Twenty-five years ago this August, Saddam Hussein’s army overran the emirate of Kuwait in a matter of hours. President George H.W. Bush acted decisively and rapidly and consistent with long-standing U.S. policy. “We had no formal commitment to Kuwait or other states in the region, but our interests there had been declared in statements by every president since Eisenhower.” After some intense National Security Council meetings and consultations, Bush declared on Aug. 5, 1990, “This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait.” The result of this decisive response was a 38-nation international coalition, the largest military alliance since World War II.The U.S. alone deployed 540,000 well-trained, well-equipped troops, joined by tens of thousands of other nations’ soldiers. By the end of February, less than seven months after the invasion, Kuwait was liberated and the Iraq military defeated. The First Gulf War seemed then, and to some extent now, a singular one with a decisive outcome that some saw as a harbinger of the future and others as a previous era’s last war. By March, the U.S. was pulling out of the Persian Gulf after a cease-fire agreement was signed.Within days of the Kuwait invasion, the 82nd Airborne Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps, which had successfully executed Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989, arrived in Saudi Arabia to establish the defense of the kingdom under the operational code name of Desert Shield. VII Corps was ordered to the Middle East on Nov. 8 with what, for most, was a no-notice announcement to units and families because planning had been restricted to a small group. Rapid ExpansionU.S. VII Corps rapidly expanded, going from a Germany-stationed peacetime strength of 76,000 soldiers to 146,000 American and British soldiers deployed in Desert Storm. Forty percent of the final deployed VII Corps had been VII Corps in Germany. Such rapid expansion while deploying and preparing for offensive operations depended on the entire U.S. Army plus selfless teamwork and disciplined battle-focused training in the desert by soldiers and leaders. VII Corps units were drawn from forward-deployed corps, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Forces Command, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, the British Army, and two Return of Forces to Germany units—the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kan., and the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas. The British 1st Armored Division joined VII Corps in Saudi Arabia, marking the first time since World War II that U.S. and British forces were together in the desert.Pulling units from Europe marked a role reversal, as the focus for decades had been on receiving units deploying from the U.S. to execute the NATO General Defense Plan, not on sending units to fight elsewhere. Deployment from Germany alone required 152 ships, plus air movement. Thus, deploying VII Corps was a first for U.S. Army Europe, as was leaving already-deployed families in Germany. Families rose to the challenge, stayed in Germany, formed family assistance centers, produced newsletters, received great assistance from our German allies and neighbors close to our kasernes, and together with families of deployed units in the U.S., implemented many actions that later helped form the basis for current family readiness groups, whose families serve with such courage in this 9/11 generation.The 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley was well down the priority list. The Big Red One’s equipment was not fully modernized. As a unit assigned to European defense, the division was expected to draw prepositioned equipment on arrival. It was also manned at no more than 90 percent of its authorized strength. New equipment, freshly painted desert tan, was received, and replacements were assigned, although some joined the division after it reached the Saudi desert. Some corps units exploded in size. The 2nd Corps Support Command, for example, grew from fewer than 8,000 soldiers to more than 26,000 as it accepted the attachment of units, many with which it had never worked.160 Kilometers in Two DaysCorps units closed from early December 1990 to mid-February 1991 in areas 400–500 kilometers from ports, assuming responsibility for defending a sector of Kuwait, joining and learning from our comrades in XVIII Corps and Marines, some of whom had been in the desert since August. After planning and rehearsing intense, large-scale desert maneuvers and live-fire exercises even as accepting new arriving units, VII Corps maneuvered farther west over 160 kilometers over two days in a rehearsal of the actual attack, and then attacked on Feb. 24 to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command in our sector of attack, east of XVIII Corps’ comprising Third Army attack, an operation demonstrating the wisdom of decisions made since the end of the Vietnam War.Since the early 1970s, the Army moved from a conscript to a volunteer force, a change that included integration of women. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command made revolutionary changes in building a cohesive force of professional soldiers with an intense ethos of being trained and ready, as well as improving leader development, and focused on winning. The Army that went to war in 1990 was the best-trained force ever fielded by the U.S. and also one with a strong support network for military families. The Army also entered the First Gulf War enjoying the benefit of force modernization producing modernized weapons systems, including the Multiple Launch Rocket System, M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter and UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter.This all worked. Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqi army was decimated in just 100 hours. After a six-week air campaign and 30 days of artillery raids and combat deception attacks by 1st Cavalry Division in the Rugi Pocket, VII Corps’ attack began with a deliberate penetration of a complex obstacle system attack by 1st Infantry Division, then passage of 1st British Armored Division attacking east. Simultaneously, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment covering force led the 1st Armored Division and 3rd Armored Division north and west around the breach. On the night of Feb. 26–27, VII Corps turned 90 degrees east and launched three division-coordinated close and deep attacks by 11th Aviation Brigade AH-64s against the Republican Guards and the Jihad Corps, destroying the Tawakalna and Medina divisions of the Republican Guards and the 10th and 12th armored divisions of the Jihad Corps and other units.By the NumbersVII Corps was the largest American armored corps ever to take the field. VII Corps soldiers attacked 250 kilometers in 89 hours, accomplishing the mission while destroying more than 11 Iraqi divisions and 3,900 armored vehicles and other material. Corps units fired 55,000 artillery rounds, 10,500 Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets and 25 Army Tactical Missile System missiles, and used 348 close-support air strikes, mainly A-10s. Corps soldiers fought day and night as a team, soldier to soldier, coalition and corps AH-64 air and ground, artillery, tank, and infantry, with combat support and combat service support in sandstorms and rain. NCO and officer leadership throughout VII Corps formations led with great skill born of hard training and with selfless courage and teamwork.VII Corps ended the war astride the Kuwait-Basra highway south of the attack zone of XVIII Corps, which had cut Highway 8 and then attacked west to east toward Basra. After securing the negotiation site at Safwan, VII Corps units conducted nine weeks of humanitarian support operations, resumed training, maintained security of northern Kuwait, destroyed Iraqi equipment, and moved 11,500 Iraqi refugees by C-130 and other means in late April to a camp built near Rafha, Saudi Arabia. Following passage of UN Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, the corps redeployed to Saudi Arabia and then to Germany and the U.S., leaving one brigade of the 3rd Armored Division in Kuwait. I said then to the corps, “It was short because you prepared so well, trained so hard, and fought with so much skill and courage.”Janus-like EventThe lessons that may have been learned from Operation Desert Storm faded rapidly, overshadowed by the so-called revolution in military affairs, whose advocates concluded that technical means had overtaken what they disparaged as industrial-age warfare. What escaped the attention of pundits is that the nature of war had not fundamentally changed. Instead, Desert Storm was a Janus-like event in which elements of the past and future could both be seen.Looking forward after Desert Storm, the Army did some battle lab and Force XXI experiments and made some wise force modernization investments in emerging Information Age technology to gain better situational awareness and battle command effectiveness, as well as investments in next-generation night vision. These efforts generated increased capability with investing in recapitalizing the force. Yet, the most important revolution in military affairs was not the technical revolution seen in the weapons systems. Rather, it was the revolution rooted in leader development and in well-educated, well-trained, highly motivated soldiers combined with the doctrinal and training revolutions of the 1970s and 1980s that produced AirLand Battle doctrine and the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany, and the Battle Command Training Program. Every one of our VII Corps after-action reviews in units following Desert Storm credited continuous training as well as teamwork and skilled, tough soldiers and leaders who took the fight to the enemy under all conditions.So there is utility in remembering what was learned in that era and what it took to build such a capacity and employ it as the Army works to inculcate Mission Command and seeks to ensure soldiers and leaders are both flexible and adaptable to win in this complex world. These qualities take form not from technology but within the minds and training of our troops and leaders as demonstrated in Desert Storm, and by the current 9/11 generation of soldiers by their skill, results, intense devotion to each other, intrepid courage, and yes, selfless sacrifice in this current 14-year war.___________________________________________________________________________VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans AssociationVII Corps cased its colors in 1992, but its veterans still recall their service together in the VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans Association. The association’s goal is to remember and honor those who did not return and to award scholarships in their memory. Since 1997, $367,000 has been awarded in scholarships.The association will hold a reunion and memorial service in Washington, D.C., in 2016. For details, go to www.desertstormvets.org.___________________________________________________________________________ * * * *