Integrating Civil Affairs

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CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS, VOLUME 6, 2019–2020

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PRESENTED BY
The Civil Affairs Association

AND THE
Association of the United States Army

IN COORDINATION WITH THE
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School/
Special Operations Center of Excellence,

the Reserve Officers Association,

the Foreign Area Officers Association,

the Alliance for Peacebuilding,

AND THE
U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

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Foreword

The 2019 Civil Affairs (CA) Symposium in Tampa, Florida, was the most substantive and productive we've had so far. The 120 members of the expanded CA family beyond the CA Corps—representing a highly-diverse community of operators, leaders, entrepreneurs and thinkers, which included participants from Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, Nigeria and the Pacific Basin—found energized consensus about integrating CA well beyond as well as within the CA Corps.

The emerging realization was that CA can find better integration, more than as a mere force multiplier, as a force for influence, collaboration and competition in a world of convergent threats and challenges. But there was also a reality check from Major General Darrel Guthrie, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)]: "We must become an adaptable, agile learning organization or we will be replaced by one that is."

He also called for "harnessing collective influence" in making CA a greater force for influence and collaboration in convergent multi-domain and information operations (IO) environments across the whole of the competition continuum. The Corps must first draw on and reinforce its core competencies and capabilities, making them better known and understood to its supported commands and agencies by more aggressively "telling the civil affairs story" with the strategic narrative emerging from our platforms.

In addition to ensuring that the Symposium's many insights, ideas and recommendations are integrated in the CA Force Modernization Assessment, we must get the Army Futures Command and other major service institutions more involved in our established CA force development deliberations and leveraging the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, *One CA Podcasts* and the many articles we have posted in the *Small Wars Journal* and other publications.

The Corps must also seize opportunities for greater impact on influence operations through national strategic initiatives. One is the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review*, in which CA can realize its role as the force of choice for DoD in U.S. interagency stabilization across competition and the full range of operations; this is a contemporary example of how CA can "secure the victory." Fortunately, the Symposia and Roundtables have provided unique platforms for dialogue on civil-military integration for stabilization operations. Whether at the tactical, operational or strategic levels, CA becomes more effective working by, with and through interorganizational partners in consolidation and competition.

Another strategic opportunity is through the State Department's Global Engagement Center (GEC). We were most fortunate to have Special Envoy and GEC Coordinator Lea Gabrielle for our keynote presentation, "Civil Affairs and America's Global Influence through Local Engagement." She recognized how the GEC and CA are natural partners in winning the global competition for influence because of CA's longstanding role as the military's primary civil reconnaissance and engagement capability and as an instrument of "expeditionary diplomacy" for well over a century. These "warrior-diplomats," however, also stand to gain much by leveraging the GEC for strategic information and guidance to win the battle of the narrative in especially irregular and hybrid warfare. Special Envoy Gabrielle stands ready to advocate CA to national leadership.

The other good news is that the Corps and its extended family are well-positioned to heed the warnings as well as seize the opportunities before them. Progress is already being made, for example, in forward-looking thinking, as reflected in the "Civil Affairs Operations: 2025 and Beyond" white paper, the *2019 Marine Corps Concept for Civil Affairs* and in the revitalization of the 38G functional specialist program. USACAPOC(A) has already grabbed the bull by the horns on integrating its CA, psychological operations (PSYOP) and IO capabilities as part of its seven-year force development strategy—which we can learn a lot about from the Marines and our allies.

The Association, in turn, has continued to build on established platforms and tools for intellectual capitalization for force development, to help tell the CA story and to assist in generating a universal narrative that advocates and identifies CA's many strategic as well as operational values. We must work to make them better known to Army, Marine and joint commanders, as well as interagency and interorganizational leadership and policymakers, to include members of Congress and the public and media at large.

The *Issue Papers* form the Association's capstone to deepen and broaden the formal processes for CA force development along the lines of policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF-P). Now in their seventh year of advancing a more strategic, comprehensive understanding of CA, they also contribute to fostering a learning organization that must go beyond military command structures and the CA Corps, including allies and counterpart civil-military organizations and interorganizational partners.

While the findings, opinions and recommendations of this singular semi-formal source document are representative of the extended family of the CA Corps, they do not represent official opinion of any kind. This document enables operator input to the CA service proponent offices, on force development and doctrinal issues, giving voice to those with the greatest stake in the future of their force. These papers are also increasingly read at major service, joint command and defense policy levels. Thanks to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), this will become even more possible.

Because more of the papers than the five printed here were very worthy of publication and contained insightful ideas, the Association now offers options for publication of paper-based articles in its brand-new *Eunomia Journal* online, as well as in the *Small Wars Journal* and professional journals, with the assistance of the Publication Advisory Board. While one goal is to mainstream CA into the larger discussions of the Army and Marines, the joint force and national security issues, the other is to help improve CA writing skills as a function of intellectual readiness and building human capital.

At this year's Symposium, we expanded the workshops from one to three, with additional workshops on reserve CA issues, as well as a workshop dedicated to NCO-related matters, which provided a greater voice to all CA constituencies. Given their immediate success, the Association has decided to feature these workshops at future symposia.

Newly-introduced benefits that have been established in the past year to better serve CA professionals, in addition to the Publication Advisory Board, include an extensive online research library and an exhaustive learning resources page that catalogues desktop-accessible professional education and training resources and that offers far more than standard military programs. *One CA Podcast* has proved to be an enormously successful source for those telling and listening to the CA story. The website has been substantially overhauled, a robust team is

now running an interactive online *Eunomia Journal* and social media outlets have expanded beyond Facebook and Twitter to include LinkedIn, Spotify and Sticher.

The Association concurs with *Issue Paper* authors Newsome, Hughes and Hurst on the expansion of the Association's relations with private sector organizations to mutual benefit. This would more than help build an industrial base to grow CA capabilities through applied sciences and technology. As sponsors, these partners could also help to keep the costs of events reasonable to all who attend and enable us to provide webcasts to a wider audience. We are deeply grateful to The Patriot Fund, Third Order Effects and Valka Mir Human Security for their involvement in last fall's Symposium; we look forward to working with them again.

At the same time, a youth movement is taking place with new Association directors announced at the board meeting after the Symposium. It is encouraging to see a lot of younger leaders joining our ranks, bringing in new ideas and enabling us to do much more. For them especially, we have launched a "Job Opportunities" website feature to assist professional and personal networking. Scholarships for young CA leaders are also under consideration. There is more value-added to membership in the Association now than ever—and not only for CA, but also for the other organizations we interact with in support of the nation's defense.

The Association will continue to provide much-needed advocacy as well as professional education and development forums. It will also continue to work in a more integral way with AUSA, the Reserve Officers Association, the Foreign Area Officers Association, the Military Officers Association of America, the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, the Alliance for Peacebuilding and other influencers of national defense policy—organizations that provide input for strategic initiatives for the nation's future and for the growth of the CA mission and branch. We are most grateful to them and especially to AUSA for its partnership in our representation at its annual convention—and their continued offer of a free year of AUSA membership for new CA Association members.

The Association is also grateful for the contributions of U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the U.S. State and Defense Departments and Agency for International Development and various functional and regional commands, as well as the NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence, with whom we look forward to formalizing our partnership.

Additional thanks go out to our Issue Papers Committee of Army Major General, USA, Ret., Mike Kuehr, Army Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, USA, Ret., Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, USMC, Ret., and to USA, Ret., Colonels Mike Cleary, Christopher Holshek and Larry Rubini, as well as to Nzinga A. Curry, AUSA's Director of Education & Programs, Ellen Toner, Editorial Manager, Kevin Irwin, Senior Graphic Artist, and their entire team for their diligence and cooperation with our editorial team.

Most important, thanks go out to those working behind the scenes to put these programs and products together, in particular to retired Colonels Christopher Holshek, Dennis Cahill and Monti Zimmerman, as well as retired Command Sergeant Major William A. Grocott, Jr., for organizing the program and facility, those preparing the Symposium and Workshop Reports, the writers of this year's *Issue Papers* and many others mentioned and unmentioned in this volume.

Finally, we congratulate our banquet speaker, former Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army Lieutenant General Karen E. Dyson, for her own services in furtherance of CA, earning her the John H. Hilldring Award. Congratulations also go to: Junior Officer

of the Year Captain Paul Mower, USMC; NCO of the Year Sergeant First Class Sean Acosta, USA; Soldier of the Year Specialist Shayne M. Lindquist, U.S. Army Reserve; recipient of the Winfield Scott Medallion, Colonel Alan McKewan, USA; recipient of the Ralph R. Temple Award, Command Sergeant Major William A. Grocott, Jr., USA, Ret.; recipient of the Eli E. Nobleman Award, recently retired Major General Daniel R. Ammerman, USA; and recipient of the Special Association Award, Colonel Tony L. Thacker, USA, for his outstanding work with CA forces and interagency partners in Syria.

We look forward to seeing many of you at the Roundtable at the Washington, DC, National Guard Armory on 7 April 2020, as well as at our Symposium, currently planned to be at Quantico, Virginia, 16–17 October 2020. To keep abreast of developments, resource additional information, donate, or join the Association, go to www.civilaffairsassoc.org.

"Secure the Victory!"

Joseph P. Kirlin III
Colonel, USA, Ret., Civil Affairs
President
The Civil Affairs Association

Executive Summary

by Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, Ret.

Over 120 members of the Civil Affairs (CA) Corps gathered with their extended family of Army, Marine, joint and allied military community and civilian interorganizational partners on 18–19 October in Tampa, Florida, for what may have been the most substantive and productive Civil Affairs Symposium to date. While they first came to look at determining ways and means for "Integrating Civil Affairs," the highly-diverse community of operators, leaders, entrepreneurs and thinkers discovered much more.

The annual professional and force development event began with three well-attended workshops to identify improvements in CA doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) along the lines of this year's topic. The intended outcomes of these workshops will help CA forces better support Army or U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) commands to prevail across the competition continuum, whether in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) or in support of interagency stabilization at joint, interorganizational and multinational (JIM) levels—two mission imperatives, many realized, that are not necessarily contradictory. In particular, their findings and recommendations will go far to enrich the CA Force Modernization Assessment (FMA) that concludes in 2020.

In addition to the usual concept-focused, proponent-centered workshop led by the CA Force Modernization Directorate at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), there was a new workshop, run by the Strategic Initiatives Group of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)], to account for views on integration issues from the reserve/conventional CA forces who represent over 80 percent of the total CA force. Panelists from the 77th Brigade (U.K.) were on hand to share experiences in integrating civil-military and information operations (IO) capabilities under one command, while representatives from the Canadian CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) forces as well as the NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence also lent to the discussions. A third workshop, for junior leaders, and run by Army and USMC CA NCOs, took on the more fundamental issues of CA readiness for core activities and tactical CA team integration in Army and USMC commands for today's complex mission environments.

Together, these three workshops provided greater voice to critical CA elements and yielded a rich harvest of insights for CA development, detailed in the Workshops Report in this sixth volume of the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*. Given immediate success of these workshops, the Civil Affairs Association has decided to feature all three at future symposia.

The workshops and Symposium strongly concluded that CA must modernize its mission capacities across the competition continuum and full range of military operations (ROMO) to meet and adapt to changing service and joint requirements as well as strategic imperatives. Driving this conclusion were these major findings:

- CA must not only draw on and reinforce its core competencies and capabilities; it must make them better known and understood by supported commands at tactical and operational MDO levels, as well as through national strategic initiatives such as the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review* (SAR) and Global Engagement Center (GEC). For both, it must also partner better with private sector organizations that could help to vastly improve CA's state of the art achievements. This, in good part, is what USACAPOC(A)

Commanding General Major General Darrell Guthrie meant by "harnessing collective influence" in his plenary presentation. While re-validating base CA activities like civil reconnaissance (CR) and civil engagement (CE) at tactical levels, as well as more operationally integrative tasks like civil information management (CIM) and civil-military operations planning for what the Marines call "civil preparation of the battlespace," the workshops also reaffirmed CA roles in consolidation, stabilization and civil-military transition management. The longstanding contribution of CA forces to "expeditionary diplomacy," as U.S. State Department Special Envoy and GEC Coordinator Lea Gabrielle outlined in her keynote presentation (and as elaborated in Workshop I and the Schafer-Saiddudin *Issue Paper*), re-affirms CA as a national strategic landpower capability and not simply a "force multiplier."

- This is also true with the increasingly crucial role CA plays in IO and in influence and counter-influence operations—in competition as well as combat. At the Symposium banquet, former Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army Lieutenant General Karen E. Dyson, USA, Ret., recalled how military forces have had far-reaching strategic impact in foreign societies in unexpected ways. She cited how a CA financial functional specialist helped her push Iraqi transition to a new monetary system by making Army cash payments to local contractors and employees in new Iraqi dinar instead of U.S. dollars, helping the population gain confidence in the new government. With the predominance of the "battle of the narrative" in today's joint operational environment, CA, psychological operations (PSYOP) and IO must better integrate to more effectively conduct irregular, hybrid warfare and other gray-zone conflicts by facilitating local governance to undermine and erode an adversary's power and will to influence, control or coerce populations and key leaders across the ROMO. DOTMLPF-P integration of CA, PSYOP and IO forces to meet this challenge is, in fact, long overdue. Under the rubric of "harnessing collective influence," USACAPOC(A)—the Army's force provider for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA, PSYOP and IO—is leading this charge, in concert with USAJFKSWCS and Army Futures Command. USACAPOC(A) has a seven-year strategy to better integrate CA/PSYOP/IO for greater simultaneous and coordinated Army impact in the civil, cognitive and information environments in convergent MDO/IO.

- Fostering a learning organization both within and beyond military command structures and the CA Corps, including allies and counterpart civil-military organizations and JIM partners, must be a major CA force development goal for improved CA operations, military and strategic decisionmaking and the growth of a learning network beyond CA and other military commands, including civilian organizations more vital to stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. CA becomes more effective when working by, with and through these partners. In addition to the USMC, USACAPOC(A) is looking to learn from British, Canadian and other NATO partners facing similar challenges, with the goal of testing this convergence through Collective Influence Detachments and Task Forces over the next three years. The implied task for the whole of CA, however, is for CA education and training programs to improve CA operator knowledge of and interoperability with these partners, as CA experience in Africa and with the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team Forward has reaffirmed.

- Information management has been a major vulnerability and a significant challenge in the integration of civil information actors under a unified CIM system—the subject of two of this year's *Issue Papers* and for which USMC CA offers an interesting tactical model

for Army CA. As both the papers and participants argued, CA must institutionalize and formalize a universal CIM system that, in turn, can work well with and will be supportive of interagency systems. Capturing the zeitgeist and echoing these findings, Major General Guthrie offered a vision for a way forward, as part of "harnessing collective influence," noting how more IO-focused CIM support along with better integration of CA, PSYOP and IO can achieve greater cognitive impacts. A major component of USACAPOC(A)'s force integration and development strategy is its implementation through regional combat and service component commands in "collective influence excursions." Major emphasis includes greater and more consistent CA participation in information environment exercises like *CPX-F*, *Cyber Blitz*, *Defender*, etc. to enhance supported interagency and command "cognitive depth" through more IO-focused CIM support to intelligence. Leveraging the Army Research Lab's work on megacities and cultural biases and USAJFK-SWCS development of geospatial assets should also vastly improve CIM. Workshop III suggested that Army and USMC CA schools should provide advance training on network analysis to assist with advanced analytics for CA operations, considering this as part of an MOS designator for tactical and operational CIM analysts.

- "Return to competition" as an operational and/or strategic outcome needs much greater stress in the current CA concept for MDO/IO support. The current *National Security Strategy* acknowledges that rising and rogue powers in our global system are unlikely to be defeated decisively on the battlefield.[1] Competition and return to competition thus represent strategic success for the United States and its allies—they are, in fact, the new endstate of MDO/IO in most contexts. The implication for CA forces, as warrior-diplomats, is in their ability to work as effectively in competition as during conflict and consolidation. As such, CA brings critical values-added in stabilization, as detailed in the SAR framework, the new DoD Directive 3000.05 and Defense Support to Stabilization guidelines and the current *National Defense Strategy* (including its new Irregular Warfare Annex).[2] CA should fulfill its potential as the DoD force of choice in U.S. interagency stabilization across the full competition continuum and ROMO in a contemporary example of how CA can "secure the victory." CA professionals retain an implied task, in addition to supported commands, to educate institutions like the new Army Futures Command in the fact that CA is more than an information or stability force. Furthermore, with regard to MDO/IO, and in addition to identifying coordination points and managing transitions with JIM partners, warfighting mechanisms supported by CA need to expand beyond conventional defeat and stability mechanisms. Command and control (C2) of CA forces, whether in Army or USMC formations or joint task forces, also needs serious reexamination of supporting versus operational C2 relationships.

- As Major General Guthrie pointed out, CA's greatest strength is in its human capital. Improving CA readiness starts by finding "the best people for the best mission"—an Army Recruiting Command as well as CA Corps task. As part of its seven-year force development strategy, USACAPOC(A) is revitalizing the 38G functional specialist program in a major move forward in growing CA human capital, this time with emphasis on 38G functional specialist capabilities through partnerships with private sector and non-governmental organizations. An example is the recently formalized program with the Smithsonian Institution to generate cultural preservation capabilities as a pilot for rebuilding all 18 functional specialties, as discussed in the online *CA Journal* and by the Symposium's science and technology panel.

- CA needs to better leverage the lessons being learned in the field and translate them into DOTMLPF-P improvements—perhaps with the creation of an institutional center for Army and USMC CA lessons linked to the Army and joint centers for lesson-learning. The 411th CA Battalion, which recently deployed to the Horn of Africa to counter illicit trafficking and infectious diseases, is one example. While validating the expeditionary value of USAR CA forces for strategic competition, such operations are rarely coordinated with those of active counterparts in the 95th CA Brigade and 83rd CA Battalion performing complementary work. Active/reserve and SOF/conventional CA integration, both pre- and post-deployment, remains a serious handicap to realizing the potential values-added of CA in the converging MDO/IO environment. The CA FMA must feature this as a major force development initiative.

- Workshop III produced numerous additional recommendations to better integrate the extended CA Corps through, for example: standardizing core competencies for tactical CA teams among Army, USMC, active and reserve CA commands; and, flexible, non-service specific requests for CA forces through a joint "clearing house" that determines required CA capabilities among service and component providers.

- During both its discussion and plenary brief-back, the workshop gave a clear-eyed assessment that, given resource constraints both from an overwhelming focus of current land force development on "lethality" and other warfighting capacities and from the perennial undervaluing of CA for other than post-conflict missions, the CA Corps will have to continue to do more with less while re-demonstrating palpable values-added to Army, USMC and joint commands.

The highlight of the Symposium was State Department Special Envoy and GEC Coordinator Lea Gabrielle's keynote presentation, "Civil Affairs and America's Global Influence through Local Engagement." Formerly a DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and CIA human intelligence operations officer, she expressed her deepened appreciation of CA and how it can help the GEC "direct, lead, synchronize, integrate and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose and counter foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security or stability of the United States and its allies and partner nations," as its mission states.

"With our global missions, it's natural that the GEC and Civil Affairs become closer partners," she said up-front. "In fact, the very reason the GEC was created falls right in line with the need to better integrate civil and military capabilities in the Army and in the military generally." CA, as the military's primary civil engagement capability for well over a century, has gained new importance as an instrument of expeditionary diplomacy—as has its ability to work by, with and through other military and interorganizational partners to help win in the global competition for influence where the likelihood of traditional state-on-state warfare remains relatively low, even as gray-zone, irregular and hybrid threats abound.

Gabrielle explained that CA proves the value of CR: "The United States has often struggled to understand the local social-political context of conflict. CA forces extend the reach of U.S. embassy country teams in remote and contested areas. As our warrior-diplomats, [they] provide us with the physical access to those regions, and the on-the-ground experience that comes with it, which then helps us fine-tune information operations."

She also discussed how CA proves the value of CE as a force for influence. "CA teams don't just tell a good story. They *are* a good story. Their work product is tangible evidence that

the U.S. and its allies bring real value to places and peoples that need it. The human networks fostered by CA teams put them in a strong position to help identify, expose and counter disinformation narratives, locally and regionally. By working closely with local populations and influencers, CA teams quickly learn about local themes and narratives."

The GEC's mission, in turn, has a very real connection to, and value for, the work of CA. She noted her personal interest in seeing how the GEC can provide good information and guidance to make CA operations even more effective.

A force of such far-reaching value needs to be adequately resourced, she stressed. "While CA teams are gaining even more strategic importance amidst this era of gray-zone conflict and people-centric warfare, we've been seeing cuts in CA forces. We need to ensure that Civil Affairs in our military are kept in balance so we can continue to leverage their experience and capabilities, both from my perch at the State Department and across the government. At the end of the day, our adversaries are pushing on all levers available to them to achieve their objectives and contest us. Our government also needs to be pushing on all available levers in a coordinated fashion to achieve our strategic objectives."

Gabrielle was impressed enough with the follow-on dialogue to stay for the subsequent panel discussion, "Science & Technology to Improve CA Integration and Strategic Performance in the 21st Century." She noted a shared challenge in how "the same technology that has put an ever-growing crowd-sourced encyclopedia in the hands of anyone with an internet connection has also put a multimedia storyteller in almost everyone's pocket—but it is not always clear who is controlling the narrative." The panel included: Dr. Bill Rivera, Director of the Laboratory for Unconventional Conflict Analysis and Simulation (LUCAS); Dr. Aleks Nesic, Visiting Professor at Joint Special Operations University and co-founder of Valka Mir Human Security; Dr. Lydia Kostopoulos, Senior Researcher, Digital Society Institute; Mr. Mike Williams, who is the Human Domain Director (Polaris Alpha) and also the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Janus Geography, Human Geography Deputy Lead and Subject Matter Expert; Dr. Peter Griffith, Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform, Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Department of State; and Dr. Nicholas Krohley, Founder of Frontline Advisory.

Moderated by Lieutenant Colonel Arnel P. David, U.S. Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff (U.K.) and co-author of *Military Strategy in the 21st Century*, the panel included young entrepreneurs looking to "operationalize the science of the human domain" through the integration of social sciences and cyber-cognitive tools as CA force multipliers. CA is a prime force for such socio-technical revolutions. First, it innovates more from the bottom-up than the top-down; second, USAR and USMC Reserve CA can especially effectively leverage new ideas and best practices from the private sector—a major theme, in fact, of another *Issue Paper*.

After Major General Guthrie's candid video remarks on USACAPOC(A) developments, strategy and vision at lunchtime (available on the Association website)[3] and a quick read-out from the previous day's workshops, the *Issue Paper* presentations were anything but anticlimactic. "Civil Affairs as a Function of Smart Power," a well-researched and innovative argument for a standardized joint assessment framework to improve CA's ability to counter "sharp" hybrid power with integrative "smart" power, written by the reserve-active author team of Captains Kevin Chapla, James P. Micciche and Kyle Staron, won first prize.

Second prize went to "Private-Sector Developed Capabilities, Not Readiness, is the Key to Civil Affairs' Future," by Major Giancarlo Newsome, Colonel Bradford Hughes and Colonel Douglas R. Hurst. This visionary treatise provided good intellectual background to

USACAPOC(A)'s approach to rebuilding CA functional specialist capabilities as well as force enhancement through a more purposeful association with private sector entities such as those that appeared at the Symposium.

Third prize went to Major Ian Duke, who briefed an interesting proposal for "Civil Knowledge Battalion: Integrating Civil Affairs with the Information Environment," which he argued would greatly enhance CA CIM capacity and capabilities to support commands with continuously well-grounded and organized knowledge, not just ad hoc information on human network analysis and network engagement.

"Changing the Business Model Part II: Integrating Civil Affairs as a Compass for Expeditionary Diplomacy," by Mr. Robert Schafer and Lieutenant Colonel Shafi Saiduddin, resonated very well with Special Envoy Gabrielle's discussion of CA as part of U.S. expeditionary diplomacy as well as with workshop proposals calling for more supporting model C2 relationships with supported service and joint commands.

Major Brian J. Hancock, Dr. Timothy P. Darr, Riannon Hazell and Peter Grazaitis, in contrast to the Duke proposal, took a more comprehensive and strategic look at CIM in "Integrating Civil Affairs through the Application of Battlefield-Relevant Civil Information Management." They also expounded on implications for CA as a force for influence in MDO/IO.

The *Civil Affairs Issue Papers* form the Association's capstone of a unique, annual, crowd-sourced learning channel and intellectual capitalization platform for U.S. land forces and their partners on civil-military management of people-centric conflict, stabilization and competition, based in good part on feedback from participants. Because many of the 23 submitted papers contained insights and ideas that should see the light of day, the Association now offers options for their publication as articles in its now interactive *CA Journal*, as well as in the *Small Wars Journal* and professional publications, with the assistance of the Publication Advisory Board. The goal is to mainstream CA into the larger discussions of the Army, USMC and joint force, and into national security issues to improve integration with them and to improve CA writing skills as a function of intellectual readiness and human capital development.

The Association has continued to build on these platforms and tools to foster a wider learning organization that goes beyond formal military command structures and even the CA Corps, including allied civil-military organizations, the private sector and JIM partners. This also serves to percolate a universal narrative that articulates and advocates CA's many strategic and operational values-added to Army, USMC and joint commanders, interagency and interorganizational leadership and policymakers, to include members of Congress as well as the public and media at large.

The energized consensus from the Symposium was that it achieved much more than expected in identifying ways ahead for CA development—not just about better integration within and well beyond the CA Corps. As warrior-diplomats who also help prevent conflict during competition and expand options for commanders in the event that competition fails, CA forces also provide a critical, embedded contribution to the information joint function (tactically and operationally) and the information element of national power strategically.

Through its CR and CE capabilities, CA is the force of choice in the consolidation of military and security gains into political and civil outcomes in the "return to competition" period of MDO/IO. Through collaborative interorganizational stabilization efforts, CA is also the force of choice for defense support to stabilization. It can help the United States to have

a countervailing, positive impact on the resilience of communities targeted by adversaries, it enhances locally-driven peacebuilding and it advances America's interests and value systems shared with allies, especially in great-power competition.

As such, CA can find better integration—more than as a mere force multiplier—as a force for influence, collaboration and competition in a world of convergent MDO/IO threats and challenges across the ROMO. The extended family of the CA Corps, however, must work both harder and smarter to make CA better known and understood to its supported commands and agencies. Beyond drawing on and reinforcing its core competencies and capabilities, it must also seize opportunities for greater impact on IO and influence and counter-influence operations (tactically and operationally) and through national strategic initiatives like the SAR and GEC—as well as in greater partnering with private sector organizations that could help to vastly improve CA's state of the art achievements through its own industrial base. This will not happen on its own or through the efforts of only a few.

In his concluding admonition, Major General Guthrie may have been talking about much more than his command or even CA: "We must become an adaptable, agile learning organization or we will be replaced by one that is."

The next steps in this continuous journey will be at the Civil Affairs Roundtable on 7 April 2020 at the National Guard Armory in Washington, DC, and the Civil Affairs Symposium at Quantico, Virginia, 16–17 October 2020.

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Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, Ret., Vice President for Military Affairs in the Civil Affairs Association, co-organizes the annual Symposium and Roundtable and co-edits the Civil Affairs Issue Papers. *A 2017 Distinguished Member of the Civil Affairs Regiment, he is a Senior Civil-Military Adviser to Narrative Strategies, LLC, as well as the NATO ResilientCivilians working group and the Alliance for Peacebuilding. His book,* Travels with Harley: Journeys in Search of Personal and National Identity*, reflects experiences and insights gained from three decades in CA at all levels and across the full competition continuum and in the joint, interorganizational, multinational and multi-domain environment.*

Notes

[1] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017.

[2] Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Stabilization*, Washington, DC, 13 December 2018; Defense Support to Stabilization Information Paper, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, DC, April 2018; Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 19 January 2018.

[3] Darrell Guthrie, "Symposium Harnesses Integrators and Influencers," Civil Affairs Association *Eunomia Journal*, 6 November 2019, https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/post/2019/11/06/symposium-harnesses-integrators-and-influencers.

2019 Civil Affairs Symposium Workshop Report

Integrating Civil Affairs in Convergent Multi-Domain and Information Operations Environments Across the Competition Continuum

by Colonel Dennis J. Cahill, USA, Ret., & Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, Ret.

Overview

On 18 October 2019, the Civil Affairs Association's annual professional and force development Symposium opened up with three workshops instead of the usual one, reflecting an expanded approach to capture insights and recommendations from more of the Civil Affairs (CA) Corps. The three facilitators then presented the findings and recommendations of each workshop in the plenary session of the Symposium the next day.

In addition to the more concept-focused, proponent-centered discussion led by the CA Force Modernization (FM) Directorate from the then CA commandant's office was a new workshop, run by the Strategic Initiatives Group of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)]. This workshop looked to account for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA integration issues (representing over 80 percent of the total CA force). A third workshop, for junior leaders and run by Army NCOs and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) staff NCOs, took on the more fundamental issues of CA readiness for core activities and tactical CA team integration in Army and USMC commands for today's complex mission environments.

By providing greater voice to all CA constituencies, the well-attended workshops yielded a rich harvest of insights for CA force development. Given their immediate success, the Association decided to feature all three of these workshops at future Symposia.

The workshops are designed for focused, informal and open discussion to identify improvements in CA doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Workshop outcomes are aimed to enhance the CA Corps' ability to help Army, USMC and joint commands prevail across the competition continuum, whether in convergent Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) or in support of interagency-led stabilization at joint, inter-organizational and multinational (JIM) levels—two imperatives, many realized, that are not necessarily contradictory.

The workshops and Symposium strongly concluded that CA must modernize its mission capacities across the competition continuum and full range of military operations (ROMO) to meet and adapt to changing service and joint requirements as well as strategic imperatives. They also re-validated base CA activities like civil reconnaissance (CR) and civil engagement (CE) at the tactical levels as well as more operationally integrative tasks like civil information management (CIM) and civil-military operations (CMO) planning for what Marines call "civil preparation of the battlespace." They also reaffirmed CA's roles in civil-military transition management and consolidation for improved operational and strategic decisionmaking and the growth of a learning network beyond CA and other military commands, including civilian organizations that are more vital to stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. They likewise recognized that CA plays a crucial role in irregular warfare by supporting local governance to undermine and erode an adversary's power and will to influence, control or coerce relevant populations and key leaders.

The following records the extensive findings and recommendations of each workshop and the plenary session. (They are also abridged in the Executive Summary of this volume. Workshop presentations and references cited are available in the research library on the Civil Affairs Association website.)

Workshop I

The first workshop explored "Integrating Army and USMC Civil Affairs in Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational Frameworks for Multi-Domain Operations." From his office as Director for CA FM of the CA Branch Proponent at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), CA Colonel Dennis J. Cahill, USA, Ret., facilitated more than 40 participants in reviewing converging Army and USMC CA roles in support of Army and USMC in both MDO and information operations (IO) environments. Joining him was a panel including: Andrew Morrison, Director, Communications, Policy and Partnerships, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) at the State Department; Ryan McCannell, Head of Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); Patrick M. Antonietti, Director for Peacekeeping and Stabilization, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs; Colonel Alan McKewan, U.S. Central Command J3-IAG CA Operations Division Chief; and, Major Csaba Szabo, Concepts, Interoperability and Capabilities Officer at the NATO CIMIC (Civil and Military Cooperation) Center of Excellence in The Hague.

Among the many findings from a rich, four-hour discussion were major points on MDO convergence and integration of CA, in response to Colonel Cahill's presentation, as well as to Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, *Competition Continuum*, 3 June 2019. The findings will be of great value to the CA Force Modernization Assessment (FMA) that concludes in 2020, Cahill noted. Major takeaways include:

- **Fostering a learning organization within and beyond military command structures and the CA Corps, including allies and counterpart civil-military forces and interorganizational partners, must be a major CA force development goal.** Major Szabo and others identified many points for CA-CIMIC and JIM collaboration in MDO/IO, including assessment, CIM and targeting. Capabilities like CA, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and CIMIC (as Workshop II also noted) are crucial to irregular and hybrid warfare and in gray-zone conflicts. These capabilities facilitate local governance in undermining and eroding an adversary's power and countering its influence and ability to control or coerce populations and key leaders. (DoD has a new, albeit classified, Irregular Warfare Annex to the regularly published *National Defense Strategy*). CA, they concluded, becomes more effective when working by, with and through interorganizational partners, mainly because they tend to work more effectively in competition and consolidation than as military forces alone. In this sense, the longstanding contribution of CA forces to "expeditionary diplomacy" presents a strategic capability more relevant than ever, as U.S. State Department Special Envoy and Global Engagement Center (GEC) Coordinator Lea Gabrielle outlined in her keynote presentation (and as elaborated in the Schafer-Saiddudin *Issue Paper*). The implied task is for CA education and training programs to improve knowledge of and interoperability with these partners, as CA experience in Africa and with the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team Forward operations has reaffirmed. In his video presentation at the Symposium plenary, USACAPOC(A) Commanding General Major General Darrell Guthrie likewise stressed the criticality of the partnering function of CA.

- **"Return to competition" as an operational and strategic outcome needs much greater focus in the current CA concept for MDO/IO support.** As Mr. McCannell articulated, the CA role in consolidation of military and security gains into political and civil outcomes, per joint and Army operations doctrine and discussed in the *2017–18 Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, needs similar attention in order for CA to better contribute to military and political-military decisionmaking. In addition to consolidation operations, Mr. Antonietti noted, CA has values-added in stabilization for return to competition and competition across the full range of operations, as detailed in the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review* (SAR) framework, the new DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 and the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) guidelines.[1] USAID, CA's major interagency partner in stabilization operations on the ground, is fielding new U.S. development assistance strategies and programs that contribute to great-power competition in regional bureaus and country teams. Another organizational cultural shift is USAID's new Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Stabilization to leverage development assistance more effectively in periods of competition and return-to-competition. Meanwhile, State CSO briefed that eight of 11 country annexes of the SAR are complete, while the Global Fragility Act, which focuses on conflict prevention framed around the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, will leverage an operational fund of $200 million. In addition to the new GEC, the State Department has also stood up an Atrocity Early Warning Task Force; CA participation is ideal for both of these. Yet the CA Corps, as a whole, is underinformed, undereducated and underrepresented on practically all these developments. The group concluded that the CA force is missing huge opportunities to gain strategic as well as operational relevance as a lead for civil-military integration and to influence capability in these major competition continuum developments and initiatives.

- **The Army and USMC need to better grasp the transition management function of CA in MDO.** Warfighting mechanisms that CA supports need to expand beyond conventional defeat and stability mechanisms. The CA concept for MDO/IO support requires CA-specific templating of support to MDO/IO, including return to competition and consolidation roles, instead of just hand-jamming CA into warfighting concepts. The group identified the value of using observe–orient–decide–act (OODA) loops to indicate continuing or enduring operations that do not include victory as such. It also identified, as critical in the MDO analysis, the need for the CA proponent to develop roles and tasks that apply to multiple MDO periods across the ROMO and to identify coordination/collaboration points with interorganizational partners in that template. The workshop also noted that Army Futures Command (AFC, which was not represented at the Symposium), in a reflection of the general Army understanding of CA, currently sees CA as information or stability forces; USMC commands have an even more narrow and tactical understanding of CA. An implied task for both Army and USMC CA proponents and commands remains to educate those institutions and supported commands on the full mission capabilities and capacities of CA.

- **Information management was acknowledged as a major vulnerability at all echelons of planning and operations integrating CA.** The *2019 Marine Corps Concept for Civil Affairs* underscores this point. The USMC almost lost its CA capability because of the inability of warfighters to understand the value of the Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) within and beyond combat operations. The winning argument centered around information and networks, i.e., the relationships established and maintained during the competition phase to expand options and access in crises. Integration with other Marine Air-Ground Task Force

(MAGTF) information capabilities under the Marine Information Group, with an "inside force" role for CA in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), is proving an equally compelling model for CA/IO related integration writ large. Army CA should, likewise, embrace the gravitational pull toward the IO joint function in similar fashion, particularly in support of joint strategy as laid out in the *2018 National Defense Strategy* Irregular Warfare Annex. At both the workshops and the Symposium overall, the role of CA in demographic data analytics and CIM is an area where CA can prove highly valuable to political, interagency and military leadership. CA helps them see, understand and influence the human terrain at the ground level (as done in northeastern Syria). Two of this year's *Issue Papers* (one from Duke, and one from Darr, Hazell and Grazaitis) provide excellent background discussion and recommendations to institutionalize and formalize a universal CIM capability that, in turn, must work well with and be supportive of civilian interorganizational systems. CSO's newly-launched Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) capability, now available to all State Department personnel, is one example of an interagency system that CA CIM can use both to leverage and to support its commercial, national-level and other data that feed into IMAP. Conversely, if coordinated in advance, IMAP can provide operationally relevant information and analysis to CA for supported command primary information requirements.

- **Finally, there was major discussion (in the plenary brief-back as well as at the workshop) on re-examining command and control (C2) of CA, whether in Army or USMC formations or in joint task forces.** As in Workshop II, there was a strong consensus on shifting to supporting vs. operational control (OPCON) type relationships with supported commands, as has been done with many other entities (special operations, medical, etc.). This, of course, has implications for how the CA Corps manages and deploys CA forces—and how it controls and supports them once deployed. The CA proponent should assess this and provide its recommendations in the CA FMA.

Workshop II

Workshop II, facilitated by Colonel Andrew Jones from USACAPOC(A)'s Strategic Initiatives Group, looked at "Integrating USACAPOC(A) as a Unique Military Influence Capability for Full-Range Operations in the Competition Continuum: DOTMLPF-P Findings and Recommendations." Among the more than 30 attendees were key USACAPOC(A) leaders, including: Brigadier General Mark E. Black, Commander, 350th Civil Affairs Command (CACOM); Brigadier General Isaac Johnson, Jr., Commander, 351st CACOM; Brigadier General Jeffrey Farris, Commander, 352nd CACOM; and Brigadier General Robert S. Cooley, Jr., Commander, 353rd CACOM; as well as Colonel Andrew Scott DeJesse, 38G/6V Cultural Heritage Preservation Officer, USACAPOC(A) Strategic Initiatives Group; Mr. James Jabinal, USMC CA Proponent; and Major Jamie Powell, British Army, Chief of Staff, 77th Brigade (U.K.).

The workshop largely looked at the challenge of operational integration in a converging environment for CMO and IO in MDO. The unique potential of USACAPOC(A) to fuse military influence capabilities remains largely untapped, while even the newest CA doctrine still overlooks CA/PSYOP/IO operations integration. They also expressed concern about active/reserve and SOF/conventional force integration, as well as what C2 models would best enable CA command support of regional and joint task force commands. In addition to the supporting command relationship model proffered in Workshop I, the C2 example of the 351st CACOM as OPCON to the Army Service Component Command in the Indo-Pacific region remains a viable consideration. Channeling the 2016 Symposium, one participant in the plenary brief-back discussion observed: "General Brooks saw the value of CA in Korea; he created a C9 [a

theater staff directorate for civil-military operations] and tested the Army system to bring U.S. Army Reserve CA forces forward. This command, control and coordination model deserves examination at the Army level."

In their remarks, the CACOM commanders, who took a prominent role in guiding discussion, foreshadowed many other salient observations that USACAPOC(A) Commanding General Major General Darrell Guthrie brought up in his video presentation at the plenary the next day. In candid remarks on a command that provides nearly all of the Army's conventional CA, PSYOP and IO capabilities, especially at the operational and strategic levels, MG Guthrie expressed serious concerns about operational readiness to operate in robust MDO/IO operations in especially JIM settings, as well as to modernize "increasingly obsolete capabilities" for CR, CE and information management.

Many of the social science and cyber-cognitive initiatives reviewed at the panel discussion of "Science & Technology to Improve CA Integration and Strategic Performance in the 21st Century" proved of considerable value to USACAPOC(A) in contemplating a way ahead on FM and multiplication. The same was true for *Issue Paper* authors Chapla, Micciche and Staron briefed on "Civil Affairs as a Function of Smart Power: Redefining Assessments, Reporting, Education and the Role of Civil Affairs within the Evolving Paradigm of Great-Power Competition"—which also appears in a *OneCA Podcast* on the Civil Affairs Association website. It also spoke to the underutilized potential of CA—discussed convincingly by *Issue Paper* authors Newsome, Hughes and Hurst—to integrate private-sector capacities and innovations on human-terrain-related science and technology that can help to grow a CA industrial base, beyond function specialists, and so enhance supported MDO/IO.

There was broad Symposium consensus that DOTMLPF-P development of operations (and appropriate force management) integration of CA, PSYOP and IO forces is long overdue. US-ACAPOC(A), through the Strategic Initiatives Group, with input from the CACOMs, is providing much of the impetus for this effort under the rubric of what Major General Guthrie called "harnessing collective influence." Colonel Jones briefed in detail USACAPOC(A)'s seven-year strategy for better integration of CA, PSYOP and IO for greater simultaneous and coordinated Army impact in the civil, cognitive and information environments in convergent MDO/IO.

A major component of this force integration and development strategy is in its implementation through geographic combatant and service component commands in "collective influence excursions," including greater and more consistent CA participation in information environment exercises like *CPX-F*, *Cyber Blitz*, *Defender*, etc. to enhance supported interagency and command "cognitive depth" through more IO-focused CIM support to intelligence. In the most recent *Cyber Blitz*, CA and PO (psychological operations) forces from the 353rd CACOM and 2nd POG (Psychological Operations Group), working in conjunction with the 151st TIOG (Theater Information Operations Group), integrated the concept of cognitive depth for the first time to this exercise.

"Our challenge in the convoluted gray-zone between human and cyber domains," Colonel Jones pointed out, "is to: first, shape the competition environment through persistent influence; second, achieve relative positional advantage; and third, to maintain and/or advance U.S. foreign and national security interests."

There are many models to consider. Mr. Jabinal briefed the integration of USMC CAGs with other IO capabilities under the MAGTF's Marine Information Group in the *2019 Marine Corps Concept for Civil Affairs* (an article that appears in the *Eunomia Journal* on the

Association website). Major Powell shared the 77th Brigade (U.K.) experiences in integrating civil-military and IO capabilities under one command. The Canadian CIMIC participants mentioned that they have also established an organizational and operational template and put it to use in Afghanistan. In the spirit of Major General Guthrie's call for greater collaboration among allied partners and the creation of wider learning organization among civil-military professionals, the workshop recommended continued and more detailed discussion of this issue at future Association events.

"They are doing fantastic work and leading in this area," Colonel Jones commended his command's Marine and NATO partners. "We are taking every opportunity to learn from them, conducting micro-excursions similar to their formations where they have already converged information-related capabilities. Our goal is to test this convergence internally, creating collective influence detachments and task forces over the next three years."

In this endeavor, USACAPOC(A) is also forging closer working relations with AFC. It will also leverage the Army Research Lab's work on megacities and cultural biases, as well as USAJFKSWCS development of geospatial assets. Still, the CA proponent must feature this issue in the CA FMA.

Revitalizing the 38G functional specialist program is also a major part of the strategy. USACAPOC(A) has renewed emphasis on growing 38G functional specialist capabilities by establishing partnerships with private-sector and non-governmental organizations. A recently formalized program with the Smithsonian Institution to generate cultural preservation capabilities is a pilot for rebuilding all 18 functional specialties in a new and more impactful way through partnering, as discussed in the online *CA Journal*.

"Over the past three years," Colonel Jones noted, "we have learned that converting 38As with functional specialties into 38Gs is a zero-net gain for readiness. We are now working closer with USARC [U.S. Army Reserve Command], the Army National Guard and industry partners to recruit from outside our formations."

As acknowledged during the brief-back, the workshop gave a clear-eyed assessment that the CA Corps will have to continue to do more with less while re-demonstrating palpable values-added to Army, USMC and joint commands. While this comes mainly from resource constraints for force growth and development, it also owes to an overwhelming focus of land forces on "lethality" and warfighting capacities, as well as the perennial undervaluing of CA for other than post-conflict missions. As one CACOM commander noted in the brief-back discussion, "the most important thing remains relevancy. In 34 months of command, my biggest challenges were from being asked to do more without getting more, whether with reserve or active commands, SOF or conventional forces."

The group also concluded that the CA Corps in general needs to better leverage the lessons being learned in the field and translate them into DOTMLPF-P improvements leading to better CA Corps integration. An example cited was the 411th CA Battalion, which recently deployed to the Horn of Africa to counter illicit trafficking and infectious diseases. While highlighting the expeditionary value of USAR Component CA forces to tackle strategic competition issues, their operations are rarely (if ever) coordinated with those of their active counterparts in the 95th CA Brigade and 83rd CA Battalion performing complementary work. Active/reserve and SOF/conventional CA integration, both pre- and post-deployment, remain a serious handicap to realizing the potential values-added of CA in the converging MDO/IO environment. The CA FMA must also take this on as a major force development initiative.

Workshop III Findings and Recommendations

Workshop III was a CA senior enlisted discussion of "Integrating CA with Local Partners: Lessons Learned from CA Team Work with Host Nation Leaders to Achieve Mission Objectives." Facilitated by Mr. Aaron Weiss, CA Strategic Planner, Office of the Deputy Commandant for Information, USMC, a vigorous discussion among the nearly 30 attendees was further steered by a panel including: Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Peter Trotter, USACAPOC(A); CSM Russell Price, 351st Civil Affairs Command; CSM Mike Mielke, 352nd CACOM; CSM Daniel F. Benedict, 353rd CACOM; Gunnery Sergeant Matthew D. Younger, 4th CAG; and Sergeant First Class Sean Acosta, USAJFKSWCS.

Their vigorous discussion yielded the following findings and recommendations:

- When rewriting DoDD 2000.13 on CA, include a section on information-sharing across the components and commands (through Corps-wide CIM and lessons-learning systems). This would improve information flow across the CA Corps as well as with service and joint commands. It would also help mitigate plans and execution teams having different formats and building their own CIM data, especially in mission hand-off and effects continuity. Instead, the teams would confirm the data and add to it, gaining better battlespace awareness, expertise and mission impact.

- USAR CA units should include tactical skills mixed with CA core competencies in training plans and events. This would enable them to support operations in all mission environments and operate more independently while performing CA tasks.

- As one workshop participant put it in the plenary brief-back, "Special Forces Groups and other tactical commanders value CA most for civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and interagency civil-military integration." Through these core tasks, CA Soldiers perform civil preparation of the battlespace—a unique capability in the Army, USMC and joint force. CA teams equally perform network analysis in order to support influence and counter-influence operations. Army and USMC CA schools should provide advance training on network analysis to assist with advanced analytics in support of military operations across the competition continuum. The CA proponent should consider this capability as part of an MOS (military occupational specialty) designator for tactical and operational CIM analysts.

- Operations tempo is very high for USAR CA while USMC Reserve CAGs often wait for missions. Unless service-specific capabilities are required, joint requests for CA teams should be written for "CA operational support" rather than specifying the service source (Army or USMC) to enable cross-leveling requests for CA forces between Army and USMC CA proponents. This would ensure more judicial utilization of Army and USMC CA as well as fulfillment of all DoD missions requiring these capabilities. "Although required by DoD," noted one plenary brief-back participant, "there are no inter-service agreements that formalize CA support to other services. There is also no 'clearing house' to determine which CA capability should apply to a given problem set. Who is working that in the Pentagon?" Another added: "We also need interagency agreements that address the sharing of assessment results and the civilian skill sets required for CA."

- Core competencies among tactical CA teams should be better standardized (and trained and equipped to those standards) among tactical Army, USMC, active and reserve CA commands and formations. This would not only enhance flexibility in CA task organizing in support of joint operations (as mentioned above), but would also enable supported

commands to have a clear expectation of the baseline capabilities from any supporting tactical CA team for planning (e.g., troop-to-task) and operations management purposes.

Conclusion

Once again, the workshop and subsequent panel discussion brought a diverse group of people together from across the CA community of interest. The issues discussed and the feedback received from this group touched on critical topics related to concepts and capability development, experimentation, doctrine, training development, personnel management and policies regarding the role of CA forces at echelons above brigade in MDO. This report will be used by the CA proponent to inform FM efforts in Fiscal Year 2020 as the Army builds toward Army 2028.

While all of the above findings and recommendations from the three workshops should be taken into consideration at both Army and USMC CA proponent offices, and especially for this year's CA FMA and in the Army CA proponent and major commands, the Association should follow USACAPOC(A)'s lead in having AFC more directly involved in CA force development deliberations like the CA Symposium and Roundtable—as well as leveraging products like the *Civil Affairs Issue Papers*, *OneCA Podcasts* and other sources recording the voices of the CA Corps on the future of its own enterprise. AFC would benefit from having another organization establish the intellectual capitalization platforms most valuable to understanding a vital part of the Army that they generally know less about, while the CA Corps would benefit from the advocacy of an Army institution more likely to have sway in Army Headquarters and U.S. Army Force Command decisions impacting CA.

What also came clear from the workshops is how the CA Corps must work both harder and smarter to make CA a greater force for influence and collaboration in convergent multi-domain and IO environments across the whole of the competition continuum. It must not only draw on and reinforce its core competencies and capabilities, making them better known and understood to its supported commands and agencies; it must also seize opportunities for greater impact on influence and counter-influence operations through national strategic initiatives such as the SAR and GEC, as well as in greater partnering with private-sector organizations that could help vastly improve CA's state of the art. This will not happen on its own or through the efforts of only a few.

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Notes

1 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Stabilization*, Washington, DC, 13 December 2018; Defense Support to Stabilization Information Paper, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, DC, April 2018.

Civil Affairs as a Function of Smart Power

Redefining Assessments, Reporting, Education and the Role of Civil Affairs within the Evolving Paradigm of Great-Power Competition

by Captains Kevin Chapla, James P. Micciche & Kyle Staron

As U.S. strategy shifts from counterterror and counter–violent extremism—efforts that have defined U.S. global engagement since 9/11—defense officials have placed an emphasis on ensuring that the United States can mitigate the influence and expansion of great and regional actors in strategic areas worldwide. It is within the reemerging paradigm of great-power competition that civil affairs (CA) teams could become critical instruments of smart power, bridging hard and soft power approaches and acting as key intermediaries between various mechanisms of state power seeking to advance U.S. strategic goals.

While uniquely positioned within the Department of Defense (DoD) to apply and project smart power, CA training and doctrine are inadequate to teach teams how to do so and must adapt to support current U.S. policy—while maintaining residual counterterror and counter–violent extremism requirements and improving the capacity and capabilities of maneuver elements. These efforts begin with establishing standard quantitative measures and assessments of the human domain; improving reporting processes and structures with an emphasis on refining writing and analytical skills; expanding access to and improving understanding of the interagency; and enhancing knowledge of all elements of national power. If CA takes this vital step, then the CA Corps has the potential to be at the forefront of advancing U.S. strategic objectives around the globe.

Defining the Conflict Environment

After nearly two decades of focusing its political, economic and military resources on countering terrorist and extremist organizations, the United States has entered a paradigm it has not experienced or embraced in the 30 years since the fall of the USSR: great-power competition. Unlike the bipolar balance of power that was the archetype of the Cold War, the United States now faces a multipolar construct with the rise of both international revisionist powers, such as Russia and China, and regional rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran, that seek to challenge U.S. hegemony. The *2017 National Security Strategy* (NSS) highlights this growing threat:

> In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great-power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.[1]

Despite substantial U.S. investments into upgrading conventional and nuclear platforms to counter improvements within their rivals' programs, the actual likelihood of a full-scale armed

conflict is far lower than during the Cold War due to the role that globalization has played in creating economic interdependence between adversaries, embodying a theory that scholars have named *The Capitalist Peace*.[2] The United States also maintains a robust architecture of global alliances that act as an additional deterrence to conflict between great-powers. Therefore, revisionist powers undertaking efforts to expand influence, enlarge territory and degrade U.S. hegemony do so at levels below conflict and often through nonmilitary mechanisms aimed at controlling narratives and capitalizing on domestic instability, a concept understood and operationalized by both Russia and China in their respective applications of *sharp power*.

Sharp power, as per the National Endowment for Democracy, "enables the authoritarians to cut, razor-like, into the fabric of a society, stoking and amplifying existing division."[3] It takes many contemporary forms, such as Russia's Gerasimov doctrine, China's three warfares and Iranian-sponsored Shia militias.[4] Despite various manifestations, the core tenet remains uniform: displace U.S. influence through domestic instability within contested regions as means to expand without direct conflict, as operationally demonstrated by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the recent rise of Badr Organization-aligned political parties in Iraq. In addition to information-centric operations and hybrid warfare campaigns, revisionist powers use international development, economic outreach and military training and sales programs as overt means to expand influence into contested regions such as Africa and Central Asia. China has been using the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank not only to access and influence individual countries but also to provide a potential alternative to current economic systems.

What becomes evident is that as long as the United States maintains an advantage in conventional military capabilities, preserves its vast systems of alliances and participates in international economic and finance systems, then its largest and most dangerous rivals will use nonmilitary means to compete. This is not to say that violent conflict will all but cease in the post-globalization version of great-power competition; rather, China and Russia will regularly compete at levels below conflict, using nonkinetic means targeted at both specific populations and global public opinion to destabilize existing order and facilitate their own expansions. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Christopher C. Krebs articulated the strategies of the two aforementioned rivals:

> They're [Russia] trying to knock us off our global position as a leader of the free world and lead democracy. And that's really what it comes down to. Russia's not trying to win the game. They're trying to get everyone else to lose. And that's kind of the Gerasimov doctrine. . . . They [China] want to ultimately be a peer, if not a dominant position to us and have us more in a client state where they're the primary economic power and we're so interdependent with them and dependent on their supply chain. So, they're not trying to disrupt us, necessarily. They're trying to manipulate us, put us in that, again, that client state position.[5]

Regardless of the form in which it manifests or at what level of warfare it occurs (tactical/operational/strategic), the successful application of sharp power requires access and the ability to influence various populations. Therefore, within the emerging great-power competition, the key terrain is the human domain, which for the purpose of this paper is "the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions."[6] It is through the key terrain of human domain that the United States will need to (re)establish dominance if it wishes to mitigate malign efforts by state actors to reorder the world in systems more friendly to authoritarian states.

How to Counter Sharp Power

As Washington begins to adapt its foreign policy to respond to the growing threat from revisionist powers, it is evident that neither hard nor soft power alone can mitigate and deter great-power efforts to expand their spheres of influence into vital regions that are normally under U.S. hegemony. U.S. policymakers must craft a policy that uses *smart power*, a combination of soft and hard power, that expands across the entire U.S. government enterprise to counter emerging threats while reaffirming the U.S.-led liberal world order as the primary hegemonic force in key regions.[7] The 2017 NSS lays out a clear argument for such an application of smart power:

> Protecting American interests requires that we compete continuously within and across these contests, which are being played out in regions around the world. The outcome of these contests will influence the political, economic, and military strength of the United States and our allies and partners. To prevail, we must integrate all elements of America's national power—political, economic, and military.[8]

In addition to the NSS, in June 2019, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19, which introduced the competition continuum, a nonbinary nonlinear construct that "describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict."[9]

To effectively counter persistent competition and use the appropriate instruments of national power, it is paramount to know not only where competitors are currently attempting to challenge the United States but also where conditions persist that rivals can exploit through the myriad of sharp power techniques. By the definition outlined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, CA operations occur within the key terrain being contested by revisionist powers and therefore position CA to identify, assess and analyze the conditions at the multiple levels of conflict that U.S. competitors seek to gain access to and potentially destabilize or influence.[10] This vital role enables policymakers to know exactly where and what assets are required to counter malign efforts and mitigate potential civil instabilities in vital regions. It also directly supports all four key elements described in JDN 1-19 that are needed to succeed in competition below levels of armed conflict and that support the overall protracted, dynamic and often imbalanced structure of the most common element of the competition continuum. Furthermore, CA units have the potential to integrate and link hard and soft power efforts by connecting DoD to the interagency at all levels of command. This function allows CA forces to be a distinctive mechanism for messaging and influence and ensures that decisionmakers have the information and partnerships to use the full spectrum of national power in creating response efforts at all levels of conflict.

CA elements will remain unable to undertake these two vital roles unless the entire CA construct takes focused efforts to standardize and improve how it measures, analyzes and reports the human domain in which it operates, specifically establishing quantifiable metrics that are supported by research and that are uniform and integrated in joint and service doctrine. Additionally, CA training must provide increased engagements and access with the interagency to build familiarity and collaborative networks to support smart power efforts while ensuring that CA personnel have baseline knowledge of the two other primary elements of national power: economics and politics. Since great-powers have the capacity to compete and disrupt at all levels of warfare, CA elements must standardize their operations and ensure regular dialogue from the strategic to tactical levels to ensure unity of effort, often accepting a role as a force multiplier and not the main effort.

Methodology

To address and objectively define existing issues, the Army's Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command granted the authors permission to conduct a survey of all Army CA captains who had deployed to a location outside the continental United States via temporary change of station or temporary duty orders as a CA team leader or civil-military operations center officer/officer in charge. The 46-question survey had four sections:

1. Attribute Data—including component, year group and deployment locations;

2. Report Types and Utilization—series of questions examining the types of reporting and data being operationally used and the recipients;

3. Report Emphasis and Interest—five-point Likert Scale assessing the emphasis that forward and rear commands place on eight reporting mechanisms; and

4. Education and Knowledge—five-point Likert Scale assessing familiarity with concepts that are vital to analyzing the human domain and using doctrinal mechanisms.

In a two-week period, 111 officers took the survey; 84 officers, or 76 percent, met the deployment criteria. Sixty-eight captains with active component deployment experience took the survey, resulting in the statistically significant sample size of over 20 percent of that population. Eighteen captains with reserve-component deployment experience took the survey (two officers had both) representing less than 1 percent of the reserve-component population. Responses represented deployments to all combatant commands, and 86 percent of respondents were in year groups 2009–2012.

Modern Mechanisms for Modern Conflict

DoD continues to focus transformation efforts on integrating data and metrics into operations and training as outlined by the *2018 National Defense Strategy* (NDS), which states, "We will emphasize new skills and complement our current workforce with information experts, data scientists, computer programmers, and basic science researchers and engineers—to use information, not simply manage it."[11] CA has yet to take the necessary measures to update doctrine and training to support DoD modernization. Central to this issue is that the CA enterprise lacks a standardized set of metrics that quantifiably measure mission-specific aspects of the human domain that can be used at all levels of conflict to support and drive operations. This issue became evident based on survey data.

When asked to "rate the level of standardization in reporting, assessments, metrics and data management on a (1-5) scale between CA elements of different organizations during yours and previous deployments to your and adjacent [areas of operations]," the average response was 2.38, with only five respondents rating the response a 5 (everything was standardized) compared with 25 rating the response a 1 (no standardization). Furthermore, when asked on a scale of 0 to 100 percent, "how much of the data and information that your element gathered or produced was structured or converted to structured data," the average answer was 43.5 percent, with only seven (8.3 percent) respondents rating this at 80 percent or higher. The lack of a standard framework to assess and quantify the human domain prevents establishing uniform measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that remain constant through team rotations, impeding the ability to identify the severity of civil instabilities, the impact of nefarious activities or the effects of friendly and allied action.

Army CA doctrine and training uses two primary mechanisms to assess the human domain of a given area of operations: an area study using a crosswalk of civil considerations

(ASCOPE) and operational variables used to generate running estimates (PMESII-PT) and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0.[12] Both mechanisms have two major faults. First, they are designed to look at macrolevel systems such as states and regions, as the CAF 2.0 manual clearly states: "For this document, and most conflict assessments in the field, the unit of analysis is the country or nation-state."[13] This means the CAF 2.0's utility is limited to the national level. This limitation does not enable sharp power initiatives that are designed to be rooted in specific macrolevel objectives but to target microlevel conditions. Second, they are subjective and do not use quantifiable data, which prevents the tracking of trends, degrades continuity between elements and prevents the ability to create measurable MOPs and MOEs. Furthermore, based on survey data, deployed teams are not using CAF 2.0 and, when it is used, commanders do not value its inputs. Only 29 percent of respondents said that they use CAF 2.0 during deployment, and only half of the officers who use it said that their forward command incorporated the findings into operations. Additionally, running estimates, the primary output of the ASCOPE/PMESII-PT crosswalk and area studies received the second lowest emphasis rating (2.1) from forward commands as compared to all other reporting and information products. These findings highlight that not only are CA elements using assessments that are structurally inadequate, but also that forward commanders do not value their outputs.

To address this critical shortfall, CA elements must establish a joint assessment framework that assesses factors that cause, prevent or indicate instability within a polis by assigning a numerical score based on fixed factors. Once metrics are assessed and computed, then a polis would be awarded an overall score, which, along with the submetrics, would be stored and shared in an enterprise database that teams would update when data and access became available. Geospatial files associated with various population centers could be associated with the overall scores and transferred to any mission command system as a map layer allowing a visual representation of both the overall and individual factors of stability and instability, enhancing maneuver elements' understanding of dynamic operating environments. Additionally, individual polis scores would have the capacity to be conglomerated for entire regions or areas, giving commanders across the spectrum of operations a better understanding of their operating environments.

Despite JP 3-57's statement that "[civil-military operations] involve complex political and societal issues that may not lend themselves to easily quantifiable MOEs and MOPs,"[14] there is substantial literature within conflict studies, stability, radicalization and a myriad of other disciplines that have done so and can be built into a comprehensive assessment framework that is grounded in academic theory but also operationally focused. Furthermore, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0 specifies that "effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation-based) and qualitative (opinion-based) indicators."[15] When it deviates from specified norms, CA doctrine impedes integration, unified action and strategic objectives. Any framework is easily programmable into an app for a smart device, facilitating data entry and ease of access to what delineates the various scores within metrics as well as clear definitions of the metric itself. An example of a metric is state-based violence against a population that a 2017 United Nations Development Programme report showed to be the main factor that drove 71 percent of individuals into militarism.[16]

State Violence

In the last 36 months, have government security forces:

- (4) Killed a member of the community;
- (3) used force against members of the community or their property;
- (2) killed a member of or used force against a neighboring polis; or
- (1) conducted no violence against the polis or surrounding community.

Each metric would have clear definitions of what constitutes the various levels and would have four possible choices to avoid the trap of neutrality selection. Different metrics would be valued differently in the overall score. To define and analyze the network-centric nature of human societies, a standardized framework must also facilitate a basic understanding of the social network of individuals within a given polis and those that exist between population centers. By applying centrality measures to standardized structured data, CA elements would better identify key influencers and communicators within a population and the roles they occupy in society, helping design more focused engagements. Additionally, understanding the network role of various municipalities facilitates a deeper understanding of where key terrain is within the human domain. Accomplishment of both the aforementioned tasks would require adding a half dozen additional questions to any framework as well as increased education and training in social network analysis, as the average self-reported familiarity with applying social network analysis concepts was 2.33 on a 5-point scale, highlighting a gap in CA training and education.

As CA elements conduct civil engagement (CE), key leader engagement, civil reconnaissance (CR) and other mission-specific tasks, they gather the information and data needed to update any such framework. While mapping and analyzing the human domain is a function that is inherent to CA, gathering the data and information needed to do so is not. CA is a smaller branch and can overcome manpower shortfalls by looking for alternate sources of information-gathering in critical key terrain, such as contracted surveys or social media data. Within the context of large-scale ground combat, CA elements could create an abbreviated version of any such framework for maneuver units to use to highlight areas where to focus CA forces in later phases of operations, setting the conditions to allow Joint Forces Command to consolidate gains and execute defeat and stability mechanisms outlined by the 2019 update to ADP 3-0.[17]

By ensuring that all CA elements across DoD are operating on a common framework that establishes a baseline of the human domain and objectively measures friendly, enemy and neutral actions and inaction at all levels of conflict, CA could assume a role in providing leadership with the data needed to prevail in the key terrain of modern great-power competition. It would then fall on CA elements to ensure that they were translating data into concise and pertinent reporting driven by MOPs, MOEs and enemy action, written for a broad audience of U.S. government personnel and focused more on tangible results than photographs and internal self-promotion.

Writing for Effect: Interpreting Cultures and Integrating Efforts

Accepting a role as a force multiplier and enabler within the context of great-power competition means that CA must integrate into existing institutions of smart power, ensuring its reporting provides valuable input to decisionmaking. CA practitioners are well-positioned to develop relationships with host-nation partners and often sponsor civil society projects to deny the enemy key terrain by fostering governance. However, the inherent value of CA lies in the unparalleled position to serve as the eyes and ears of combatant commanders and policymakers in the interagency community. CA occupies a unique and overt position within the U.S. government that can potentially produce information advising policymakers about social, political, military and information domain trends in a given operating environment. Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns described diplomats as "translators of the world to Washington and of Washington to the world" and "early warning radars for troubles and opportunities and builders and fixers of relations."[18] CA must embrace serving as an interpreter of distinct cultures and processes not only between DoD and the interagency but also for the human domain in which it operates, a role clearly defined in joint and service doctrine as an enabler of unified action.[19] Despite its codification in doctrine, CA officers self-reported not being able

to fulfill such a role, rating their "familiarity of DoD and interagency funding, authorities, and approval process" as about 3 on a 5-point scale, highlighting a substantial gap in training and aptitude in a core function of CA operations.

While CE and CR are fundamental tools used to gain context of complex contested human domains, the value of CA to the DoD and interagency is the ability to articulate this context to strategic decisionmakers through reporting. These decisionmakers exist across the spectrum of U.S. government agencies. Therefore, to integrate into efforts to mitigate adversarial sharp power operations, CA must streamline all reporting, ensuring propagation across the U.S. government enterprise without duplication of effort. Nearly 80 percent of survey respondents said that they were required to submit reports to different elements that had similar information but different formats, indicating a redundancy of effort and the regiment's failure to find standardized reporting formats that provide value across the whole of the U.S. government.

Integrating CA into existing instruments of U.S. foreign policy requires an understanding of the intended audience of reports. As evidenced by 54.8 percent of survey respondents listing interagency partners as recipients of regular reporting, CA information and analysis potentially informs interagency decisionmakers across U.S. government agencies. Communicating within this sphere requires a more nuanced and less direct approach to articulating assertions and analysis regarding societal and institutional trends. The academic-minded perspective of many interagency leaders demands that CA reporting conform to consider political and historical context, not just haphazard analyses. The interagency places a higher premium on discussions and well-researched reports than it does on sound bites and one-page snapshots of a country's entire political landscape. To gain influence and credibility in these circles, CA must emphasize education in all elements of national power and the invaluable skills of effective writing. The CA professional development model for both officers and NCOs should place the same value on interagency broadening opportunities and strategic-level staff positions as it does Department of the Army pamphlet-codified key-developmental positions. Furthermore, the Civil Affairs Qualification Course should incorporate temporary duty internships to embassies, combatant commands and Washington, DC, to build an understanding of interagency culture, enhance regional expertise and establish collaborative relationships and networks.

Conclusion: The Storyboard Trap

In contrast to data-driven and easily shareable reporting, CA has relied on PowerPoint slides known as storyboards as a principal reporting tool. Survey results highlight this reliance as storyboards tied with situational reports for the most commonly required reporting product (96 percent), with the highest emphasis rating within organic CA commands (3.51). The storyboard, an unstructured and unstandardized report, encourages practitioners to make unsubstantiated assertions and to dubiously connect tactical-level actions to strategic objectives to aggrandize efforts. With no system in place to ground reporting in baseline metrics, it is difficult for teams to relate tactical-level operations to battlefield gains under a strategic objective. The inability of CA to properly package information and support assertions with data has manifested into this reliance on the storyboard. Without the proper tools, CA practitioners cannot objectively assess the effectiveness of their operations and will instinctively reach for meaningful analysis on a storyboard where none might exist. Additionally, if an event is truly "storyboard worthy," then it should be highlighted not by a two-page PowerPoint slide limited to DoD channels, but through psychological operations, information operations, public affairs or other elements to assist in dominating the information domain and potentially supporting messaging campaigns across all levels of conflict.

While storyboards provide a photographic record of an event, they do not inform decision-making or meaningfully contribute to the intelligence cycle, highlighting a gap in the CA Corps' ability to justify conclusions about governance, stability and societal trends with hard data. At present, the storyboard is a tool for CA units to "demonstrate value" to higher commands, but it has proven irrelevant. Considering survey findings, the CA Corps must make every effort to ensure that its reporting is relevant and useful to the U.S. government rather than being merely self-promotional. Transitioning from storyboards to reporting that relies on data-driven analysis requires cultural change that only senior CA leadership can institutionalize. If CA is to integrate into Multi-Domain Operations, the Corps must demonstrate the value of its reporting and role to the entire U.S. government, not only to itself; an emphasis on function rather than flair is the only way forward in the paradigm of great-power competition in the Information Age.

Summary of DOTMLPF-P Recommendations for the CA Proponent

- **Doctrine**: Establish a standardized joint assessment framework of the human domain that uses quantitatively associated metrics to facilitate the establishment of MOPs/MOEs and the tracking of trends.

- **Training**: Establish greater interagency contact during the CA Qualification Course and the U.S. Marine Corps equivalent using the existing reserve component annual training framework to send CA personnel to embassies, combatant command captains and interagency partners to increase cultural understanding of agencies and their processes, enhance regional expertise and form collaborative networks and relationships.

  - Ensure writing courses are part of all CA training, with a focus on producing officers and NCOs who can write effectively for the broadest possible audience.

  - Integrate graduate-level education into CA training that focuses on elements of national power beyond the military; this includes economic, political, information and soft power. Include substantial training in the application of use of social network analysis procedures and techniques.

- **Leadership and Education**: Decrease emphasis on storyboards and increase emphasis on data and metrics that align with those of interagency partners.

- **Personnel**: Ensure the Army Human Resources Command assigns CA personnel to billets and positions that align with control language and regional expertise, enhancing the expertise of a given region and improving overall understanding of the human domain.

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Acknowledgments

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Private-Sector Developed Capabilities, Not Readiness, is the Key to Civil Affairs' Future

by Major Giancarlo Newsome, Colonel Bradford Hughes & Colonel Douglas R. Hurst

The forms of conflict employed by adversaries in the future are expected to be hybrid in nature, blending conventional and irregular capabilities, and will more often challenge the stability of regions through indirect means.

—Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo,
former Commanding General of U.S. Army Special Operations Command

State and nonstate actors will always seek to influence and control unconventional sectors of social and civil infrastructure in their military strategies. While the United States and its allies need to be prepared to decisively defeat tomorrow's conventional military threats, they also need to learn how to identify and defeat the weaponization of a region's civil and social infrastructure. Civil affairs (CA) holds an increasingly critical role in effectively assessing and defeating tomorrow's unconventional threats. Unfortunately, U.S. Army CA, unlike its branch peers, has almost no private-industry or congressional champions.

Army CA maintains readiness without relevant capabilities. It does not have the capabilities to effectively assess or defeat the complex digital and social threats within the civil considerations of tomorrow's battlespace. CA needs a private-sector industrial base with champions in Congress to drive modernization and claim leadership in today's great-power competition. This paper suggests that CA synchronize with Army Futures Command (AFC); create a program-management organization similar to Army Program Executive Office–Aviation (PEO–Aviation), which would bring competing private-sector research and development organizations; and reinvigorate the Civil Affairs Association to be a stronger advocate for the branch.

These three things would help to defeat tomorrow's civil-sector threats, including China's worldwide CA posturing strategies. Creating a nontraditional industrial base to help CA would not only create a congressional basis of support that CA severely lacks but would also expand U.S. economic and security cooperation beyond military hardware and training. Seizing opportunities and defeating threats in the human domain of military conflict saves the most lives and protects long-term U.S. economic and security interests.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) stole the U.S. coalition's defeat after the first Battle of Mosul by seizing control of the civil considerations of the battlefield. ISIS conducted its own stabilization operations with impunity by offering jobs, commerce, rule of law, governance and control of critical social infrastructure in retaking Mosul and other territories around the world. In essence, ISIS harnessed its collective influence across the indigenous population and institutions. Fawaz A. Gerges, author of *ISIS: A History*, said that "the Islamic State's capacity to govern is really as dangerous as their combatants."[1] The U.S. Army lost the stabilization battle to ISIS but won the kinetic war at a high cost. Imagine instead if a coalition of civil-military forces had the technologies and capabilities to preemptively assess and defeat these civil-sector threats as they began to appear. This would have represented a much higher

return-on-investment form of lethality. Conventional forces would not have had to return to secure Mosul. How many lives and connections of goodwill could have been saved?

While readiness is unquestionably critical for military success, readiness without modern and relevant capabilities falls short of victory. CA has neither the appropriate capabilities nor the relevant readiness to professionally understand, fight and defeat the threats within the civil considerations of tomorrow's Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). As a result, CA is marginally relevant and poorly integrated in the future Army force.

CA, aided by and synchronized with AFC and its private-sector engagement, could give the civil considerations in operations planning doctrine more attention and depth. CA functional specialists' civil-sector expertise and their private-sector networks must be professionally managed, just as Army Aviation is. As PEO–Aviation develops technologies, capabilities and doctrine to win tomorrow's airspace battles, CA must do the same for tomorrow's civil-sector battlespace. In time, history will show the lives, property and money that can be saved through the "lethal" effects of a modern and capable CA force which establishes security and goodwill across the civil considerations of tomorrow's battlefield.

Tomorrow's CA Doctrine Needs Private-Sector Help

The U.S. Army counts on CA to credibly inform commanders of the opportunities and threats within the "civil considerations" aspect of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) factors in mission and operations planning.[2] When the "C" for "civil considerations" was added to the METT-TC mnemonic, it was clear that Army doctrine had evolved to account for the criticality of civil considerations in military operations planning. Unfortunately, almost no tools, private-sector expertise or weapon systems have been provided to Soldiers to properly assess and defeat the relevant threats that they discover.

Consider how even civilians can describe the evolution of military capabilities that have been developed in the past century to ensure air superiority (aircraft and helicopters). Technology-enabled capabilities such as airplanes and helicopters changed Army warfighting doctrine. Until the UH-1 helicopter was invented, there was no air assault doctrine. What changes in warfighting doctrine, capabilities and technologies will people talk about in regard to CA in 20 years?

Most CA Soldiers have no professional background or credentials to conduct effective analysis across ASCOPE (area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events) and PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time) operational variables. While certainly a best effort is given, derived from the Army mentality described by former 353d Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) commander Brigadier General Glenn Goddard as the "handle it, Captain" ethos, it still is an amateur analysis and effort.[3] Senior leaders need to consider how this is not only an inappropriately assigned task for the CA Soldier and team but that this is a significant risk for commanders, the Soldiers they lead and the mission. The current 353d CACOM commander, Brigadier General Robert S. Cooley, Jr., aptly described the impression of CA Soliders as follows: "They were great and the unit wanted more, or they were horrible and the unit never wanted a CA Soldier near them again."[4]

Leaders must consider all factors that make up their operational environment, including social factors initiating and sustaining a conflict. Failure to do so may lead to misunderstandings, miscalculations, and faulty plans that do not address the desired end state and ultimately lead to strategic failure and world condemnation.[5]

If your life depended on understanding the threats and opportunities within a region's AS-COPE or PMESII-PT, would you trust a trained infantry, armor or artillery Soldier to help you, or would you trust someone in the private sector who has had to make a living developing expertise in these civil sectors? The strategy behind standing up a cadre of CA functional specialists was a great first step by CA to mitigate this risk.

The strength of each CA functional specialist is not with the individual military specialist but with the private-sector network they represent. Unfortunately, CAPOC continues to struggle to fill and retain its functional specialist ranks, as the Army lacks an easy mechanism for CA generalists to engage their help.[6] Apps like the one that Third Order Effects (in which some of the authors are invested) is developing could be invaluable in getting this civil-sector talent and the technology "weapon systems" they have access to deployed more quickly.

Incentivizing Failure Is Important

A CA generalist by training does not have an industry reputation to protect or an ongoing industry reward for learning through failure. The capability provided to commanders of today's CA readiness is at best information of civil stability and security threats. Information alone does not defeat our enemies. Decisive and appropriate action, enabled by modern talent and technology, especially considering today's great-power competition, are required to neutralize tomorrow's civil consideration threats.[7] Just as the U.S. Army is the global leader advancing aviation technology to seize the military advantage, the Army needs to partner with the private sector to do the same for the civil-sector battlespace.

Private-sector competition incentivizes failure, which accelerates technology effectiveness and readiness. Consider how valuable it is that there are multiple books like *The World's Worst Aircraft*.[8] CA needs the same benefit of private-enterprise failures to give their ground commanders truly optimized civil-sector threat identification and elimination solutions. Government and military leaders are too often incentivized to create solutions for problems that are given to them by their supervisors, who are similarly unqualified for the task or attached to past "sacred cows of success." Imagine conversely an entire private industry outside these internal echo chambers, incentivized and competing to best understand tomorrow's civil-sector threats and continuously presenting solutions to leadership. This occurs daily, especially with the creation of AFC, with aviation, armor, artillery and the other sectors of the Army. The recent coming together between the Smithsonian and the CA cultural affairs officer is a step in this direction.[9]

During his tenet as Army Chief of Staff, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. Milley, in speaking before the Association of the United States Army in 2017, said that Soldiers are the Army's "most valuable asset, and arguably our most significant asymmetric advantage inherent in the American military and the United States Army," precisely because "we come from a society of improvisers, a society of tinkerers, innovators, problem-solvers, techno-savvy at an early age."[10]

CA Needs AFC Sponsorship

Such a dire need and green field creation of a CA private-sector industrial base fits well the mission of the new AFC. Its website states, "At AFC, we believe in utilizing the best expertise, whatever the source, to create innovative solutions faster and better. We're on a quest to modernize the way the Army does business by creating a space of endless possibilities to explore, develop, and test new methods, organizations, and technologies."[11]

CA Functional Specialists

Military Government Specialist (38G) Skill Identifiers	Other Army Capabilities
• 4A – Industry and Production	• 27A/3N – International Law Officer
• 4C – Civil Administration	• 60C – Public Health Officer
• 4D – Laws, Regulations and Policies	• 64B – Veterinarian Preventative Medicine Officer
• 4E – Environmental and Natural Resources	• 66B – Public Health Nurse
• 4F – Energy	• 70H – Medical Plans Officer
• 4G – Judiciary and Legal System	• 70K – Health Facilities Planner
• 4H – Corrections	• 72D – Environmental Science Officer
• 5Y – Emergency Management	• 68W – Senior Health Care Noncommissioned Officer
• 6C – Finance, Money and Banking	
• 6D – Education	
• 6E – Commerce and Trade	
• 6F – Transportation	
• 6G – Water and Sanitation	
• 6H – Law and Boarder Enforcement	
• 6R – Technology and Telecommunications	
• 6U – Agriculture Business and Food	
• 6V – Heritage and Preservation	
• 6W – Archivist	

There are 18 military government specialist capabilities and eight other Army capabilities nested within 16 functional specialties that are aligned within the five functional specialty areas framework. This provides the foundation of the Army's required military government capability, as directed in Department of Defense Directives 5100.01 and 2000.13.

Even the Chaplain Corps has a Capabilities Development and Integration (CDI) Directorate in AFC. CA would be well-served if it could seize upon and join the momentum of AFC as it creates private-sector innovation and university partnerships.

When examining the 18 specialties of the CA functional specialist program (see figure 1), there is an enormous breadth of civil consideration threats that deserve serious attention. An unnoticed or unchallenged threat in one or more civil sectors could undermine even the most well-executed conventional military operation.

New York Times journalist Rukmini Callimachi, in studying the incredible resurgence of ISIS, stated that "they built their state on the back of the one that existed before, absorbing the administrative know-how of its hundreds of government cadres. An examination of how the group governed reveals a pattern of collaboration between the militants and the civilians under their yoke. One of the keys to their success was their diversified revenue stream. The group drew its income from so many strands of the economy that airstrikes alone were not enough to cripple it."[12] If ISIS could be so systematic, organized and effective in conducting such a civil-relations coup, imagine what an organized great-power threat could do to take control of a weak nation-state. As China is building roads across Africa, are they already winning a cross-national battle of goodwill?[13] A well-organized cadre of CA functional specialists could accelerate the creation of a CA industrial base given that they already represent a private-sector network of relationships and technology. Existing functional specialists would confirm that there is a large private sector, well outside the traditional defense industrial complex, that is ready to compete to develop the most lethal technologies for defeating the threats within the civil considerations of tomorrow's MDO.

Learning from Army Aviation and the Army Aviation Association of America

CA spends almost no money in obtaining private-sector help in developing counterthreat capabilities for the complex and critical civil sectors of the CA battlespace. Consider in contrast how Army Aviation is spending and has spent billions of dollars over many years hiring private industry to help it dominate its battlespace sectors. The U.S. Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft program funded a private-sector competition to develop this future weapon system for $3.9 billion.[14] This is approximately 36 times the entire annual budget of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), or CAPOC, of roughly $110 million. Even the cost of one new CH-53K helicopter is greater than the annual budget for the 13,000 Soldiers that make up CAPOC.[15]

Does the value of one helicopter toward enhancing Soldier lethality exceed that of the entirety of CAPOC? This is an absurd but valid question that simply highlights how CA has not had a private-sector industrial base to help itself. When one attends "Quad-A," the lead annual Army Aviation exhibition run by the Army Aviation of Association of America, the private sector and all its supporting congressional staffers are clearly visible. The event is well-funded by industry, showing Army and Army Aviation leaders their latest capabilities for defeating tomorrow's aviation threats. The Civil Affairs Association needs to evolve and become a trade association as much as it is a representative association for the CA Corps.

The CA functional specialist program pool of "civil consideration" experts should create a CA program executive/weapon system development office that models Army Aviation. PEO Aviation spends billions of dollars with private industry to extend the range, lift and capabilities of its weapon systems to more effectively defeat tomorrow's enemy. Army Aviation knows it cannot develop tomorrow's weapon systems from within. CA is no different.

Redefine the Role of the Civil Affairs Association

One of the greatest but sorely underutilized assets to the CA community is the Civil Affairs Association. Well-funded associations provide the communities that they represent with a continuous set of new tools from the industrial base they have cultivated. On a macrolevel, we can look at the Association for the United States Army (AUSA), whose mission explicitly calls out serving industry partners.

> The Association of the United States Army is a nonprofit educational and professional development association serving America's Total Army, our Soldiers, Army civilians, and their families; our industry partners, and supporters of a strong national defense. AUSA provides a voice for the Army, supports the Soldier, and honors those who have served in order to advance the security of the nation.[16]

SOFWERX is another industry-supported organization that the Civil Affairs Association could model or partner with. SOFWERX works in tandem with the special operations community to bring innovative ideas and products to the forefront and to get that innovation into the hands of special operations operators.

AUSA and SOFWERX are invigorated associations that are made up of stakeholders who want to serve their communities with the best tools and that actively advocate for and inform industry, academia and congressional leaders how to better secure the victory for tomorrow.

Foreign Military Sales of CA Technologies and Services Will Create Long-Lasting Economic and Security Cooperation

As the United States leads the world and is sought after for its private-sector developed aviation, armor, missile and other traditional military capabilities, U.S. private industry in time could offer the same for CA-related technologies. When one thinks of the opportunities that could be leveraged with today's technologies across the 18 CA specialties and eight civil-sector Army capabilities, CA could easily create an industrial base on par with Army Aviation. Imagine the impact if CA had helped indigenous governance leaders in Mosul run a business plan competition seeking the best technology partnerships for their infrastructure reconstruction. Imagine then if the host nation requested CA technologies and services to be added to our foreign military sales and security cooperation offerings. Enormous strategic value is generated when indigenous security and business partnerships are created with private U.S. organizations through foreign military sales. Disarming threats through indigenous business partnerships represents a form of lethality with a much higher return on investment than traditional kinetic options.

American Denial Syndrome Must Stay in Check

Nadia Schadlow, former Deputy National Security Adviser and a seasoned international security and foreign policy professional, described the threat of the "American denial syndrome" at the 2018 Civil Affairs Symposium. This syndrome represents a common American culture in and out of the military of reluctance and concern with the military getting involved in resolving civil-sector threats. The U.S. military feels that addressing threats and opportunities for military advantage in the civil sector is "out of bounds." *New York Times* journalist Callimachi, mentioned earlier, observed in interviewing the populations post-ISIS rule: "Few have anything good to say about their old rulers [ISIS]—unless prodded to talk about the services they provided." Callimachi's research discovered that "ISIS built a state of administrative efficiency that collected taxes and picked up the garbage. It ran a marriage office that oversaw medical examinations to ensure that couples could have children. It issued birth certificates—printed on Islamic State stationery—to babies born under the caliphate's black flag. It even ran its own DMV."[17] Imagine if U.S. forces had not suffered under American denial syndrome and could have shared with these communities the best coalition forces' civil-sector expertise and technology to restore their services.

CA, in cooperation with the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), needs to create systems across the 18 CA functional specialties that can identify regional and local governance gaps that state and nonstate actors are threatening to weaponize. A closer partnership with DoS and USAID during peacetime is the best form of readiness training for CA operators to be effective in future MDO. While it is a just American reluctance for the U.S. military to secure civil-sector threats for "imperial interests," this concern is principally hyperbole as there is no compelling recent historical evidence of America behaving in this way systemically. Look how Japan and Germany, the archenemies of the United States in World War II, had by 1970 achieved second and third global gross domestic product positions with their own sovereignty—as they were direct beneficiaries of the great CA work provided by America's Marshall Plan conducted by the DoS and the U.S. Army.[18]

Conclusion

Asking Soldiers to account for civil considerations and potential dangers without giving them the necessary tools or weapon systems risks not only U.S. credibility but also Soldiers' lives. Broad and intentional private-sector technology development through the Army's CA

cadre of experts would secure CA success on tomorrow's battlefield, and private-sector organizations as a focused industry would greatly expand congressional visibility and bipartisan appreciation to the return-on-investment lethality that CA uniquely delivers to the American taxpayer. The absence of leadership, funding and strategy for developing and deploying CA weapon systems with ready and able "lethal" private-sector networks is allowing the growth of national security threats with great-power nations and nonstate actors.

General Murray, Commander of AFC, expressed a need to shift doctrine to explore less-materiel solutions for these expanding adversaries that operate in the "grey areas of conflict."[19] Even in his own command, though, the cross-functional teams (CFTs) are heavily materiel-centric, clearly reflecting the long-standing industrial base behind each CFT. A more advanced helicopter, combat vehicle or piece of artillery will not defeat a "grey" adversary who has seized control of a region's digitally-controlled utilities, infrastructure, media, finance, commerce or legal system. While we may beat China in the great-power competition for future vertical lift, we may lose to China when those aircraft and their support elements are blocked from using the civil infrastructure that China's military has built.

Learning from China's activities in Africa, the return-on-investment lethality of deployed private-industry CA capabilities will far exceed that of traditional military hardware production and related foreign military sales. CA lethality disarms and neutralizes threats to stability, security and U.S. interests by substituting, whenever feasible, the ingenuity of American free markets for American firepower. CA lethality neutralizes civil consideration threats before they become weaponized. Furthermore, CA, with dedicated private-industry help, can uniquely lay the foundation for long-term economic cooperation and security with host-nation partners.

We must mass effects generated outside DoD to ensure that we identify, gain and maintain this time-sensitive key terrain at the moment of adversary government dissolution. If Venezuela, North Korea, Mali or any other unstable region has a collapse of civil-sector governance, will the U.S. Army, fully backed by the power of American ingenuity, be ready to help restore critical functions? Will tomorrow's U.S. Army CA demonstrate capable and relevant readiness, as our forefathers did after World War II?

CA needs to work with senior DoD leadership, AFC, DoS and Congress to duplicate and fund a program management and foreign military sales infrastructure, as Army Aviation has with the private sector, to fill the enormous capability gap for neutralizing civil consideration threats.

> The city fell late on the evening of 30 April, and the American columns poured in. At dawn of the next day, people came out of their roofless, windowless apartments or cold cellars and, as if by reflex, began to move along the streets . . . When Lt. Col. Eugene Keller and his Military Government Detachment drove into the Bavarian capital that morning, not one of the twenty-four officers and twenty-eight enlisted men had seen the city before. But they had been preparing themselves for the moment since the unit was formed in England a year before. They had spent many days poring over maps and air photos, consulting reference works, and studying the directives of Supreme Headquarters. Colonel Keller said, "We knew Munich better than we did our own home towns." The column wheeled into Marienplatz and parked in front of the Rathaus. Colonel Keller carried a detailed plan for establishing military government in Munich. He and his men knew exactly what to do: appoint an Oberbuergermeister, establish law and order, get the utilities working, arrange to feed the needy, and at the same time to throw the Nazis out of office and replace them with politically acceptable persons.[20]

<div align="center">★ ★ ★</div>

Major Giancarlo Newsome, son of an Italian beneficiary of the Marshall Plan, is a former Army aviator. Salesperson of the year for a Fortune 500 aerospace company, he held director- and vice president-level international sales and marketing positions for other similar companies. Appointed a military governance specialist economist/ commerce officer in 2017, he is assigned to the U.S. Army Reserves, 75th Innovation Command, in Houston, and served a tour of duty with U.S. Army Africa. He speaks English, Italian, French, Portuguese and Spanish.

Colonel Bradford "Brad" Hughes, a former master army aviator, is Director of Operations for a helicopter charter company serving Central Texas. Transferred to CA in 2018, he was appointed a military government specialist with a transportation skill identifier and serves as the functional specialty chief for the 351st Civil Affairs Command in Mountain View, California. He has served on three combat tours, including one as an aviation support battalion commander in Kuwait in 2013 during Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as for the United Nations Mission in Haiti; Hurricane Katrina Response; Operation Blue Advance (U.S. Joint Forces Command); Operation Jump Start; Joint Task Force Southwest Border; National Guard Bureau–Domestic Operations and Joint Doctrine, Training and Force Development; Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2018; and Balikatan 2019.

Retired Colonel Douglas R. Hurst's last 13 of 30 years of military service were as an active duty civil affairs officer assigned to U.S. Central Command in special operations and joint roles, planning and executing over 300 theater security cooperation and key leader engagement missions in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Germany, the United Kingdom and Qatar. He is the Chief Executive Officer of Third Order Effects, LLC.

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Civil Knowledge Battalion: Integrating Civil Affairs with the Information Environment

by Major Ian Duke

Civil affairs (CA) needs an integrated active duty and reserve civil knowledge battalion (CKB). In the increasingly complex information environment, military and civilian leaders require credible and comprehensive civil knowledge to make timely tactical and strategic military decisions. A CKB would leverage the integration of active and reserve CA forces with civilians to realize the potential of credible civil knowledge on military and civilian decision-making processes to gain primacy in the civil information environment and across the competition continuum. A CKB would mass analytical effort in three key areas: human network analysis; network engagement; and continuity and professional development.

The Information Problem

U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford Jr., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, challenged the joint force in 2017 to build information into "thinking from the ground up."[1] He said that the joint force is ineffective at integrating information into its operations, largely due to "policies, conventions, cultural mindsets, and approaches to information."[2] Complicating this effort is the overall increase of information combined with increasing disinformation from multiple sources and adversaries causing confusion and lack of confidence in previously established understanding. Ominously, the future of the information environment seems to point toward a reality where U.S. forces will not enjoy overmatch.[3] In reaction, the joint force created "information" as the seventh warfighting function in 2017 to focus military information-related capabilities (IRCs). CA needs to be at the forefront of this effort by gathering and processing civil information to provide operationally relevant civil knowledge.

Doctrine states that intelligence drives operations.[4] In much the same way, civil information and knowledge drive CA operations. (Doctrine states this a little more narrowly.[5]) Intelligence is integrated in all parts of the operations cycle and military decisionmaking. Similarly, civilian and military decisionmakers need credible civil information, generated into relevant knowledge and then integrated with their processes, to make sound political and strategic choices: defining endstates; consolidating military and security gains into political and civil outcomes; and understanding when armed conflict has returned to competition. Further, the nascent concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) hinges on IRCs providing a "deep and common understanding" of the operational environment to be effective.[6]

CA's Information Problem

CA grew (and reduced) from the tactical military commander's perceived need to understand and influence the civil component in their areas of operation (particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan). The holistic understanding generated from adding civil knowledge bridged tactical operations to strategic contexts and provided the missing political element to military operations. The new focus on emerging "great-power competition" in the *2018 National Security Strategy* and *2018 National Defense Strategy*—and a global competition continuum—has

generated a demand for a more sophisticated and comprehensive type of understanding.[7] CA activities, through access to civil networks, generate the type of required strategic political context. In other words, operationally and strategically relevant civil information management (CIM)/civil knowledge integration (CKI) is why civil reconnaissance and engagement exist.[8]

Intelligence sections are robust across the joint force; however, with their steadfast focus on the enemy, they do not have the time or inclination to focus on generating civil knowledge. In the intelligence community, information is seen as "unfinished," but intelligence, as a finished product, is something that fits into a body of existing knowledge. CA needs to solve a similar definitional problem set, as "civil information" is "unfinished," but civil knowledge is a finished, usable product that is acceptable across academia, government and joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) partners. CA, as a much smaller and more specific capability, is obligated to take hard-won civil information from the tactical teams and to produce civil knowledge that enables the consolidation of gains, facilitates the understanding of relevant civil considerations and provides real-world tactical to strategic political/socioeconomic context to decisionmakers.

In the latest Army modernization strategy, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley stated that the Army needs access to civilian networks to build and maintain common understanding.[9] Milley was mostly referring to computer networks, but the intent is clear. MDO demands that CA integrate fully with what it calls information environment operations (IEO):

> IEO must be fully integrated into the planning and execution of the joint targeting process. . . . The military capabilities that contribute to IEO which should be taken into consideration include: strategic communications, joint and interagency coordination, public affairs, civil-military operations, cyberspace operations, information assurance, space operations, military information support to operations, intelligence, military deception, operations security, EMS operations, and military and civilian engagement.[10]

Building shared understanding in the information environment is like hosting a potluck dinner. Everyone needs to bring something, ideally unique yet relevant, or that will be the last time that guest is invited. In a CKB, CA forces would create the unique and relevant knowledge products that commanders and civilian agencies at multiple levels need. Many of those needs are baselines for governance in conflict areas to "consolidate gains" and to make MDO manageable. An example of the interagency looking for relevant and credible political knowledge is the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review*, a joint report from the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD that defines stabilization "as a political endeavor to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict."[11] Across the competition continuum, as long as CA forces are generating and integrating relevant civil knowledge for MDO before, during and after large-scale combat operations, they will be asked back.

CA is uniquely situated to create advantageous knowledge by merging civilian open-source material with primary-gathered information from CA activities. However, CA publishes minimal documents, reports or studies that are referenced by JIM partners and academia. To build credibility, CA needs to subject its work to professional discussions and peer review across diverse communities, including development, diplomacy, security, intelligence and academia. The risk of not doing so can result in reduced confidence by civilian and military decisionmakers in CA products.

The 2018 "Civil Affairs Operations: 2025 and Beyond" white paper implies that a higher level of professionalism and resource allocation must be directed toward building a CKI capability to realize its vision:

> The CA force's future focus must holistically encompass the collection, fusion, analysis, evaluation and integration of critical civil knowledge to inform commanders' situational understanding and decision-making. Civil reconnaissance [CR] of the future occurs on the ground, in the air, and across all publicly available information (PAI). The CA force must be fully capable of persistent CR and [civil engagement] across domains, to include cyberspace, and of building and maintaining a global lexicon of military-relevant local, regional, and trans-regional civil information and civil (political, economic, social, infrastructure and information) networks. A future, expanded practice of civil information management (CIM) applies civil expertise and predictive analysis to evaluate, model, and anticipate human geography, which includes the decision-making of relevant actors.[12]

To generate this level of knowledge, CA forces must leverage an expansive variety of networks, which requires an enormous upgrade in capability. The current organizational structure (modified table of organization and equipment) is not designed to prioritize civil information. Reserve and conventional CA battalion CIM cells usually have the most capable officer in the unit, but they have no CA NCOs on a career progression path to master geospatial, statistical and analytical systems on which professionals spend whole careers. Active special operations CA battalions are more robust; however, they are stovepiped to their individual regions and they lack consistency and professionalization due to assignment rotations, extra duties and airborne activities.[13]

A Solution

A CKB would include the three main Army CA tribes—U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (CAPOC), 83d Civil Affairs Battalion and 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations and Airborne)—as well as United States Marines Corps CA CIM and psychological operations and information operations specialists. This battalion would mass U.S. military CIM/CKI capabilities, maximize situational awareness and understanding, focus the effort and build an integrated approach to generating relevant civil knowledge to the benefit of all military commands. Its structure would emphasize formal accountability for measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the creation of civil knowledge. This modest organizational change would generate the perspectives required for new information-based challenges.

Feasibly, a CKB could start small as a provisional command with a narrow focus and then scale appropriately as it proves useful (or dysfunctional). Massing civil information personnel at the CKB would build the depth and focus needed for consistency and increase the breadth of analysis. CA is exactly the type of relatively small but powerful landpower capability that Army Futures Command says must innovate to ensure success of the joint force.[14]

The CKB concept runs in the same vein as general purpose force and special operations units that have dedicated intelligence battalions or detachments. As an example, facing similar challenges with the integration of intelligence, the 75th Ranger Regiment activated the Ranger Military Intelligence Battalion in 2017.[15] Such massing of like personnel facilitated improved cyber capabilities, an increase in command control of analytical efforts and enhanced JIM coordination. One of the motivations for the activation was the previous lack of clear oversight

of training and operations over its dispersed intelligence elements. A CKB would similarly consolidate the CIM/CKI effort.

A CKB would provide CA a vehicle to contribute directly to and receive direction from these types of high-level strategic discussions. Conceptually, yet on an obviously much more modest scale, a CKB would be to CA what agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Ground Intelligence Center, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and National Reconnaissance Office are to Army Intelligence. Representatives from key U.S. stabilization partner agencies (DoS and USAID) could act as links to civil information and knowledge from those agencies to round out a national civil-military capability in support of U.S. political-military and stabilization strategies and activities.

Integration as Key

This paper envisions three general integrating forces that would make a CKB successful: the integration of CA; the inclusion of civilians and civilian entities; and three lines of effort (LoE), which are discussed in the next few sections.

First, the CKB would need to be an active unit to have full-time dedication, but it would need the reserves, the largest element of CA, to be directly tied in. CKB products must include Army and Marine reserve information, perspectives and expertise—including from CA functional specialists—to be comprehensive. Reservists could participate in a multitude of ways, such as directly through mobilizations on active duty orders, active/guard/reserve slots or civilian ties when their experience and expertise are essential.

Leadership from the CA ranks would be the glue that holds this hybrid organization together. Generally, an initial provisional command with a post-command lieutenant colonel would be in charge, along with a handful of specially selected reserve, conventional and special operations force officers and NCOs. Command and control of the CKB could be similarly shared through an activated reserve CA officer to serve as deputing commanding officer or commander as the situation warrants. Generally, individual and unit performance could be measured by the number and level of references of generated CA products by potential JIM consumers.

The objective focus on information would lessen contentious differences in subjective identity friction between different CA elements. The sources of operationally relevant information are less important than the overall validity or actionability of the information itself. Importantly, a CKB would leverage and sort information from different CA units with different authorities or permissions to gather civil information to create an inclusive and more credible civil picture. In this way, there would be an incentive to create knowledge that would not only be more credible but would also be capable of integration with consumers of CA products. This concept sees the CKB as shaping the overall CA internal and external identity, as identity is best defined by what something does or produces as opposed to what something looks like or says it does.

Critical for the success of a CKB would be civilian analysts, interagency representatives or liaisons and networks with think tanks. Civilians would institutionalize the civil-military mindset, give partners a long-term contact and provide continuity of position and mission. Long-term analytical efforts require long-term and focused efforts by personnel who are unburdened by the multitude of Army tasks. As in the intelligence world, the necessity of such a sophisticated system of CIM underscores the need for civilian professionals who can shepherd information, master technical systems and generate knowledge over time. It would also professionalize CA analyst positions, providing additional skill opportunities and professional development options. Indeed, many reservists would be best suited to civilian openings in the CKB.

LoE I: Human Network Analysis (HNA)

LoE I provides the focus and training capability required for many excellent HNA initiatives already in progress, particularly under the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. A CKB would consolidate, integrate and mass these nascent and ambitious HNA initiatives, in turn maximizing its potential. It would also provide the single point of focus to integrate networks from other IRCs for comprehensive HNA.[16] Not only would this provide a viable reach-back resource and/or augment a CA team's analytical effort, with deployed CA teams sending real-time information back for more complex analysis, but there would also emerge more capability to have more intensive and extended training for CA teams.

Removing regional stovepiping permits HNA to occur with a global perspective, facilitating the integration of larger data sets from JIM partners with tactical CA teams. Metaphorically, CA teams would gather tactical information about trees and CKB HNA would strategically analyze the forest. This knowledge would then be pushed out and integrated at the global, regional or local level. It could also feed tactical targeting cycles, refine network engagement in other areas or, at a minimum, add to historical continuity. Further, analytical forces within a CKB could be surged and scaled to analyze specific areas of concern for contingencies, specific units or missions.

Technological integration and innovation are essential to build and maintain cutting-edge analytical capabilities, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and biometrics. A dedicated element within a CKB would provide the massed effort necessary to utilize and stay current with these emergent big-data techniques. As former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, a member of the Defense Innovation Board, noted, with proper computing focus, large amounts of data "are easily dealt with."[17]

LoE II: Network Engagement

This LoE focuses on building active operational networks and sharing with JIM partners. This is where CKI as referenced in the "Civil Affairs Operations: 2025 and Beyond" white paper occurs. This would be the largest endeavor because it would take time, effort and tailoring to effectively reach different network audiences and customers of civil information and knowledge. To differentiate, some elements of these networks may already be or become part of the professional networks referenced in LoE III.

The most recent initiative, the Commercial Civil Affairs System–Army, is an excellent start to creating a globally-accessible repository of information that could link with other civil databases. However, to make this global CKI solution work, it would need a dedicated and consolidated effort to cultivate provided information into operational knowledge. Just as social media is generated from users, there need to be curators, organizers and analysts who maintain communities of interest and keep the engagement relevant and on track. Further, even when (or if) Distributed Common Ground System–Army comes online, a similar effort would be needed to make it effective.

A CKB could maintain larger operational networks, thus freeing up CA teams to prioritize activities. For example, a recent CA team in Peru worked with a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that was highly-effective in mitigating flood impacts; however, the contact languished because of a change of operational focus. In this case, the CKB would contact the NGO to monitor actions, follow its network on social media and/or reach out directly to provide a consistent contact. Then, for example, it could follow up on previous civic actions, respond to inquiries and shepherd long-term studies across multiple team deployments. This is a method to maintain

a wider and more sustainable information and operations network than a CA team could effectively manage, thus reducing the inherent opportunity cost and raising cost-benefit that each CA team has when it plans missions. This would operationalize the continental U.S. base by keeping redeployed CA forces (especially useful with long dwell times) tied to the forward missions.

Active maintenance of operational networks over the long term would remove some of the "fickle American" criticism, or the idea that the United States is only in touch when it needs something in the moment. U.S. Navy Admiral Craig Faller, commander of U.S. Southern Command, notes that it is critical to "pick up the phone and call [contacts], just because." In this sense, CA personnel who have worked hard to build relationships and rapport could leverage a CKB to keep contacts in a "warm-base" status. CA personnel would continue on their individual career paths and be able to return to networks in a managed way.

Similarly, MDO envisions a form of "active engagement" that acts to "deter escalation, defeat attempts by adversaries to 'win without fighting,' and set conditions for a rapid transition to armed conflict."[18] CA needs to test the limits of this type of active network engagement across space and time. The key word is *active*, as less operationally relevant networks need to identify the minimum effort needed for long-term network maintenance. In this way, CA could leverage its understanding of dynamic governance situations and provide the timely feedback to commanders that effective MDO would demand.

LoE III: Continuity and Professional Development

An LoE for continuity is necessary to balance the disruptive nature of change. LoE III differs from LoE II by maintaining separation from day-to-day operations to document, analyze and measure changes in the civil environment over time. In addition to providing a history of CA operations and networks for CA elements, especially newly-trained forces, LoE III would facilitate longer-range planning by providing valid context to governance endstates. Finally, it would differentiate professional networks from operational ones, as CA forces need a professional network to access as they potentially (eventually) branch out from CA, e.g., psychological or intelligence operations, foreign area officers, Army strategists, various JIM assignments, NGOs and peacebuilding organizations and, especially, commercial enterprises.

The continuity LoE would help develop and manage MOP and MOE because of the focus on longer historical operational knowledge. Recent conflicts taught us that credible civil information needs to be available before a conflict arises to produce realistic plans and to understand the strategic effects of targeting.[19] These measurements would be far easier to take from a global and historical CKB perspective than across the disparate tactical units and deployments of reserve and active CA forces.

To provide effective continuity, CA operations history needs to be codified. For example, many (some would say most) teams do not know the history of why they are in an area. This can be especially embarrassing when teams are less informed about previous CA missions than foreign-nation hosts. There are various efforts throughout the CA Corps that do this, but there should be a dedicated and accountable element that is incentivized and judged on its ability to pull this information from the tactical level and push it out as shared understanding. With short tactical deployments and personnel constantly changing, a CKB could provide continuity to JIM partners. It could serve as an antidote to "DoD fatigue," where outside agencies tire of the ever-changing faces of military members with the same questions. Post-deployment CA forces could use a post-team assignment at the CKB to create more detailed follow-on products with deeper perspective as well as to foster expertise, specialization and professionalization.

Professional development and expanding career paths are perhaps where a CKB could provide the most benefits to the CA regiment. CA attracts great talent, but retention remains a challenge. LoE III could leverage the resulting relationships developed in the first two LoEs to focus on developing and maintaining a professional network and on providing an official conduit to strengthen ties through sharing personnel with other IRCs, such as cyber, psychological and intelligence operations and public affairs. It would be a way for those who leave CA to keep in touch with and perhaps even continue contributing to a civil common operating picture.

A CKB has the potential to extend the careers of officers and NCOs and even provide a platform for CA warrant officers through more diverse and specialized assignments. Indeed, since CA personnel would be rated on their ability to build, analyze and maintain civil networks, multiple personal opportunities outside of the military might arise. More interaction with civilian entities and increased public/private partnerships would expose talented CA personnel to wider career and industry possibilities. JIM partners might be appreciative of having consistent points of contact throughout their own ever-changing civilian and military careers. In this sense, a CKB would provide an official connection to reinforce the positive influence of outside groups such as the Civil Affairs Association and Friends of Civil Affairs.

Conclusion

Effectively conducting HNA and network engagement with global civil information and knowledge combined with outside entities would begin to answer many challenges of MDO for the Army, Marine Corps and joint force. Further, it would give CA the feasible organizational change needed to realize its 2025 vision of taking its gathered information and then generating and integrating civil knowledge to create situational awareness and understanding shared among a wide variety of JIM partners essential to overall success. Additionally, it would build a high level of continuity to keep its forces productively contributing during and after their CA time. The active/reserve integration, as well as civilian inclusion, for a CKB is a leadership challenge. However, it would help integrate the CA Corps and its wider community to focus on and maximize its most valuable commodity: civil information/knowledge.

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Changing the Business Model Part II: Integrating Civil Affairs as a Compass for Expeditionary Diplomacy

by Robert Schafer and Lieutenant Colonel Shafi Saiduddin

Civil Affairs (CA) has a unique challenge: as the primary DoD human geography capability to engage civil societies and agencies, it is required across the full spectrum of competition and conflict, but much of the Army's CA branch, which is one of the service's smallest, is in the reserve component (RC). CA must integrate with both military and civilian organizations throughout the U.S. national security establishment, yet there are not enough CA forces to fully integrate with all supported organizations. Increasing CA's effectiveness requires new mental models for integration. The CA Corps, the Army and the joint force must all be open to new paradigms that may seem paradoxical or counterintuitive to traditional methods of integrating military capabilities.

Countries hindered by instability from insurgent or terrorist organizations or further contested by state-based adversaries or their proxies will continue to pose national security challenges to the United States and its allies.[1] The United States, therefore, must be more selective on how it prioritizes efforts and resources in support of stabilization operations. This must be done to consolidate military and security gains into political and civil outcomes and to build better civil and institutional resiliencies among host-nation partners and committed international stakeholders. To codify a framework for what stabilization means to whole-of-government efforts, the U.S. Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD published the *2018 Stabilization Assistance Review* (SAR) in June 2018.[2]

SAR highlights a current problem with CA integration. It defines roles for the key agencies involved in providing stabilization assistance to foreign countries. DoS is designated as the overall lead for stabilization efforts, formulating the political strategy. USAID is intended to be the lead implementer for non-security stabilization assistance, bringing considerable technical expertise. The SAR specifies that DoD is a supporting element in providing security-related stabilization assistance in support of civilian-led efforts.[3]

CA is DoD's force of choice for working with DoS and USAID; however, except for a few liaison and exchange positions, the relationship between CA forces and DoS is episodic. Most CA forces exist in the RC and are aligned with conventional maneuver forces.

The tactical orientation of CA forces reflects the larger problem of the U.S. military in being focused heavily toward operations and not necessarily connected to strategy. In order to generate strategic effects, CA will have to realign forces to support strategic efforts such as stabilization and conflict prevention while still being able to support maneuver commanders, enhance lethality and consolidate gains at the tactical level—all without a foreseeable increase in force structure. The concept of "expeditionary diplomacy," as used in the Syria Transition Assistance Response Teams Forward (START-FWD) platform in Northern Syria, provides a model through which CA can integrate with civilian agency partners and generate strategic effects to support the joint force.

Expeditionary Diplomacy

SAR defines stabilization as an "inherently political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence."[4] Stabilization efforts are primarily for political means and are designed around targeted activities that enable host nations to govern effectively. Thus, stabilization efforts differ from humanitarian assistance, which focuses on the immediate need to reduce suffering among a populace.

Expeditionary diplomacy can be best described as a nonlinear approach to diplomacy in that the engagements and dialogues are not conducted at the highest level within formal state enclaves but rather at the lowest level of local government, occurring often at the most austere outposts. This is an important distinction, as diplomatic engagements and democracy-promoting activities in remote or austere areas is exactly where CA can best provide defense support to expeditionary diplomacy and development activities. This, however, is not a new concept. In fact, we argued in a 2016 essay, published by the Civil Affairs Association, for the necessity of CA to change its business model and become more flexible and agile in its support to diplomacy and development.[5] START-FWD, in this case, provides the ad hoc expeditionary platform in which CA teams are deftly able to integrate and facilitate the implementation of humanitarian and stabilization assistance into areas devastated by civil war and exploited by the Islamic State.

It should also be noted that the term *expeditionary diplomacy* has previously been used to describe the Lewis and Clark Expedition, one of the first civil reconnaissance (CR)–type activities conducted by the U.S. Army and an important part of the heritage of the CA Corps.[6] Through CR and engagements, CA forces can develop an accurate picture of the civil environment to guide U.S. government planning efforts.

Case Study: START-FWD

START-FWD is an ad hoc amalgamation of partners from DoS and USAID. Their forward-deployed personnel often concurrently maintain their other job duties within their parent departments, from both domestic and overseas postings. In Northeast Syria, START-FWD follows expeditionary diplomacy (previously known as transformational diplomacy), which gives planners flexible and agile programming support of democracy-promoting activities.[7]

The campaign to defeat the Islamic State gained momentum in Northeast Syria throughout 2015 and 2016 in DoS- and USAID-led humanitarian and stabilization efforts, expanded through reliance on remote programming and monitoring from outside Syria. In May 2017, then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson approved START-FWD, which became an official entity co-located with the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) in Northeast Syria. Using SOJTF-OIR assets to support civilian in-country presence, START-FWD contributed to a common operating picture across civilian and military lines of effort through regular information sharing and sustained opportunities for integrated planning. In fact, START-FWD made an indelible impression with visiting delegations from coalition member states. As a result, opportunities for foreign donor support increased, thereby increasing the overall capacity for burden sharing by other donor nations, especially with donors expressing greater confidence in contributing humanitarian and stabilization funding to Northeast Syria.

In late December 2018, START-FWD left Northeast Syria due to policy changes stemming from President Trump's infamous tweet.[8] Despite the sudden withdrawal, START-FWD continued to plan for a return and took advantage of the downtime to reassess what had or had not been working and what needed to improve. In May 2019, START-FWD hosted a lessons

conference in Germany, with several personnel representing their professional equities across the spectrum of DoD, DoS and USAID. This conference fulfilled the recommendation published by the DoS Office of the Inspector General that called for a review of lessons from the START-FWD mission.[9]

Expeditionary diplomacy requires unity of civilian command and more agile political-military decisionmaking. In nonpermissive environments, such as Syria, START-FWD lacked an embassy-in-exile structure that would have eased decisionmaking efforts. It also lacked a better integration of civilian and military staff officers for planning purposes. Moving forward, START-FWD and CA need to identify the best options to nest their resources to ensure effective assistance planning that ultimately leads to a defined strategy with clear endstates and pre-identified off-ramps. This potentially involves, as recommendations from several conference attendees pointed out, more predeployment consultations for establishing baseline operational knowledge and mission background.

Recent findings from a DoD lessons-learned report indicate that if the DoS values expeditionary diplomacy, then DoS should streamline planning support to interagency endeavors. It should also develop management strategies that are flexible enough to recruit and deploy staff personnel while resourcing logistics and security.[10] Partnering with CA made tactical operations for START-FWD easier, mostly due to the persistent presence of DoD assets on the ground in Northeast Syria conducting CR or engaging with key leaders within the various tribal and civic councils. This ultimately optimized the common operating picture into an interactive, nonlinear, resource-driven, actionable map. Thus, START-FWD's success in Northeast Syria is not about amending its current reliance on DoD entities, but about the innovations that DoS, USAID and DoD pooled together to address unforeseen turbulence not only in Northeast Syria but in other seemingly unrelated complex international systems that are ripe for transition from malign state or nonstate actor control.

The relationship among DoS, USAID and CA has been long, with several success stories at the operational level. Yet, what is still lacking is a training metric that can measure from the baseline operational knowledge and that creates and maintains data sets that monitoring and evaluation experts can use to assess the measures of performance from a training perspective. Collaborative training scenarios need to go beyond the assumptions that DoS or USAID role players are merely mock ambassadors. Rather, they must be cast into the realm of realism where all stakeholders encounter the same problems on the ground or behind the bureaucratic, stove-piped curtains and move forward with realistic, bottom-up, resource-driven solutions. This echoes other recommendations that seek to "conduct combined interagency, scenario-based stabilization planning exercises to include field and policy-level actors and, where possible, implementers and civil society actors as well."[11]

Building an Expeditionary Diplomacy "Team of Teams"

Expeditionary diplomacy will continue to necessitate ad hoc teams of DoS and CA. Integration needs to begin during training and education. Key to building effective teams is building trust, purpose and shared consciousness.[12] Military and civilian agencies involved in expeditionary diplomacy have unique and nuanced cultures that have the potential to become barriers to effective operations unless trust and cohesion are built in advance. CA and DoS have the potential to form highly-effective, interconnected networks of teams, as described by General Stanley McChrystal, USA, Ret., as a means of addressing the speed and complexity of operating environments.[13]

Vehicles for building trust and purpose include combined educational and training opportunities. Professional military education (PME) is an ideal long-term solution; however, these courses tend to be programmed rather inflexibly in terms of career progression and organizational budgets. Over time, PME builds trust between organizations, particularly with future senior leadership.

Another method, more immediate and involving more organizational members, is through combined individual tactical and survivability training. Defining characteristics of expeditionary diplomacy are austere and nonpermissive environments. This results in a requirement for advanced skills in field medicine, tactical driving and weapons training for selected personnel. Civilian agencies and military units often meet these requirements through in-house training events and contracted training. Combining predeployment survivability training informally on a regular basis would go a long way to building a sense of trust and common purpose at every level of organization. USAID, for example, has proposed creating rapid expeditionary development teams to deploy into nonpermissive environments.[14] These teams would be natural partners for special operations CA forces and would have many of the same training requirements.

Shared consciousness comes from persistent engagement and the combining of knowledge platforms. It is difficult to develop in an ad hoc configuration. This is an area where Army Reserve CA has the potential to link DoS, special operations CA forces and the conventional maneuver forces that they primarily support. Compared to active duty CA forces, reserve CA has a relative personnel depth, much like CA functional specialists, who bring specific civil-sector expertise to support both DoD and interagency needs. While creating additional active duty liaison positions with USAID or DoS may not be possible because of the size of the CA force, it may be feasible to assign more reservists to individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) positions with civilian agencies. These positions could also provide civilian agencies with ready access to civil information management platforms. This persistent presence could set the conditions for ad hoc platforms such as START-FWD, providing venues for predeployment coordination and the establishment of baseline operational knowledge.

Integration of CA with stabilization agency partners cannot happen at the expense of integration with supported service and joint forces. However, new models for integration could provide options to support all requirements. Support to expeditionary diplomacy could serve as a unifying concept for the CA Corps, integrating special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (CF) as well as active and reserve CA forces.

SOF-CF I3: Changing Mental Models

Traditional industrial-era conventional militaries have relatively predictable structures, organized in a linear manner with a mix of capabilities arrayed at echelon and aligned mathematically over time and space in order to generate effects. Human geography is complex and non-linear, driven by attitudes and cultures that shape human politics and is not readily influenced by traditional military means. As SAR points out, stabilization is inherently a political endeavor; however, human politics in the civil component is not confined within lines on a map.

The current force allocation model for conventional CA, assigning a CA battalion to a maneuver division and tasking out CA companies to brigade combat teams, is inflexible and dilutes the effectiveness of CA. Maneuver forces are arrayed based on physical geography and enemy force locations, while CA addresses human geography. This inherent conflict limits the effectiveness of CA units that are embedded within CF. Regardless of whether CA forces are aligned

under CF or SOF commands, they remain distinct from other capabilities found in CF. By the DoD definition of special operations, CA could be viewed as an inherently SOF capability.[15]

A potential model for CA integration with linear conventional capabilities exists through SOF-CF integration, interoperability and interdependence (SOF-CF I3) as described in Army Field Manual 6-05.[16] Key points from this concept are the need for new mental models, the use of supporting-supported relationships and the importance of liaison elements.

Although CA forces exist within CF, they are "structured, trained, maintained, and employed differently to deliver separate capabilities." The methods CA forces use vary significantly from those used in maneuver warfare. "Commanders must recognize that all elements have distinct, unique, and complementary characteristics and cultural behaviors. A successful technique is to work with these differing attributes and not try to force one element to conform to the cultural behaviors of the other."[17]

CF Integration

In large-scale combat operations against a great-power competitor, CA could increase lethality through CR, civil engagement and civil network analysis. CA could also be viewed as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform.[18] However, CA units require flexibility to conduct these activities. Many of the effects that CF commanders desire are conducted by and through unified action partners (UAPs). Focused platforms such as START-FWD have a greater potential to deliver effects for CF than CA tactical units dispersed throughout conventional formations.

Integration with CF requires reexamining methods of staff support and operational capability. The difficulty of integrating CA is illustrated by the Army's warfighting function concept. CA does not fit neatly within the warfighting functions of maneuver, intelligence, fires, protection, etc., yet it has significant impact on all of them. An "information" warfighting function has been proposed and an "engagement" function nearly adopted, but CA is more than those. CA can best be viewed as a cross-cutting capability that requires integration with all warfighting functions. Further, the "delivery mechanisms" for CA effects, such as UAPs and interagency platforms, exist outside the force structure of maneuver forces.

Reconfiguring the conventional CA force should follow these principles: deployment of CA units based on human geography or terrain management rather than maneuver warfare control measures or areas of responsibility; flexible allocation of CA units managed through supporting-supported command relationships; and an extensive network of liaison elements widely distributed throughout CF engaging with external CA elements and platforms.

The model that the U.S. Air Force uses to integrate airpower provides a potential model for CA. Forces outside the operational control of maneuver commanders provide air effects, but they are closely coordinated to the lowest echelon through highly-networked liaison elements like the tactical air control party (TACP). This model has applicability for CA, as Air Force TACPs are divided between SOF and CF, and it provides lessons for integration of SOF and CF CA.

Highly-networked CA liaison elements, with organic communications equipment, could deploy and embed with key nodes of supported units. Their tasks would include both coordinating with external CA units and interagency platforms like START-FWD as well as advising the warfighting functions that they are working with. For example, CA liaison elements on a division staff could embed with intelligence, fires, protection, information operations and logistics. Unlike a traditional G9/S9 section, which must attend multiple working groups to engage these functions, the liaison elements would maintain persistent presence with each

section. Embedding liaison elements within multiple staff sections both reinforces the concept that civil-military operations (CMO) are a unit commander's responsibility and also institutionalizes CMO within maneuver staffs.

This liaison network would ensure shared consciousness and the operationalization of civil information. Further, it would ensure that CA tactical units, a very limited resource, are used in areas where they are most needed. The CA team is a strategic capability that has the potential to generate effects out of proportion to its size.[19] However, teams require a level of autonomy and flexibility that is not possible when under the operational control of a tactical maneuver unit. Reducing the headquarter-to-team ratio in Army Reserve CA could free up personnel to provide liaison elements as well as fill IMA positions with DoS.

Enabling CA teams also requires rethinking the utility of planning elements at the operational and tactical levels. Traditional planning teams tend to stovepipe CA within a single staff section. By increasing the connectivity between maneuver unit staffs and CA teams through liaison elements, CA could match the speed of the operating environment.

Conclusion

The discussion on stabilization takes on new importance when viewed in the context of changes in warfare. Sean McFate, author of *The New Rules of Order: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder* and national security expert, interviewed in the Association's *One CA* podcasts, describes the character of warfare moving toward a state of "durable disorder," with conventional warfare being an anomaly.[20] This is particularly significant when viewed in terms of great-power competition, which is often perceived in terms of large-scale combat between peer competitors; however, it is far more likely that the operating environment will continue to be characterized by political warfare, with peer competitors using nonmilitary elements of power and conducting irregular warfare through proxy forces.

CA support to stabilization and building partner-nation civilian resilience denies adversaries access to contested space in the competition phase. CA also sets the conditions to preserve combat power in high-intensity conflict, increase lethality and enable the consolidation of gains. To achieve effects, CA forces must move away from their rigid alignment with conventional formations. This is counterintuitive to traditional military concepts of integration but would increase the effectiveness of CA for joint force commanders at all echelons. Ultimately, joint force commanders require the effects delivered by CA; they do not necessarily require the presence of CA units within their formations. Support to expeditionary diplomacy provides a unifying concept; START-FWD illustrates a potential model for CA integration that could deliver strategic effects.

Recommendations for the CA Proponent:

1. Increase CA training and interoperability with DoS and USAID, to include PME, medical, tactical and survivability training;

2. deploy CA units based on human geography rather than maneuver warfare control measures or physical terrain;

3. incorporate SOF-CF I3 as a model for CF CA integration;

4. implement a flexible force allocation model for conventional CA with supporting-supported command relationships; deploy an extensive CA liaison officer network down to the tactical level (Air Force TACP model); and

5. reduce the headquarters-to-team ratio in Army Reserve CA to free up personnel for liaison elements with CF and proposed IMA positions with DoS and USAID.

<p align="center">★   ★   ★</p>

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Integrating Civil Affairs Through the Application of Battlefield-Relevant Civil Information Management

by Major Brian J. Hancock, Dr. Timothy P. Darr, Riannon Hazell and Peter Grazaitis

Warfare is ever changing. In an era of great-power competitors characterized by hybrid shadow warfare and the proliferation of non-state actors, America is losing ground to increasingly bolder adversaries. In a recent Pentagon strategic multi-layer assessment, the presenter declared, "The Golden Age of SIGINT is over."[1] This has serious implications for the intelligence community. With the rise of effective anti-access/area denial (A2AD) systems, hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence (AI), traditional models of maneuver and logistics are also breaking down. War is changing faster and on a larger scale than at any time in the last 350 years.[2] The inability of DoD to keep pace with this change has prompted some experts to point out that the United States has failed to achieve its strategic objectives in every conflict since 1945.[3]

The Civil Affairs (CA) corps is equally impacted by the unprecedented pace of change. It was a common theme at the 2017–2018 Civil Affairs Symposium that inadequate manning, training and equipping of CA forces is preventing it from realizing its full potential as a combat multiplier.[4] As a consequence, there has been a reduction in force in the active component (AC) CA community, which will soon be mirrored in the reserve component (RC).

The stakes have never been higher. If America is to defeat its adversaries in the densely populated littorals, CA must assume its role as the integrator of choice to deliver population-centric effects that achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

The Case for Civil Information

The U.S. military excels at achieving tactical victory on the battlefield. However, translating these victories at the operational level to achieve strategic objectives remains elusive. The key to successful strategy is effective decisionmaking at all levels of the organization. This facilitates matching the best capability to any problem, prudent assumption of risk and rapid execution. The single most important factor for effective decisionmaking is the quantity and quality of information that the decisionmaker has available. Superior information drives superior decisions.

While few would debate the importance of information in modern warfare, there is less certainty on how information should be weaponized to secure strategic success. Modern military decisionmakers are essentially knowledge managers. They take information, then apply analysis and expert judgment in an effort to reach understanding, which can be leveraged to generate an efficient course of action designed to achieve the commander's intent. To facilitate understanding which can be exploited, information must be timely, accurate and insightful.

All elements of the total force require information. It is one of the key points of overlap between the AC and the RC, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces, and among intergovernmental organizations, other government agencies and non-government organizations. All of these organizations must consume and produce quality information in order to achieve their respective missions. Information is the currency of choice in modern crisis and

is a natural integrator. Further, the act of sharing and receiving information fosters unity of effort among participating entities.

The Army, Marine Corps and joint doctrine all recognize that CA is an information-related capability.[5] Within CA, the organization that is tasked with managing information applicable to the civil domain is the Civil Information Management (CIM) cell. According to Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, the mission of the CIM cell is to "collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate" civil information to U.S. government (USG) and DoD agencies and to Unified Action Partners (UAP).

While CA CIM cells do an admirable job of collecting and processing relevant civil information, they are not manned or equipped to collect and evaluate the totality of civil information required to inform modern crisis managers. This problem is further compounded by the fact that the majority of civil information is produced by non-military entities, and flows over many and disparate, unclassified systems. While a number of well-funded agencies staffed with subject matter experts (National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United States Geological Survey, United Nations Development Program [UNDP] et al.) have a stake in civil information, no one agency is tasked with civil information as their primary mission. There is, in effect, a strategic civil information gap which prevents the total force from making timely and accurate decisions in the civil domain through each phase and across the range of military operations (ROMO).

Battlefield-Relevant Civil Information Management

For civil information to be battlefield relevant, it must have the potential to affect *maneuver*. For instance, predictive modeling which demonstrates the likely impacts to city and social systems as a result of a natural or man-made disaster provides the combatant commander (COCOM) with significant insight for force tailoring in Phases I-II (deter/seize the initiative). As an alternative, a predictive model which accurately depicts the change in civilian movement if certain nodes in the transportation network are destroyed by fires is highly-relevant to shoot/no-shoot decisions in Phase III.

This paper presents an abbreviated conceptual model capable of capturing the preponderance of civil information, integrating CA across the joint community as well as UAP, and generating outputs so significant at each phase—and throughout the ROMO—that every COCOM will demand CA forces for every mission.

Model Basic Considerations

Currently, both the USG and the private sector employ a wide variety of technical platforms to capture and transmit civil information. Rather than attempt to force a myriad of disparate users to adopt a single technical solution, the model presented in this paper is platform agnostic. It is built on transportable code that can be ingested into the individual user's platform of choice for viewing outputs. Likewise, the model is capable of ingesting inputs from other systems in any standard format.

For the purposes of this model, the authors divide civil information stakeholders into three broad classifications: those who produce civil information; those who consume civil information; and those who do both. The proposed model connects all of these groups in an unclassified environment, allowing each participant to provide information within their sphere of expertise and to consume information relevant to their specific mission. Organizations which are averse to working directly with the military are accessed through an acceptable interlocutor such as

the UNDP, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Information Center (UNOCHA-HIC) or the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Sample Integrated Battlefield-Relevant CIM Outputs

There are a number of game-changing, information-related capabilities in the DoD research and development (R&D) pipeline supported by the conceptual model below. One such product, sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineer R&D Center, is the Framework for Integrating Complex Uncertain Systems (FICUS).[6]

Enhanced by machine learning, FICUS will have the capability to run complex geospatial proxy simulations in seconds, instead of hours or days, producing the most likely, most dangerous and best-case scenarios. It is possible to run a thousand simulations and generate a low margin of error in less than two hours. The FICUS dataset has rich neighborhood-level demographics, making it easy to determine such factors as what languages people speak, their ethnicity, social status, whether they own an automobile, etc. FICUS's transportation simulation has the potential to model precise transportation nodes and to calculate traffic patterns under a variety of conditions.

In Phase III operations (dominate), FICUS's ability to calculate change in traffic patterns due to fires or other military activity will provide high-leverage knowledge to military planners. FICUS also has the ability to ingest transportable code. Stanford University scientists Benjamin Huyn and Sanjay Basu recently developed a model for calculating internally displaced persons (IDP).[7] The model aggregates metadata, which is available at low cost, and a random forest AI to predict the destination of IDPs with great accuracy. While the model cannot predict the routes that the IDPs will take, or their demographic information, FICUS can.

The Stanford model is written in a form that FICUS can ingest. Combined, these tools can model who is likely to be displaced by any course of action, their characteristics, the routes they will take, whether they will travel by car, train, air or foot and where they are likely to go. In summation, it will be the most accurate and comprehensive IDP model ever created. Such knowledge will allow the humanitarian community to stage resources and personnel with unprecedented accuracy and to inform commanders where and when they need to deploy forces to minimize the effects of the civilian population on their intended schemes of maneuver.

Another capability under development is the Mega-City Analysis and Visualization Environment (M-CAVE) produced by Knowledge-Based Systems Incorporated under a small business innovative research contract from Army Research Labs (contract # W911SR-18-C-0039). The objective of this capability is to research, implement and demonstrate analytic capabilities and a supporting logical or reference architecture for predictive analytics focused on the human domain. A reference architecture is a logical rather than a physical architecture. That is, it describes the functional components or services necessary to support a set of use cases or user stories. As such, it is agnostic toward the technology used to implement the architecture. The reference architecture addresses the following challenges:

1. Accurate (i.e., consistent with how humans make decisions) models of human decision-making, in specific situations, for the purpose of forecasting future responses; and

2. presenting the right product to the right user or decisionmaker at the right time in a format that is appropriate to the decisionmaking task.

The first challenge implies computational agent decision models that accurately forecast how humans will make decisions, with all the contextual biases of a particular situation. This

is in contrast to state-of-the-art agent models in which agents are trained to make the "rational" or "optimal" action in all cases. For example, when making an assessment of a situation prior to acting, humans are influenced by a variety of biases that a super-intelligent agent is not: pessimism, optimism, framing, groupthink, etc. This situation assessment, in turn, influences the decision of what action to take (if any at all). In addition to the biases inherent in situation assessment, the decision to act is influenced by a variety of biases, including risk-taking or risk aversion, confirmation biases, sunk-cost fallacies, etc.

The second challenge implies that the architecture facilitates the analyst in composing products or reports to meet the specific needs of the decisionmaker. The figure below shows the reference architecture. A description of its components follows.

NGO – non-governmental organization
IGO – international government organization
OGA – other government agency

Ingest services perform initial transformation of the data to information and the storing of that information in the data warehouse. This includes indexing (for efficient storage and information retrieval) and metadata extraction (the title of the source material, author, URL or location of the raw data, keywords, an abstract, date created, etc.). We assume that two types of data are of interest to the users: public data and private data. Public data includes website content, RSS feeds (really simple syndication, i.e., a way to track and see updates from multiple websites and/or news sources at once), Twitter, Facebook, etc. and is accessed using standard web-crawling technologies. Private data includes documents, databases, etc. that are not publicly available and are accessed via direct upload.

Information extraction services provide a more advanced set of capabilities for extracting information from data. Open source text literature has become an increasingly rich source of information about civilian beliefs, opinions and inclinations. The information extracted by this process is stored in a repository that is typically separate from the raw data. These services include capabilities such as theme or topic extraction, sentiment extraction, event extraction, location extraction, social network extraction, etc. If done carefully, the information extracted by the services can provide baselines for community behavior and responses, making it possible

to measure the extent to which actions are effective in creating desired changes and to compare forecasted results against ground truth.

The *data warehouse* is the repository of integrated (or processed) data from one or more raw data sources, or other processed data sources. Typically, a data warehouse for CIM will include: processed data, report templates, report archives and agent decisionmaking models. More details will be provided below.

A collection of *query services* are used to implement standard CRUD (create, read, update and delete) capabilities. These services are implemented such that they are aligned with a common data model or ontology so that the user of the services can express the query in the most natural way.

A detailed discussion of the *modeling and forecasting services* is beyond the scope of this *Issue Paper*. At a high level, the key requirement is that these services must facilitate understanding the civilian environment (the human domain generally) in order to empower the analyst in shaping civil actions. This implies *profile-based agent models* of human decisionmakers. Profile-based means models of a specific human, models of a notional group representative, or models of an agent with specific behavioral tendencies or biases. These models need to reflect how the targeted agent actually makes decisions in a situated environment and responds to specific stressors or stimuli. The models need to be informed by data and need to be configurable or tunable to a situation to support "what if" analysis in a simulation exercise.

The general modeling process is an iterative process that includes formation of a hypothesis, collection of evidence for that hypothesis, creation of an appropriate model to test the hypothesis, simulation and validation of the model and, finally, saving the model for historical purposes or to include in a report or product. This process is implemented in the *modeler* capability shown in the architecture. The information extraction services described above are used for evidence of the model hypotheses. For example, the analyst may hypothesize that a key community leader will respond to an intervention in a certain way because of how that leader responded in the past. This hypothesis is supported by mining open sources for past statements and actions by the leader. This is used as inputs to the model, which is then simulated and validated. An effective validation approach uses agent-based simulation techniques.

As a more specific example, this modeling process and its associated architectural services support the capability to calculate brokerage and in-degree centrality among social systems using extracted social network information. National Defense University fellow Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Battle recently published a thesis which demonstrates how such information can be utilized to make high-payoff social investments that generate social movements capable of achieving U.S. strategic policy goals when transformed through the process of social appropriation.[8] This would elevate psychological operations target audience analysis to new levels, and provide a powerful new tool in the U.S. information operations arsenal.

The *report/product composer* is a capability that ties all of the information and models together into an output that is tailored to the consumer. It utilizes *visualization services* to present outputs in a clear and compelling manner (social network graphs, sentiment trends, community response forecasts, etc.). The report/product composition process starts with a report template, which is a standard or customized presentation of the output or existing report. Using intuitive drag-and-drop interactions, the content creator organizes the material to meet either consumer decisionmaking needs or the prescribed report/product outline. The author collects evidence for report content using the information resident in the data warehouse and

performs agent-based simulations to present forecasted effects. The report/product is intended to be a dynamic output; that is, the content is updated by monitoring incoming data feeds and updating model forecasts as needed (on demand or according to a daily schedule). The *report viewer* component is the final output, as presented to the consumer. This could be a webpage where consumers can request updates or more information, or a more traditional document or PowerPoint briefing.

DOTMLPF-P Recommendations

Implementation of the models and architecture presented in this paper will require a number of changes across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P). The areas most effected are materiel, training and policy. Currently, there is no approved standard CIM unclassified platform. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army Unclassified (DCGS-A[U]) is the current proposed materiel solution, but the new equipment fielding and training have been delayed due to funding.

It is not critical whether the Army deploys a DCGS-A(U) platform, an unclassified Palantir/ Gotham platform, or something else, but whichever it decides on, the Army needs to get it into warfighters' hands quickly. The current revised draft of Army Training Publication 3-57.70, *CMOC Operations*, states that CIM cells at every echelon require a continuous and uninterrupted connection to the internet, even in areas where no local internet service providers are available. This requirement cannot be met with an asynchronous mode; it must be *connected* at all times so that it can portal data through the information extraction services to inform the forecast models and populate the reports and products dynamically, in real time. While SOF CA has access to satellite communications, reserve CA does not. USMC expeditionary forces use a device called a MiFi for this purpose. The MiFi is high-bandwidth, low-cost, stealthy and supports a dozen simultaneous devices with acceptable performance—even in austere conditions. Such a device should be added to the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of CA CIM Cells.

In addition to the capabilities noted above, a CIM laptop solution must have basic hardening versus physical, cyber and electronic warfare threats. Finally, it should be engineered with signature management in mind to reduce the enemy's ability to target friendly forces. Software and data should reside on a secure government cloud solution which will simplify maintenance and updates. CIM data placed in the government cloud, including models and model results as described above, will be stored in perpetuity and be available to all stakeholders. Developing a strong base of historical data will also facilitate AI training leading to superior, insightful outputs.

Battlefield significant CIM will also require some changes in how we train the force. All 38 series (Civil Affairs) MOS (military occupational specialty) personnel should have a chance to test the equipment in a field environment. They should also receive introductory training on big data and how it is managed, to include basic familiarity with organizational tools, such as Hadoop and Spark that run on the Amazon EMR platform. They should also have basic training in analytical software used by intelligence, such as Niagra Files (NiFi), and web crawlers. 12Y (Geospatial Engineers) MOS qualified personnel will require the above training, plus how to apply statistics and spatial cluster analysis to GIS (geographic information system, i.e., a system designed to capture, store, manipulate, analyze, manage and present spatial or geographic data) tools such as ArcGIS and ArcGIS Collector. A two-hour block of training should also be inserted into the various pre-command courses, demonstrating the battlefield-relevant civil information that the CIM cell can provide for command decisions. Finally, all CIM cell staff

should have an opportunity to attend the Network Engagement course offered by the intelligence community. While this class has traditionally focused on identifying and neutralizing enemy networks, it continues to evolve and progressively add content on how to identify and influence friendly and neutral networks in support of U.S. policy.

The policy level will require facilitation to bring together the principal stakeholders across the military and civilian community to build a customizable shared data model. A diverse special taskforce with broad authorities will have to be established to perform needs analysis and to shape the system architecture so that it is broadly accepted and utilized. Organizations that must maintain neutrality, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, will need to have an acceptable interlocutor, such as UNOCHA-HIC, in order to participate. Most arrangements can be established and managed with interagency agreements, but congressional approval may be required in select cases.

Conclusion

By 2050, according to the United Nations, 68 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas.[9] As modern weapons become progressively miniaturized and more destructive, civilian casualties and collateral damage amplified by ever-present modern media seems inevitable. Unfortunately, each enemy death and destroyed building, while a victory at the physical level, only hastens moral defeat, which in turn leads to strategic defeat.[10] Winning the peace in an age of enduring disorder, characterized by fragile states and dense urban terrain, is a wicked problem set.

There is no simple solution to the challenges that the free world will face now and in the future. What is clear, however, is that no matter what strategy is devised, civil information will be vital to success. The authors here have presented a viable model, integrated across both the military and civilian communities. It can secure the role of the CA Corps in any crisis, reversing the trend of strategic defeat and improving the condition of our defense community and so of the entire nation.

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