must make the right assumptions in the next war. That is important. More importantly, planners must stress-test the plan, using either traditional wargaming techniques or other methods.

In my current role as an Army acquisition officer, I often say optimism has no place in the complex information technology (IT) projects I manage. Optimism is irrational, and it can act like a virus infecting every aspect of a project, dooming it to failure. In every post-mortem I have done on failed IT projects, I could trace the failure’s root cause to a flawed plan with bad assumptions and irrational optimism.

Consequently, I now require my teams to do “pre-mortems” before we commit to a project plan. Pre-mortems reframe the plan as a failure. This prospective hindsight can be powerful, eliminating bias and irrational optimism because the team must first accept their plan has failed. Then, the team can rationally determine the root causes of that failure and put measures in place to prevent that failure’s occurrence after the plan is in motion. Had we done a pre-mortem in 2002 to stress-test the Iraq war plan, the outcome in terms of regional impact may have been different.

Train Now

The Army has the right doctrine in place to guide the next post-conflict transition to stability operations. However, the Army will fall short of meeting its goals if it does not prepare and train for these transitions before conflict unfolds. The next transition in the next conflict will require trained soldiers and leaders at all levels who know what to do and the quick actions to take to stabilize the situation and achieve a quick exit. Training must include joint and interagency partners, given their important roles during transition.

The Army needs to be just as good at transitioning from combat as it is at transitioning to combat, because its adversaries are watching and may be deterred from acting if they see the Army fight and win on the battlefield, then transition to stability operations quickly and seamlessly. Furthermore, it will give U.S. political leaders more options when considering whether to deploy its land army in the next conflict. 

Securing the Peace

The Army’s ability to dominate in large-scale combat is unquestioned, but victory on the battlefield is only the opening act. The true test of strategic success lies in what happens after the last shot is fired. Future conflicts may demand that Army leadership treat the transition to stability operations as the decisive point, not an afterthought.

The contemporary operating environment poses challenges unseen and unimagined back in 2003. The world has changed since then. It has gotten more complex and undeniably more technocentric and dangerous. The next transition to stability operations will require early, unbiased planning to be successful. Robust plans, training hard and resourcing smart can facilitate speed, integration and clarity in those first chaotic days and weeks. It could mean the difference between a six-week, post-combat commitment or a 60-year commitment.

The good news is that today’s Army is better positioned than ever to meet this challenge. It has the doctrine, experience and talent to turn lessons learned into action. If the Army commits to rehearsing transitions as rigorously as its troops rehearse assaults, it will not only win the fight, it also will secure the peace. And in the end, that is what victory truly means.

Lt. Col. Scott Rutter, U.S. Army retired, contributed to this article.

Col. Matthew Paul is an Army acquisition officer leading modernization efforts across the Army. He is currently assigned to Program Executive Office Enterprise as a project manager and acting deputy PEO at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He has 27 years in leadership positions serving in infantry and acquisition command assignments, including multiple combat tours in Iraq. He is co-author of Damn Fine Soldiers with Lt. Col. Scott Rutter, U.S. Army retired.