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Reviews
03/20/2007

'BLACK SUNDAY' AMBUSH—A COMPELLING, INDIVIDUALIZED ACCOUNT
The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family. Martha Raddatz. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 310 pages; photographs; maps; $24.95.
Reviewed by Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army retired
The war in Iraq has stimulated the publication of a great many books that debate policy, the accuracy of U.S. intelligence, the efficacy of using force, the nature of the global war on terrorism and military decision making. Now there are even a few entries on who "lost" Iraq. Far fewer are books on the lot of soldiers in combat. With The Long Road Home Martha Raddatz, in part, redresses the balance. She does this by letting soldiers and their families tell their stories—stories that need to be heard by the vast majority of Americans who don't have anything to do with the armed forces or even know anyone who serves. It is also an important read for soldiers and their families because it is their story—they will recognize themselves in this compelling account of courage both in Iraq and at home. If reading this book does not elicit an emotional response, nothing will.
Raddatz is the White House correspondent for ABC News, but her resume warrants the title of "war correspondent" as well. She reported ably on the early effort in Bosnia, when the conditions of that mission were unclear. Her understanding of what happened in Iraq in 2004 appears to be informed by that earlier experience. In December 1995 and for most of the next year no one could say whether there would be ambushes and attacks against the implementation force. Accordingly, American units in Bosnia equipped and trained for combat operations and/or stability operations. It seems likely that Bosnia affected the way Raddatz sees the problem of stability operations. Arguably, she developed her affinity and obvious respect for soldiers by getting to know them as they adapted to the ambiguous mission in Bosnia. Wherever she learned to care about soldiers as individuals, it is apparent in The Long Road Home that she does. The same can be said of her presentation of family members she interviewed. Such attention to the individual is one reason why this is an important book.
The Long Road Home is an account of a serious fight in Iraq—nearly a year to the day after the fall of Baghdad—that marked a turning point in the war. On Sunday, April 4, 2004, the newly arrived 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry fought a difficult battle against a well-organized and large-scale enemy. The battle began with an ambush of a single platoon as it executed a humanitarian mission. The enemy nearly overwhelmed the platoon, surrounded them and attacked with unrelenting persistence. The enemy, composed of at least some trained soldiers and hundreds of others, then proceeded to ambush the relieving forces. Ultimately, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, had to mount a full-scale battalion-sized operation to free the ambushed platoon. Some soldiers who fought and died on what became known as "Black Sunday" had arrived in Iraq just four days earlier.
There are compelling characters in this story, ranging from 5th Cavalry leaders to the fine young soldiers who fought and died in Sadr City on Black Sunday—including Eddy Chen, the first soldier killed that day, and Cindy Sheehan's son Casey.
Raddatz is unobtrusive in the story of Black Sunday, but her point of view is unequivocal. "Black Sunday," she says, marked a "turning point." The 1st Cavalry Division, the Army and perhaps the entire military found itself "ambushed, unprepared, bloodied and alone." The troopers of the 1st Cavalry Division believed they were coming to Iraq on a peacekeeping mission, or at least that is what those in the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry believed. Moreover, 1st Cavalry (and everyone else for that matter) were organized to do just that—peacekeeping. Accordingly, the cavalry left most of their tanks and Bradleys at home. The 1st Cavalry's mission turned out to be peace enforcement and ultimately counterinsurgency, both of which require a sophisticated tack including the application of combat power. This requires a balanced approach in how units organize and train for stabilization missions, which by definition are ambiguous and dynamic. As Raddatz notes, "The enemy gets a vote."
The book also raises questions like the one posed by a young trooper after the fight, when he wondered why they had not brought all of their tanks. Since he fought from the back of a light, unarmed, unarmored truck instead of a combat vehicle, he had reason to ask. The Long Road Home also raises the question of why, in 2004, the Army would organize and train to do peacekeeping instead of preparing units to operate anywhere on the continuum of stability operations. This is a particularly good question given the Army's experience in Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Somalia.
Raddatz puts the reader in the fight as effectively as Mark Bowden does in Black Hawk Down and with the compassion of Hal Moore and Joe Galloway in We Were Soldiers Once...And Young. In many ways the The Long Road Home is similar to We Were Soldiers Once...And Young. Raddatz goes a bit further in developing the story of family support groups and the way the rear detachment and families coped with the devastating news that followed Black Sunday. Here she does yeoman service to the long-suffering spouses and soldiers who remain at home but are connected directly, and often painfully, to what happens in the field.
The Long Road Home is a must-read book that illuminates the superb quality of the young soldiers and officers who are in the thick of it in Iraq and Afghanistan.
COL. GREGORY FONTENOT, USA Ret., is the director of the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He is a co-author of On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
NEUROSCIENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense. Jonathan D. Moreno. Dana Press. 210 pages; index; $23.95.
Reviewed by James Jay Carafano
In a memorable 1961 speech, President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned Americans, "The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." Eisenhower feared that excessive defense spending might lead to a cabal of collusion among defense industries, the Pentagon and big government who would make decisions that suited them best, undermining democracy. In short, they might use the pursuit of making Americans safer to do all kinds of ill. In Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense Jonathan Moreno warns that bad things can still happen in the name of national security—in more ways than one.
Moreno, a professor of bioethics at the University of Virginia and a defense consultant, sketches out contemporary efforts by the Pentagon to harness the science and technology related to the study of the brain in the fields of neuroscience and neuropharmacology. Each chapter examines a potential military use, surveys ongoing research, evaluates the possibilities for new developments to affect both the defense and commercial sectors and considers the ethical impact of scientific innovations.
The topics addressed include using drugs to improve performance; creating machines to make soldiers smarter; understanding, predicting or even affecting and spying on how people think; and fielding nonlethal weapons. The capabilities discussed range from those already in use, such as antifatigue drugs taken by soldiers during Desert Storm, to science fiction, including experiments in parapsychology. Along the way, Moreno provides a tutorial on how the brain works; a summary of major controversies on theories concerning brain science; and an overview of commercial and nondefense scientific developments.
Moreno also includes a number of cautionary tales, particularly from the early decades of the Cold War, when some nasty things were done in the name of national security. One of the difficult challenges of developing brain weapons is that at some point they have to be tested on brains. The traditional checks on human medical experimentation are the reviewing of proposals by a research ethics committee and obtaining the informed voluntary consent of participants. The military and the CIA sometimes skipped these steps in trials that ranged from testing brainwashing techniques to administering mind-altering drugs. In the most "fortunate" cases only individual rights were compromised; in the worst, health and lives were put at risk.
Mind Wars raises a number of serious ethical issues that may be faced by researchers and those who procure and deploy the capabilities scientists might develop. Modifying the brain, for example, by increasing the cognitive power of individuals to perform functions with computer-like precision, could undermine human dignity. Enhancing interrogation techniques with methods and medicines developed by neuroscience might become so effective that at some point they cross the line between legitimate action and torture, or lead to the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy. The enhancement of individual warfighters might someday produce extraordinary capabilities, such as soldiers who know no fear and accept irrational missions without a second thought—and it is not clear, Moreno argues, that there is an adequate conceptual framework to determine whether such innovations are moral.
The ethical challenges raised in defense studies, Moreno suggests, are unique. While civilian researchers also encounter similar ethical dilemmas, military and intelligence projects are more problematic because their purpose is not just to save or improve lives but to defend all our lives. The danger, Moreno warns, is the tendency to assume greater risks in pursuit of national security. In addition, the penchant for secrecy undercuts the normal check on scientific excess—the transparency provided by scientists openly sharing information about their work and opening their efforts to public scrutiny.
For all the troubling issues raised in Mind Wars, Moreno does not argue against defense brain research. Science should help protect the nation, and there are dual-use benefits that emerge from defense research that have important application to private-sector medical advances. Moreno contends, however, that his view "that it would be bad for science and for our society for the neuroscience community to insulate itself from support from national security agencies does not imply that research should be unconstrained." The solution, he argues, is conducting ethical and policy reviews of projects at the outset and providing as much transparency as possible, consistent with the needs of national security.
Moreno's prescription misses a significant factor that might determine—more than any defense ethics advisory board—the course of future research. During the Cold War, the government financed much of the cutting-edge research on ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, computers and related electronics that resulted in new combat capabilities. Today, the government is virtually dependent on the private sector for advances in the rapidly growing fields of new science and technology. Biotechnology, for example, is one of the fastest growing commercial sectors in the world. The number of biotechnology companies in the United States alone has tripled since 1992. These firms are research intensive, bringing new methods and products into the marketplace every day. Many of the benefits of this effort are largely dual-use, increasing the possibility that knowledge, skills and equipment could be adopted by any military, not just the United States. Even if the U.S. military does not conduct advanced research in neuroscience and neuropharmacology, it might find itself "riding the tiger" in a brave new world where warriors are not born, but made.
JAMES JAY CARAFANO is a member of the National Academies' Board on Army Science and Technology and author of GI Ingenuity: Technology, Improvisation, and Winning World War II.
BLAME EXAMINED: STUART'S ROLE AT GETTYSBURG
Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg. Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi. Savas Beatie. 428 pages; maps; photographs; appendices; index; $32.95.
Reviewed by Col. Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army retired
When a number of Southern historians and former Confederate generals examined the Gettysburg campaign to determine why the seemingly invincible Army of Northern Virginia commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee suffered its first significant military defeat, most of the blame centered on Lee's flamboyant chief of cavalry, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. In the opening weeks of the campaign, Stuart allowed himself to be detached from the remainder of the Confederate army and Lee stumbled into the ensuing battle without the benefit of the "eyes and ... ears of his army." In Plenty of Blame to Go Around, Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi thoroughly investigate Stuart's role and conclude that no single person should be made "to shoulder the blame for the crippling Southern loss at Gettysburg."
Both Wittenberg and Petruzzi are emerging Civil War cavalry historians, specializing in Eastern Theater cavalry operations. Wittenberg's first book, Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions, won the prestigious 1998 Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award. Petruzzi is the author of numerous magazine articles on mounted operations and is editor of the popular [Brig. Gen. John] "Buford's Boys" web site. Both are frequent visitors to the Gettysburg battlefield.
Plenty of Blame to Go Around is actually two books in one. The first section examines Stuart's controversial ride; the second part addresses the subsequent historical controversy as Stuart's detractors and his defenders attempted to affix blame for Lee's failure in the Gettysburg campaign. At the onset of the campaign, Stuart requested permission to leave sufficient cavalry with Lee and then to move the remainder of his force to "attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington ... and to join our army north of the Potomac." Lee unwisely acquiesced and moved his army north with the expectation that if the Union Army moved, Stuart would return to army headquarters to operate in the traditional reconnaissance role.
Contrary to the allegation by Michael Shaara in The Killer Angels that Stuart was "joy-riding" in Maryland and Pennsylvania, Wittenberg and Petruzzi assert that Stuart actually dispatched a courier to Lee, informing him that the federal army was moving north. That report never reached army headquarters, nor did it appear in the official records of the War of the Rebellion. Complicating further communications between Lee and Stuart, however, was the disposition of the Army of the Potomac, which moved north and severed Stuart's communications with his commander.
Moreover, the Confederate cavalry force became hotly engaged even before it crossed the Potomac River. On more than one occasion Stuart's mission was compromised and Stuart himself was nearly captured. By the time Stuart joined the Army of Northern Virginia on July 2, 1863, his march had consumed eight days, covered nearly 200 miles and included four sizeable skirmishes and two pitched battles. The Battle of Gettysburg had concluded its second day when Stuart's cavalry reached Lee and the mounted force was completely exhausted.
The most significant question that the authors explore is what impact, if any, Stuart's absence from the Army of Northern Virginia had upon the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg. Here, Wittenberg and Petruzzi's analysis breaks down. Lee certainly was looking for a battle of decision to destroy the Army of the Potomac. Whether that battle occurred at Gettysburg or some other location is irrelevant. Wittenberg and Petruzzi conclude that there is nothing in the historical record to suggest Lee would have acted differently if Stuart's horsemen had been present. Perhaps, but Lee certainly would have had a clearer picture of the disposition of the enemy's forces and could have deployed his own army accordingly.
Recriminations against Stuart began as soon as the campaign ended, and it is here that Wittenberg and Petruzzi make their greatest contribution by tracing the evolution of the historiography surrounding Stuart's controversial role in the Gettysburg campaign. Using contemporary accounts by veterans and correspondents, coupled with a plethora of books written by historians over the next hundred-plus years, the authors argue persuasively that no individual was solely responsible for the Southern defeat at Gettysburg.
As the title suggests, Wittenberg and Petruzzi believe there was plenty of blame to go around for Lee's failed invasion. None of the senior commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia performed to expectation, including its commanding general, who repeatedly issued discretionary orders to subordinate commanders who required more definitive direction. It is in this context that Stuart's role must be considered, even though the cavalry leader had performed exemplarily in the army's previous campaigns. Stuart was certainly operating within the letter of Lee's order, but he failed to prioritize his tasks properly. Keeping Lee informed was a far more critical mission than the disruption of the Army of the Potomac's rear area.
To their credit Wittenberg and Petruzzi examine the performance of Union cavalry in impeding Stuart's advance into Pennsylvania. Vigorous opposition by little known cavalry leaders repeatedly cost Stuart valuable hours and kept him far behind schedule in his efforts to join Lee's army at Gettysburg. According to the authors, "the plucky Federal cavalry deserve much of the credit for the delays that befell Stuart's expedition."
Another interesting feature of Plenty of Blame to Go Around is the book's appendices. Collectively, they contain a detailed order of battle for each of Stuart's cavalry engagements, as well as Stuart's self-serving official report of the Gettysburg campaign. Many readers will also enjoy the final appendix, in which Wittenberg and Petruzzi outline a driving tour of Jeb Stuart's ride to Gettysburg. In addition, current photographs and excellent maps greatly enhance the text.
In the final analysis, Wittenberg and Petruzzi have written the most comprehensive account of Stuart's controversial ride. Readers may question the authors' conclusions, but no study of Lee's second invasion of the North will be complete without assessing their findings. Plenty of Blame to Go Around is investigative history at its best.
COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant.
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