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Reviews
09/01/2007
Masterful Analysis of the American Revolution
Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. John Ferling. Oxford University Press. 679 pages; maps; halftone illustrations; index; $29.95.
Reviewed by Col. Cole C. Kingseed
U.S. Army retired
To Gen. George Washington, America’s victory in the American Revolution was “little short of a standing miracle.” In what is likely to become the finest single-volume treatise of the conflict in a generation, historian John Ferling seeks to explain “why America won the war, and why the British, despite their many advantages, lost it.” The result is a literary tour de force that encompasses the political, military and social dimensions of the War of Independence.
In Almost a Miracle Ferling brings impressive credentials to his study of the American Revolution. With more than 40 years of experience as a student of the conflict, he is the author of nine books on the war. He has also appeared in four television documentaries devoted to the revolution, and his book A Leap in the Dark won the prestigious Fraunces Tavern Book Award as the year’s best book on the American War of Independence.
Ferling’s willingness to challenge conventional interpretations of the war makes Almost a Miracle a riveting read. He convincingly argues that the United States came much closer to ending short of the great American victory than most readers realize. Ferling also sees more flaws and greater virtues in the figure of George Washington. His most controversial finding centers on the crucial importance of the war in the South in determining the outcome of the American Revolution. Ferling’s analysis of the southern campaign leads the reader to a deeper appreciation of Gen. Nathanael Greene, who assumed command of the southern army in the wake of the disaster at Camden, S.C., in August 1780.
Almost a Miracle also examines the political landscape on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Ferling, the British government under Lord North led Great Britain into a faraway war without a plan for waging it. Not surprisingly, it took almost a year to develop a strategy aimed at strangulation of New England. The Second Continental Congress also vacillated between war aims before deciding on a war for reconciliation, not independence. Reconciliation, however, was to be on Congress’ own terms, with a British confederation with diminished parliamentary authority. With no hope of compromise, it was little more than a pipe dream.
Ferling presents an intriguing portrait of George Washington. The American commander in chief certainly matured as the years passed. He outgrew the “anxious impulsiveness” that he sometimes displayed during the siege of Boston. Every subsequent step he took from 1776 on was the “result of meticulous planning.” Perhaps his greatest attribute was his selection of superb subordinates, including Henry Knox and Nathanael Greene, the most capable American commander. It was Greene who recaptured the Carolinas and Georgia following his tactical defeat at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781. In Congress, John Adams admitted that Greene’s 1781 Carolina campaign was as glorious for the American arms as Washington’s capture of Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown.
This is not to say that Washington’s generalship was above reproach. A better strategist than a tactician, Washington never grew appreciably as a battlefield commander. His tactical limitations were exhibited at Brooklyn, N.Y., Germantown, Pa., and Monmouth, N.J. According to Ferling, Washington’s greatest liability was his indecisiveness, which he displayed on numerous battlefields. Washington’s shortcomings, however, were soon forgotten by contemporary critics in the aftermath of Yorktown.
Did the British lose or did the Americans win? Ferling says Great Britain did not fight the war in a vacuum, and the Americans deserve much credit for their victory. The American citizen-soldier and the militia were indispensable to the ultimate victory. In the final analysis, Britain’s suppression of the American rebellion “was foiled in the fighting in the North between 1775 and 1778, but the American victory was won at last in the South in 1780-1781.”
Ferling states that contemporaries on both sides of the Atlantic were quick to ponder the mysteries of the war’s outcome. Ferling’s interpretation is provocative. He suggests that Great Britain faced an uphill fight in the War of Independence. Though the mother country enlisted more than 150,000 men to bear arms during the war, the majority of these soldiers were not dispatched to America. By war’s end, only 35,000 troops were stationed in North America, less than 20 percent of the total number the Crown had under arms. That dispersal of forces, coupled with “a military that selected its highest officers on anything but experience and professional competence, was markedly defective.”
Ferling is exceptionally critical of British general William Howe, who possessed the capacity to crush the Continental Army in the war’s early years. Howe’s conduct of the war in the aftermath of the Battle of Long Island in 1776 is difficult to comprehend, since he had strategic victory in his grasp before letting Washington escape to fight another day. Howe’s refusal to coordinate his strategy with the other British armies doomed Britain’s effort to win the war in 1777. Britain then turned to a southern strategy designed to reclaim those colonies that held the greatest economic importance to British interests.
Thomas Paine, author of The American Crisis, identified the principal reason why the United States defeated the world’s most formidable military power: the war had been “the country’s war, the public’s war … the war of the people in their own behalf.” Thus the American people and their soldiers, not just George Washington, had endured to gain a victory. Ferling is to be commended for presenting a highly readable account that is sure to foster increased interest in the War of Independence.
COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant.
The Untold Story of the Pentagon
The Pentagon: A History. Steve Vogel. Random House. 629 pages; black and white photographs; maps; $32.95.
Reviewed by Nancy Barclay Graves
Who among you has not done time in the Pentagon? Steve Vogel has compiled the untold story of this venerable building—its personalities, construction, reconstruction following 9/11 and ongoing renovation. The Pentagon: A History is well illustrated with maps, photographs and a timeline. Vogel’s prose is fast moving, born of his years as a journalist, most notably with the Washington Post, reporting from Rwanda, Somalia, the first Gulf War, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon.
The Pentagon is not only a structure—a colossal one at that—but a symbol of U.S. power. It is the product of the vision of men like Gen. Brehon B. Somervell and Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves who, at the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, built a structure in record time to house the 30,000 personnel who would serve in the headquarters during the incredible effort of World War II. It was not an easy task.
Just to find a location for so massive a building was a challenge. The Virginia side of the Potomac River, then sparsely developed, had the acreage. The original site preferred by Gen. Somervell lay near the Memorial Bridge. President Roosevelt, however, would not let the integrity of the Custis-Lee mansion and the hallowed grounds of Arlington Cemetery be impinged upon. He chose the present location himself after a late afternoon automobile drive through the area. The site chosen, farther south of the Memorial Bridge, incorporated an aptly named low spot known as Hell’s Bottom (low not only in feet above sea level, but as the location of gambling, prostitution and murder). The area’s spicy history is well recounted by Vogel.
Then-Brig. Gen. Somervell, chief of the Army’s Construction Division, called in his chief of design, Maj. Hugh (Pat) Casey, in July 1941, and tasked him with the design of a new War Department Headquarters with a floor area of 500,000 square feet, to be finished in one year, with first occupancy in six months. The basic design was to be on Somervell’s desk by 9 a.m. Monday—and it was.
That was the start of the frenetic pace that ensued for the next 18 months. Somervell chose then-Col. Groves as the expediter. The job was done; not on budget, but almost on time.
Vogel has extensively researched the Pentagon’s construction, including pitfalls and successes. He introduces a cast of personalities through whom the building comes alive in a race against time.
There is the forceful Gen. Somervell who, after completing the Pentagon construction, was responsible during World War II for the logistics of the U.S. Army. Lt. Gen. Groves is well-known for his role as head of the Manhattan Project, which produced the atomic bomb, but not so well-known as the whip hand in the building of the Pentagon. Many others are depicted here who deserve recognition: Maj. Casey, chief of design for the Construction Division, became Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s chief engineer in Allied Forces Pacific, retiring as a major general; Lt. Col. Clarence Renshaw, engineer for the project, had a full Corps of Engineers career, also retiring as a major general; 1st Lt. Robert Furman, executive officer for the project, was assigned by Gen. Groves to the Manhattan Project to sleuth out what progress the Germans were making toward an atomic bomb and traveled the world as Groves’ intelligence man. John McShain, Paul Hauck and George Edwin Bergstrom were preeminent among the civilian builders and architects whose stories are well worth the read. Architect Ides van der Gracht organized a team of several hundred draftsmen and architects who stayed one step ahead of—or sometimes one step behind—the construction. He later served heroically in the American intelligence community and was with American troops when they liberated his mother and sister, held throughout the war in Holland.
The Pentagon became not only a magnificent structure, but was in the forefront of the societal changes taking place in the 1940s. The location in Virginia of a federal building confronted a dichotomy of standards. President Roosevelt had decreed that there would be no racial discrimination in federal buildings. Virginia said there would be no mixing of the races in facilities such as restrooms and restaurants. Vogel details how this dilemma was solved, not without bloodshed. The Pentagon became the first truly integrated building in Virginia, and hence in the South.
By the end of World War II in 1945, the role of the Pentagon was well established. Roosevelt had envisioned it being the site of a depository of the archives of the country; indeed, the floors had been built to hold heavy files. At the end of the war, however, no one could imagine leaving the building, which had become the symbol of American power, and so the archives went elsewhere. Unification of the services into the Department of Defense also took place there. The birth of the DoD was not easy, and Vogel describes the difficulties, the ego conflicts, the foot-dragging. Secretaries of Defense, of the Army, Navy and Air Force come and go, but for almost 40 years one man ran the Pentagon. David O. Cook, known by his initials as “Doc,” came to the Pentagon as the director of Administration and Management for the Secretary of Defense. In reality, he was the “Mayor of the Pentagon.” By the 1980s Cook realized that the building was in desperate need of renovation. This was not easily done because the General Services Administration was loath to spend the money needed. Cook attacked. He got the building ceded to the Department of Defense, he got Congress to listen to his list of deficiencies, and finally in 1993, he was able to move forward on a billion-dollar renovation plan.
Although the original building had been built in 18 months, renovation would take more than 10 years. The building divided naturally into five sections. People in the first section would move out, and then as each section was finished, people from the next section would occupy the completed section, and so on until the five sections were finished. The cast of characters, headed by Army veteran and Air Force contracts specialist Walker Lee Evey, gives personality to the story. Evey was pressed into service to oversee the work—the right man at the right time.
The renovation of the first section was complete and was just being repopulated when American Airlines Flight 77 slammed into it. Vogel describes that horrendous day, the heroism of so many, the destruction of so much. He puts us there, with the victims, the firefighters, the emergency workers and those who came back to the building on 9/12, defiant.
Once again, the right man at the right time was found, and Vogel expertly describes the reconstruction. Allyn Kilsheimer, a no-nonsense engineer, is to damaged buildings what Paul (Red) Adair was to oil well fires. Kilsheimer was persuaded to come to the Pentagon and oversee the daunting effort. Reconstruction was completed within a year, on budget, on time, as phenomenal a feat as the original construction. The renovation continues.
In 1993 on the 50th anniversary of the building of the Pentagon at a ceremony marking its designation as a national historic landmark, Gen. Colin Powell paid it tribute:
The Eiffel Tower may be more impressive, the Taj Mahal more exotic, the pyramids more mysterious, and St. Peter and St. Paul’s basilicas more sublime. But the Pentagon has stood … for half a century as a powerful and renowned symbol of America’s convictions, America’s power, and of America’s willingly accepted obligation to the world. In its somber and unpretentious way, it has weathered time, it has weathered wars, it has weathered innumerable crises, and it has weathered the storm of politics.
Readers will find Steve Vogel’s The Pentagon: A History informative, entertaining and rewarding. They will also learn the answer to the big question: Why is it a pentagon?
NANCY BARCLAY GRAVES is a freelance writer who lives in Arlington, Va.
New Assessment Of U.S.-China Relations
Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy. Bates Gill. Brookings Institution Press. 267 pages; index; $28.95.
Reviewed by Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson
U.S. Army retired
Bates Gill opens his book Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy with two thematic points: China is pursuing regional and global security matters that are far more consistent with broad international norms and practice than in the past; and China may eclipse Japan as the predominant Asian power in the western Pacific. Further, he maintains that China has set out three recognizable goals: it seeks to maintain a stable international environment; its security diplomacy is designed to augment its wealth and influence; and it seeks to circumvent American influence around its periphery while avoiding overt confrontation.
Gill implies that the attitude of the Chinese government toward Taiwan is somewhat like that of a parent towards a troublesome offspring: In due time Taiwan will return to mainland control, but it is not necessary to press the matter for settlement—unless someone makes an issue of it. Beijing recognizes and worries about the prominence of the United States in world security affairs. It understands, however, that the world is undergoing remarkable changes. It is aware that international alliances are changing—not only those of the United States, but those of Asian nations as well. Furthermore, the Chinese leadership understands the global drift toward proliferation of nuclear weapons, as it does the norms of national sovereignty and foreign intervention, such as in the case of Iraq today.
Rising Star is organized into seven chapters, the first two of which deal with security diplomacy and regional security mechanisms. Gill points to the Chinese exercise of skillful diplomatic preemption, such as being the first to have their head of state send a message of sympathy to the U.S. President in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The surprise in Washington, D.C.—because of the call from Beijing—was sufficient to prompt an unusually comprehensive American reassessment of Sino-American policy. Unfortunately, in Gill’s view, the action in Washington was insufficient, considering the opportunities that were opened. To this day, he suggests, the American leadership has not evidenced any deep understanding of the new outlook in vogue among the Chinese leadership.
Gill avers that American policy toward China has been “tentative, uncertain and muddled,” which he attributes primarily to influential “China hawks” in high positions of the U.S. government. These officials, he argues, have continued to believe in an inevitable conflict between the two countries. He points out that the U.S. National Security Strategy for 2003 voiced a welcome for a “strong, peaceful and prosperous China,” but that American policy has been slow to pursue the principle in practice.
Much of Rising Star is devoted to discussion of the complex array of international security organizations to which China belongs and through which it strives to guide developments around its periphery and beyond. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, China’s strong arms control and nonproliferation policies have earned it a favorable reputation among many abroad, but American interests in antiballistic missile systems and weapons in outer space remain sensitive matters in Beijing.
Readers will find strong arguments for greater awareness of the new security outlook in China. China wants to open up. Gill argues for stronger military-to-military ties and a strategic dialog with high-level defense officials. He favors exchange visits by senior civilian and military leaders, increased naval port calls and academic exchanges between military institutions. If we can believe Bates Gill, China is again a land of great opportunity for ventilation of American foreign security issues and cooperative programs. While perhaps not for everyone, Rising Star is certainly a work for the bookshelves of imaginative officers worldwide.
MAJ. GEN. EDWARD B. ATKESON, USA Ret., Ph.D., is a senior fellow at AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare. He has written four books and more than 150 articles on military affairs.
Revisiting U.S. Foreign Policy
Winning the Un-War: A New Strategy for the War on Terrorism. Charles Peña. Potomac Books, Inc. 241 pages; index; $27.95.
Reviewed by Col. Gregory Fontenot
U.S. Army retired
Charles Peña is a former director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, which perhaps is introduction enough to understand why Winning the Un-War comes with a very clear libertarian point of view. A self-described defense analyst, Peña spends the first 100 or so pages telling the reader things that surely everyone has heard by now. Among the obvious things Peña reveals are that the United States did not need to invade Iraq and that no weapons of mass destruction were found. Moreover, he asserts that the war has been managed poorly almost since the outset. Peña also argues that Iraq is a distraction from the main fight against al Qaeda. In short, Peña has little new to say about the war against radical Islam, including his major thesis that al Qaeda hates us not for what we are, but for what we do.
What the United States does that irritates al Qaeda and others is that it supports Israel and operates in places where Muslim radicals would prefer that the United States not operate. Fair enough; supporting Israel and operating in the Gulf are major sources of irritation to radical Muslims, and for that matter, to some that are not. But Peña’s argument goes beyond calling for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from overseas. He really argues that the issue is that the United States has an activist foreign policy. He offers as examples a list of events titled, “Terrorist Attacks Caused by an Activist U.S. Foreign Policy,” in an appendix, designed to illustrate that U.S. foreign policy is the cause of current troubles. The list is coherent only because each event on the list can be attributed to someone being unhappy about U.S. foreign policy. It includes at least one attack based on “rising opposition” within the United States to the war in Vietnam and lacks any sense of context. While the list is interesting, it is not convincing.
Peña proposes a strategy to achieve security for the United States that has several features. Chief among these is that the United States should quit irritating Muslims by having a presence in any Islamic countries, quit supporting Israel and quit collaborating with repressive Islamic governments. This alone is the key, in his mind, to avoiding further terrorist incidents. Step one is to withdraw U.S. forces from anywhere they are and to avoid intervening in any situation in which U.S. interests are not directly challenged. Implicit in this idea is that the United States would remove itself from alliances. What is not clear in Peña’s proposal is what, beyond attacks on the United States, constitute threats to U.S. interests. Taken literally, his logic runs like this: How could it possibly matter to the United States if Russia overran Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia again?
Peña claims that he does not argue for absolute disengagement or an isolationist policy, while at the same time advocating that the United States withdraw behind the moats afforded by the Atlantic and the Pacific. He honestly seems to believe that the two oceans afford protection from attack. Peña favors an aggressive effort to dismantle al Qaeda, even to the point of operating in a country like Pakistan, but only on our own terms. The best news of all, if Peña is correct, is that this “strategy” can be executed cheaply at less than half the price of the current armed forces and roughly half as many troops. How? By relying on human intelligence and precision attack, the U.S. Army, Peña believes, could be safely reduced to as few as five or six divisions.
As evidence for the efficacy of this policy, Peña cites statistics that support the narrative of an empty battlefield. This is all very interesting, but irrelevant in the end. What Peña misses, as do most defense analysts talking about empty battlefields, is context. Yes, fewer troops can wage war over broader areas based on improved communications and weapons, but context remains important. For example, wars were often settled in the 18th century with very small armies and low density in the theaters in which they operated. Battlefield density alone is not the effective measure of the number of troops required. But 18th-century armies achieved decisive results in a handful of battles with very small armies, resulting in the rise and fall of nations. Density on the battlefield in World War II was less than at Waterloo, but many more troops were required to reach decisive results.
Control of terrain has, until recently, required that armies grow ever larger despite lower density at the tactical level. For that matter, more troops not fewer troops tend to be required to do the kind of operations that will be necessary to defeat al Qaeda. Peña also says that despite cuts, the United States will still be able to array overwhelming force at any point of decision. But the United States will do so, he says, with fewer C-17s, since intervention will not be required as often in the absence of an irritating foreign policy.
Winning the Un-War is an argument couched from a strictly libertarian point of view. Government is the problem. Minimal government unencumbered with troops to execute an activist foreign policy is better suited, according to this view, for protecting the country against the threat of terrorist attacks than the current model. Perhaps so, but Peña is unconvincing. He may be right that al Qaeda hates us for what we do, but there is little evidence to suggest that it hates us any less for who we are.
COL. GREGORY FONTENOT, USA Ret., is the director of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He is a co-author of On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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