Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow’s “Front & Center” article—“Winning the Information War” (April)—was an excellent primer for those uneducated in the nature of information-campaign planning and execution. My military and civilian experience in the field convinces me that far too many senior officers give lip service to the concept without really understanding it.

Col. Grunow pulled some punches, however. The first is that senior leaders need to understand that the days of simply smashing an enemy on the battlefield are over—at least for the moment. Because we live in an information-centric age, we must accept that shaping the information campaign is equally as important as delivering steel on target.

It has been my sad experience that too many commanders try to wish away this reality, throwing it over the fence to the public affairs or civil affairs communities. The motivation for this phenomenon is obvious: information operations are hard and, quite honestly, not a lot of fun. Running down the bad guys is actually a lot more rewarding, possibly because the results are more tangible.

The problem with senior leadership extends quite high, and I can certainly understand a reluctance to put in print the fact that a successful information campaign in an engagement such as Iraq starts at the very top. There are three obvious (and a slew of less obvious) targets of an information campaign. The first is the Iraqi people themselves; the second is the insurgency; and the third is the American public. This third target is equally as important as the first two and is the principal point of failure. I propose that a successful information campaign targeting the American people must rest on two pillars: truth and necessity. Both of these pillars must be established and maintained by the Office of the President of the United States. Sadly, these pillars are practically nonexistent.

Concerning the truth pillar, the American public has an incredible capacity for forgiveness. Admitting to mistakes and telling the truth about anything is far more conducive to holding the public’s trust and support than trying to spin something. The truth always comes out sooner or later, and the public will condemn you much faster for lying than for being wrong. Military commanders are actually raised on this principle, but some appear to “learn” that political interests require other practices as they move into the semipublic sphere, usually before they pin on their first star.

The necessity pillar is of equal importance, and this is a chief area where the Bush administration has failed. Efforts to convince the American people of the importance of prosecuting the Iraq war to a successful conclusion have been limited to ineffectual sound bites that do little more than placate the faithful. In other words, the people that most need to be convinced that the Iraq endeavor is worthwhile are those that the administration seems the least interested in convincing. The President must continue to make his case and provide evidence of success, if he is to do anything more than forestall the inevitable rejection of the war by a majority of Americans.

Within the military, there are myriad points of potential failure in the operation of an information campaign, especially if we wish to encourage the concept of a free press. The primary risk here, of course, is the freedom of journalists to travel about unfettered by military control (granted that they do this in Iraq somewhat at their own peril) and interpret things they see in manners unfavorable to the United States. It is tempting to try to control these agents, but ultimately futile to actually do so. Essentially, we must accept that the press must be accommodated; we must assume that journalists will be present and that they will convey things to their consumers (the public) that may not be accurate or fair. We have no choice but to work to get our own side of the story out, without appearing to be consumed with point-by-point rebuttals to those reporters whom we find less than unbiased. We must also accept that there will always be those whom we are unable to convince.

Back in the good old days when we practiced for wars that did not include the presence of civilians or journalists, we found it easy to tell our soldiers, “Never mind why, just do it.” Those days are gone. We’ve recognized that an informed soldier is more effective than a robot; in fact, we have incorporated this into our orders process—we publish the “commander’s intent” so that soldiers might recognize opportunities when they present themselves and take action without waiting for explicit instructions from the chain of command. This is a basic principle of maneuver warfare that we should now reinforce in information operations. Soldiers must be informed of what the goals are so that when they get cornered by a reporter (who is probably far better at extracting embarrassing revelations than many professional interrogators I’ve known) they know what message we’re trying to get out. The absolute last thing we need is an uninformed soldier feeling he has to make something up—or worse, lie—about what’s going on. The press routinely eats these guys for lunch. Our soldiers must understand that they are free to speak candidly (they will, anyway), but they must also understand that they have a responsibility to their fellow soldiers and the chain of command to support the information campaign.

A successful information campaign must be proactive. To underscore Col. Grunow’s point about being discouraged by a public affairs officer from accepting an invitation to CNN: if we don’t step into the breach, the press will always be able to find someone who will. And that someone may not have our interests at heart when they start talking. It is far better to step into the fray, appear strong and tell the truth, even when it’s not flattering, and take our lumps when we have to. If we are going to wear the white hats, we need to conduct ourselves accordingly. On the other hand, few empires were ever built or maintained by guys in white hats. In that respect, we better make sure we know what we’re doing before we start.

Information operations are not a lot of fun, but we are foolish to believe that they are anything other than vital.

LT. COL. MARK KIMMEY, USAR RET.
New York, N.Y.

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I was in eastern Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006 (Sadr City, 9 Nissan, Adhamiya, Rusafa, Zafaraniya and Salman Pak) and was responsible for all reconstruction efforts with the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). My boss gave me lots of leeway (no coaching or pre-briefs), and I was able to engage media as often as they were available.

We had some success stories so I briefed (no PowerPoint, rather, face-to-face discussion) and escorted the likes of Jennifer Eccleston (CNN), Kimberly Dozier (CBS), Martha Raddatz (ABC), Hugh Sykes (BBC) and many others. In all cases I was not scripted by my boss; I briefed them and led them through the neighborhoods as I saw fit, letting the Iraqis speak for themselves about how they felt about progress.

Some members of the press corps were concerned that this was risky, but the rewards were huge because of the instant credibility. I could not have bought the kind of comments we received from Iraqis—and they were 100 percent credible because they were solicited randomly in the neighborhoods.

Interestingly, shortly after getting back to the States, I was asked to do a few presentations on what my battalion did and why we were so successful in eastern Baghdad (minimal-risk audiences). I was forced back into the old model where I had to send all of my slides and comments in for review. Just weeks earlier I had access to the highest levels of media and complete trust, and now—because we were back in the States—the muzzle was reinstituted.

Thank you for your outstanding article. It really captured a critical element in this campaign.

LT. COL. S. JAMIE GAYTON
Santa Monica, Calif.


WALTER REED
I read with interest your article on Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in the April issue of Army Magazine (“Washington Report”). As a concerned contractor, who assumed facility maintenance responsibilities at WRAMC on February 4, 2007, I need to correct a key data point mentioned in the article. IAP Worldwide Services had 290 qualified personnel on board on day one of our contract (not 100 as stated in the article) with all required disciplines covered. As of April 10, 324 were on duty with a plan to grow to 349 in the coming weeks. The bogus numbers of our start-up strength that appeared in various media, not just ARMY Magazine, ranged from 50 to 100 and have no basis in fact. IAP is proud to be at WRAMC and will be very much a part of the solution to get things fixed.

LT. GEN. CHUCK DOMINY, USA RET.
Vice President, Government Affairs
IAP Worldwide Services
Arlington, Va.


NCOs—MENTORS & FRIENDS
Once again, I was pleased to read the latest contribution by Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, U.S. Army retired (“NCO Mentorship—And Friendship”) in your March issue.

He described some of the very people with whom I “grew up” in the Army. He did it in such a way as to reveal his love for good NCOs and his pride in good units. Some of my very best times in the Army were spent doing “impossible things” with the help of dedicated, hard-charging NCOs. Thanks for the good memories.

Gen. Meloy’s byline is the first thing I search for when I open my new ARMY Magazine each month. Keep those articles coming, please.

LT. COL. MIKE BUTT, USA RET.
Jonesboro, Ga.