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Institute of Land Warfare >> AUSA Book Program >> Book Reviews >> Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives Email this... Email    Print this Print


Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives

By: COL John M. Collins USA (Ret.)

Reviewed By: GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S.A (Ret.)


In the future, I predict that anyone interested in military strategy, for whatever reason, will turn first to John Collins. All the nuts, bolts, lumber and sheet metal needed to put together concepts for the utilization of the military forces of a nation are laid out in this new volume, a compendium of the basic elements of national interest, national power and national conflicts.

The book is a digest of important thoughts, ideas and basic truths gleaned from studies of old masters, scholars and practitioners throughout the ages, all identified in extensive chapter notes and a bibliography that will take years to gather and read. It is not a revelation of new thinking on the subject, although there are nuggets of wisdom that are the author's own expression of how to do things. It is instead a workbook, a text of those things that today's students and practicing strategists should be reminded to think about. It is a comprehensive portrayal of what has to be considered, what has to be done to understand or to prepare for the employment of military power in pursuit of national interests. It is not a presentation of how to do it, which is a final step that must be taken by the practitioner using the tools provided.

The book begins with an overview that provides a direct, uncomplicated understanding of the strategic hierarchy and strategic processes, followed in logical sequence by the framework and fundamentals of military strategy. The primacy of national political policy is explained and established, strategic building blocks are identified and the fundamentals of preparedness, of deterrence and of war-fighting are discussed. The venerable principles of war, expanded from nine -- to twelve, are augmented with two additional sets of principles that apply to preparedness and deterrence. The text then makes the transition to special applications of these fundamentals for nuclear warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency, terrorism and counterterrorism, coalition warfare and others, each chapter a logical utilization of the fundamentals to meet special requirements.

The text is thought-provoking, challenging the reader's knowledge and thinking. Can time really be a principle of war? Are there other principles overlooked or forgotten? How can installations be a principle? The answers to these questions, among many others provided in the text, provide insight to the thinking that is new, that is, a way of organizing and discussing facts, factors, shibboleths and truisms not readily available in other presentations.

There are some disappointments. The chapters on nuclear, chemical and biological warfare address coping with such attacks, but there is no discussion of how or why one should consider employing this kind of weaponry. There is no discussion of the battlefield utility, for example, of short-range, low-yield nuclear artillery against an airborne or amphibious force landed on a critical objective, or of a chemical strike aimed at immobilizing the same force. In other words, there is no contemplation that we might find the use of these means reasonable or necessary; we need only prepare to cope with an enemy's use of them.

There is no discussion of timeliness as a prime consideration in the value of intelligence. In addition, I can argue, if we want to alter or modify the principles of war, audacity and tenacity have as much appeal as flexibility and morals.

Such shortcomings, however, do not detract from the overall value of this work.

One of the finest tributes of the book is found in the author's own words, written in the prospectus, referring to the tragedy of September 11, a happening that postdated the typesetting of the text. He wrote, "Neither those events nor subsequent developments invalidate chapters in this book that concern sociopolitical terrorism, counterterrorism and associated topics." He changed not a word he had written.

I expect to find this volume on the shelves of many who work in the Pentagon, in the headquarters serving our commanders in chief and other commanders, and prominent in the libraries of our service schools for years to come. It will be an invaluable text for strategists of all types.

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