Two important things have changed since Lt. Col.(P) Craig T. Trebilcock's tour in Iraq in 2003-04 ("The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq," February). First, the current Iraqi security forces are entirely different from the improvised Iraqi Freedom Forces (IFF) of the early conflict. In Al Anbar, for example, the police, with strong community ties and often tribal roots, have expanded to their full size. Trained at formal academies, they are covering the province with neighborhood stations and squeezing insurgents out. The Iraqi Army, though too small, is equipped, trained and increasingly operating on its own. When challenged, both the army and the police stand and fight.

The other change is that al Qaeda's domination [sic] of the Sunni insurgency will not allow an "Iraqi" solution. Al Qaeda's vision of a universal caliphate impels it to expand its attacks against Shia and Kurds nationally and, beyond Iraq, against regional and international communities. In fact, al Qaeda's attacks on tribal leaders and its imposition of a harsh religious regime has given Coalition forces an opening with the traditional tribal structure.

Finally, tribalism is not universal. The more urban, secular and Western an Iraqi is, the less tribal he will be.

COL. MARK F. CANCIAN
Al Anbar, Iraq


THE AUTHOR RESPONDS:
Col. Cancian's observations are certainly reasonable. However, I have not been in a box since 2003-04, and there was no intent to compare the current Iraqi police forces and the IFF in my article. The IFF reference was simply to show that looking out for one's own best interest is much more of a cultural value in Iraq than is sacrifice for the greater good of the nation.

The police are an even greater problem than the Iraqi Army in terms of corruption, extracurricular violence/extortion and playing sectarian favorites. This information comes from civil affairs personnel I remain in regular contact with who are still in Baghdad. The Jameat, made up of 200 to 300 corrupt police officers in Basra, has regularly engaged in kidnapping, extortion and murder in that city over the past year. That doesn't sound like a reliable police force to me.

Al Qaeda can only exist in Anbar and Baghdad with complicity from the Sunni insurgents, so saying that al Qaeda's presence precludes an Iraqi solution skirts the point that al Qaeda can operate only because of Sunni Iraqi backing. And the Sunnis assist them only because of their common enemy—us. If we are not there, then the Sunnis will turn around and get rid of al Qaeda for the very reasons Col. Cancian cites. The Iraqi Sunnis do not like the Saudi/Syrian/Iranian/Jordanian al Qaeda operatives on their turf; it is a marriage of convenience to defeat us. Take us out of the equation and the Sunnis turn on al Qaeda for the reasons mentioned by Col. Cancian.

I certainly hope Col. Cancian is correct in his current assessment of the Iraqi Army and police. That would mean we can now start pulling back instead of pumping in more troops ... and yet that isn't happening.

LT. COL.(P) CRAIG T. TREBILCOCK
Glen Rock, Pa.