America’s post-9/11 war is not over—far from it. Who will win and what kind of world will emerge are still open questions. As retired Brig. Gen. John S. Brown put it, “We’re in the third inning.” So no final lessons can be identified or learned, but an in-process review is necessary if we are serious about ending the war in a way that both creates a better peace and secures U.S. strategic interests in the process.Toward that end, I will present seven propositions. These propositions may not be self-evident, but there is a sound case that can be made for each. Further, each has implications for the Army. Some of these implications apply to the Army’s warfighting challenges; others, to what the Army should be identifying as its war-waging challenges; for war has both a fighting dimension (tactical and operational) and a waging dimension (operational and strategic).One: Create Coherent StrategyOur post-9/11 wars have not been three—Afghanistan, Iraq, and the wider war against al-Qaida; now the Islamic State group and their ilk. They have been one war. The current lull in the war is a matter of U.S. policy, not a matter of fact. Our enemies have increased their operations and expanded their influence while we have decreased ours. Further, others—Russia, China and Iran, for example—are taking advantage of a perceived opportunity. Perhaps this lull is necessary for domestic political and economic reasons, but even if it is, it’s temporary.The Army should use its considerable intellectual strength to help create a coherent national and coalition strategy to win the war we’re in, then use it to identify the means that will be necessary to win. The current drawdown of ground forces is likely to be reversed. The Army will be called upon to expand—it’s just a matter of when.Two: Go on CounteroffensiveWars are won on the offensive. At least since 2010, we have been on the defensive: Decapitation strikes and raids are defensive spoiling attacks, not a manifestation of a strategic counteroffensive. Partner capacity development, as it is currently envisioned and practiced, prolongs the ability to shift to a counteroffensive, thus yielding time and space to the enemy. The Army is being sized to stay on the defense.At some point, some form of counter-offensive will be required. That counter-offensive will likely include significant numbers of coalition and U.S. ground forces, for a real coalition cannot be built upon the principle of “we bomb, you die.” Our national interests cannot be assured via that principle. Again, the Army must be ready to expand and to contribute to developing a coherent set of aims as well as a set of military and nonmilitary strategies, policies and campaigns—the war-waging side of business—that increase the potential of winning the war.Three: Get Boots on GroundSize matters in the kinds of war we are facing now and will face for the foreseeable future. On one hand, technology is very important to fighting and waging our wars and to some extent, it can offset the numbers of ground forces necessary. On the other hand, on-the-ground numbers cannot be as fully offset by advanced technology in the ways it can be in a conventional war. You cannot fight and wage “wars among the people” (or whatever name we give this war as a result of our intellectual work) remotely.The Army must make the case, clearly and forcefully, for ground forces being essential to ultimate success in our war. And, once more, the Army must be ready to expand.Four: Add LeadersOur post-9/11 war is leader- and headquarters-intensive. When employed, ground force headquarters expand to become 24/7 capable and able to accommodate intelligence, information and civil-military capacities that their tables of organization and equipment do not include. New headquarters—joint and multinational—are formed. Our war is a coalition war, and coalitions need liaison officers and liaison teams. Partner capacity development, which will be required to win this war, entails embedded advisers, ground force partners and institutional development. These leaders are in addition to those needed to train, prepare and lead our own combat forces when employed.Expanded leader requirements, plus the potential expansion, all suggest that the current leader-to-led ratio—one that I believe was last updated in the 1980s as a result of post-Vietnam analysis and embedded in the Department of Defense Military Personnel Act—is outdated. The current ratio guarantees continued reliance on a “rob Peter to pay Paul” approach to leader distribution and limits force employment options the Army can offer to senior leadership. The Army must identify new ways in which the active component, National Guard and Reserve can complement each other and identify new personnel policies to recruit and retain the necessary leaders.Five: Prepare to AdaptWars are won and lost at the strategic level. Excellence at the warfighting level cannot offset lack of excellence at the war-waging, strategic level. The Army has a role not just in how war is fought but also in how war is waged. That is, senior Army leaders participate in the dialogue and decisions that shape initial war aims, strategies, resourcing and sustaining policies, and campaign design—and should also play a role in adapting these initial decisions and actions as the war unfolds. They should not merely offer advice and then await decisions, nor limit how they view themselves as executors at the strategic level.Beyond the warfighting challenges, the Army must reflect on its performance at the war-waging level. This reflection will find that senior Army leaders sometimes did well in helping create the best initial decisions concerning war aims as well as military and nonmilitary strategies, policies and campaigns—and sometimes did poorly. Secondly, this reflection must focus on how well Army senior leaders helped adapt those initial decisions as the war unfolded. Again, we will find both successes and failures. In short, if we’re really in the third inning, the Army must develop solutions to war-waging challenges that can help guide the rest of the war.Six: Enforce Cost StandardsAll wars cost a lot of money, and no war is truly “cost-effective.” Our wars, however, have cost too much. Part of the increased costs resulted from poor management in theater: badly written contracts and poor execution of them, for example, and insufficient internal and external audits that should be normal command functions even in war. Another part, however, results from a too-high cost per soldier—whether in garrison prior to deployment or while deployed. In a very real way, we’re pricing ourselves out of business.Reasonable cost-per-soldier standards must be established and enforced. Commander proficiency at expeditionary fiscal management must improve. Stewardship continues even in war.Seven: Build Conventional CapacityWhile some form of “hybrid warfare,” “war amidst the people,” “three-block war” or “fourth-generation warfare” seems to be the norm as to the type of war we face (and all of these include, in my view, elements of combined arms warfare, cyber operations and countering criminal elements), the norm has exceptions. Conventional warfare remains a real possibility. The Army would do an injustice to the nation if it optimized for only one form of war. We are in a reverse of the Cold War period, when conventional war was the norm and the other forms were the lesser-included cases.The Army cannot optimize for one form of war. Like during the Cold War, the Army must build lesser-included-case capacity within the force structure necessary to execute the norm. That means we have to build conventional war capacity into the force structures necessary to succeed in the kinds of wars that are our current norm.What does this all mean beyond the specific implications? At least the following two meta-conclusions seem reasonable:To help shape the strategic environment, the Army must create a compelling narrative about the kind of war we’re in, what “winning” means in this kind of war, and what’s necessary—domestic and coalition, military and nonmilitary—to win. If the Army does not have access to the intellectual capacity, who does?The current narrative is that we’re in an interwar period, but the wars we’re in are unwinnable; military force is not decisive and our participation makes things worse, so we should use as little as possible.This is paradoxical and a denial of reality. Further, allowing the current narrative to continue erodes the trust that binds the profession together, for our soldiers’ and subordinate leaders’ experiences tell them that it’s not accurate. It also may ultimately erode the confidence that the American people have in their Army, for many ordinary citizens see the current narrative for what it is. Regardless of the positive aspects of the Army Operating Concept, it is unhelpful in creating the kind of compelling narrative that I suggest.Preserving force structure, developing an expansibility capacity, increasing the leader-to-led ratio, and reducing cost per soldier will require a very close relationship among the active component, Guard and Reserve as well as between the conventional and special operations forces. And it will need administration and congressional support. The active component/reserve component relationship is in poor shape; the conventional/special operations forces relationship—the best it’s been in years—is at risk; and accurate understanding of the war and what it will take to win is, to be kind, illusive among both military and civilian leaders.The Army must be innovative in the way the components’ force structures mesh and in how leaders (officer and NCO) can go back and forth between components. The force-structure and end-strength problems that the Army faces cannot be solved by one component, nor does one component have all the answers. The sacred cows of the active component, Guard and Reserve must each be put on the butcher block, and false myths must be exposed and abandoned. Doing this requires a level of trust that does not now exist among the components.The conventional/special operations forces relationship is at risk for at least two reasons:–  The conventional force is the recruiting pool for our special operations forces; if the size of the “gene pool” shrinks too much, the quality of special operations forces will shrink correspondingly.–  The “we can do it all” mentality is beginning to emerge from the special operations community, partly because the mentality is created by assigning too many missions to them but also because some of those leaders believe they can do it all. The “special” in special operations forces will erode if “special” becomes “all.” The tribe mentality that predates 9/11 could still return. A concerted civil-military engagement program is necessary, one that conforms to law, regulation and custom. But the need for private, candid, straightforward, perhaps even contentious sets of dialogues between senior political and military leaders is needed to forge a common understanding of our war, then to figure out a way to end this war with a better peace. So far, our record in this regard is spotted at best.Our political leaders in both the executive and legislative branches have full plates. Money is tight; there’s a legitimate public debate over the extent and limits of government; there’s no foreign policy or national security consensus; bipartisanship is at an all-time low, as is understanding of the war and the American armed forces even as the military is held in high esteem. In fact, holding an institution in high regard when you know little about it is, itself, risk-ridden. When the conditions finally emerge such that our political leaders and citizenry at large demand a shift to the offensive and success against our enemies, the Army and the other services will have to be ready to ask for what is needed and explain why it is needed. Some of that work has begun, but this task must be taken up in earnest on both sides of the dialogue.Fighting and waging war has never been easy. Long wars against ambiguous enemies are particularly hard for democracies. The hard is not impossible, it’s just hard. We are in “inning three,” so to speak. Looking back, our record has both successes and failures. The important task, however, is to look forward. The seven propositions of this “in-process review” are aimed to help in whatever forward-looking conversations might emerge.