The story of David and Goliath is a popular biblical tale depicting the extraordinary journey of a young shepherd who fearlessly confronts a formidable giant. Armed with only a sling, David defies all odds to fell Goliath and emerge victorious. When considering employment of a simple sling to defeat a larger enemy, the tale highlights that it is not the size difference between opponents that matters, but rather the effectiveness of the weapon itself.
In October 2023, Hamas carried out a large-scale surprise attack against Israel with the help of drones. The crude, inexpensive drones achieved lethal effects against an adversary with more sophisticated weapons and defense systems. Ukraine reportedly has launched over 1.2 million drones as of last year in its war with Russia. In a brazen attack this past June, Ukraine used 117 small drones to target and destroy about a third of Russia’s strategic bombing aircraft.
Deploying Drones
As the U.S. Army looks to counter these evolving threats, it pursues strategies to procure low-cost, commercially available, purpose-built, attritable systems as part of its continuous transformation. If the Army is serious about employing attritable systems to meet these types of dynamic battlefield threats, it must establish clear characterization of capabilities, new cost-estimate approaches and appropriation thresholds, and new acquisition processes to rapidly procure and sustain such capabilities.
Attritable is a new word used within military speak. What does it mean? The term is generally understood as “able to undergo attrition.” However, application in a military context varies. The Air Force has described attritable systems as a new class of purpose-built, reusable, unmanned aircraft that can be produced inexpensively enough for a combatant commander to risk its loss.
Optional Recovery
The Army has referred to its small, uncrewed aircraft as attritable, meaning they may not be recovered after use. A former deputy secretary of war differentiated between expendable and attritable systems, characterizing the latter as having the fuel, endurance and navigation capabilities to make it back to U.S. or allied control for reuse across a 3- to 5-year lifespan. None of these definitions distinguish between prototype development and fielded systems. Without clarity, transformation will become mired in institutional confusion. A precise definition of what “attritable” means, coupled with consistency of its application, is critical prior to embarking on an enterprise strategy of transformation leveraging such capabilities.
Accurately predicting cost thresholds for attritable systems is equally important. This will require new cost-estimate approaches, creation of novel funding models and incorporation of projected costs into the Army’s budgeting and financial planning processes.
As with the definition of attritable, the threshold for “low-cost” also is unclear—is it $5,000, $10,000 or $500,000? In 2020, the Air Force estimated attritable aircraft could cost between $2 million and $20 million per unit. In its fiscal 2025 budget submission to Congress, the Army requested over $20 million in procurement funding for 40 small, uncrewed aircraft systems. By today’s standards, “low-cost” means whatever fits within budgets to allow for large-scale system delivery.
To procure and field materiel solutions, the Army must determine per-unit cost estimates and acceptable thresholds of low-cost attritable systems across the lifecycle of a weapon system. The most logical method to develop cost estimates for acquisition programs would be to assess the cost of drones currently used on the battlefield, and there is no better source of empirical data to begin this development than Ukraine.
The Army should leverage statistical and machine-learning techniques to develop cost-estimate models that can predict the expected costs of deploying and operating attritable systems in different scenarios. Subsequently, based on cost models, the Army should then determine cost thresholds for attritable systems, balancing cost-effectiveness with operational effectiveness.
Novel Approach
Procurement, fielding and sustainment of attritable systems also requires new acquisition and contracting approaches. Rather than adapting existing acquisition processes for large weapon systems to tailor “out” requirements, the Army should create a standalone approach for procurement of attritable systems. The Army requires an innovative acquisition pathway focused on the unique attributes and rapid procurement requirements of these technologies.
During Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the Army routinely leveraged processes and tools outside of traditional cumbersome acquisition processes.
Offer a Framework
Organizations still operating within those early established nonstandard systems can provide valuable insights on building new frameworks for acquisition and sustainment of attritable systems.
Critics argue that congressional appropriations and budget constraints make it challenging to determine how many systems should be purchased, and whether they should be characterized as expendable (as with ammunition) or optionally recoverable. They point out the difficulty in establishing minimal production sustainment rates and difficult logistics considerations across the lifecycle of such equipment; factors that complicate financial planning and audit readiness.
The question of whether it is appropriate to prioritize cost over reliability and effectiveness also looms. However, what is clear is that technology is changing so rapidly on the modern battlefield that traditional program procurement strategies are becoming obsolete.
David’s victory was a masterclass in strategy, adaptability and the effective use of available resources.
If the Army does not develop a procurement strategy that prioritizes speed, precision and unconventional solutions to ensure nimble, attritable capabilities become key to modern warfare, they risk being felled like Goliath. Learning how to keep ahead of the next sling shot must begin with a clear definition of what attritable means.
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Maj. Gen. Michelle Link is the commanding general of the 75th U.S. Army Reserve Innovation Command in Houston. She previously served as the deputy commander, Joint Task Force Red Hill, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. She has a Master of Science in engineering management, manufacture and design from the University of Hertfordshire, England, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. In her civilian capacity, Link serves as the deputy program executive officer, Ground Combat Systems for the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.