By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired

For the past five years, through various expressions of opinion, resolutions and public advocacy, AUSA has called for an increase in the size of the Army. In December 2006, in testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (see page 15), our Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, revealed that Army brigades are now spending less than a year in “dwell time” in the United States before their next deployment. He went on to advocate that we “grow the Army” as a “wise and prudent action.”

I don’t know the linkage between that speech and the sudden outpourings of reporters, columnists and pundits who published articles entitled “Stretched Too Thin,” “The Nation Needs a Bigger Army,” “Bush Seeks a Larger Military” and others, all within the last two weeks of 2006. It is gratifying, of course, that these wise and learned observers have come to the realization that the Army is too small and that we can look forward to their as yet unrevealed advice concerning how the increase will be achieved. We can also anticipate counterclaims that the Army is as large as we need, as large as we can afford.

My interest in the size of the Army goes back a long way, but restricting my thoughts only to what followed the end of the Cold War, I think there are factors that are pertinent to the question of the Army’s size. When downsizing was first considered by the George H.W. Bush administration, the Army proposed—and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Colin Powell endorsed—an end strength of about 650,000. Defense analysts and budgeteers whittled the figure, and the Army accommodated to a 575,000 target. Subsequently that number shrank in stages to the 482,000 authorized, augmented by a temporary increase to 512,000. None of those reductions was accompanied by changes in the National Military Strategy or the mission load of the Army that had judged initially a need for 650,000.

Then there is the once credible three-for-one formula that advocates that for every force deployed for an extended period we will have another preparing to go and a third recovering from its previous commitment. Exceptions to this rule of thumb are many and often cited, but the announced aim of today’s leaders is for a force that can commit active Army brigades for one-year combat tours followed by two years at home station before they are called again to return to combat. (The aim for the reserve components is one year deployed followed by five years at home stations.) Given today’s consistent demand for 200,000 to 220,000 deployed, the total end-strength requirement becomes 600,000 to 660,000.

Today’s terminology expresses much the same demand. The operational forces, 43 brigade combat teams and approximately 90 support brigades, total 480,000. The total generating forces—Training and Doctrine Command restored to a healthier strength, Army Materiel Command, Installation Management Command and TTHS (transients, trainees, holdees and students) account—exceed 600,000.

There is ample evidence and justification for additional Army strength. AUSA’s long espoused need for an increase of 100,000 is not hard to endorse. In fact, most of our military commitments have been for unforeseen crises: who predicted Grenada, the Panama invasion, the defense of Bosnia, the liberation of Kuwait, the need to destroy the Taliban? It is also a fact that hot spots like the Sudan, Somalia and Palestine, coupled with threats to South Korea and Taiwan or the anti-American animosity growing in Latin America, virtually guarantee a continuing pattern of such commitments. Without specifying how 100,000 spaces should be allocated, we can confidently recommend that the Army force generation system will determine the long-term force structure required to build and sustain our national security requirements for the foreseeable future.

The need for a strong land warfare capability is apparent. The need for Congress to raise and sustain that capability is likewise apparent. It is late in coming, but the country cannot afford to ignore the demands for an adequate Army necessary for the protection of our national interests. It will take time and we will be asking for continuing inordinate sacrifice from today’s soldiers to tide us through the months and years until the growth is complete and the Army is once again sized adequately for its missions.

For me, there is one clinching argument. The United States won only three of the wars in which we engaged in the second half of the 20th century—Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf. In each we employed overwhelming power and won in a matter of hours. In each we had an adequate force structure, military control of operations and, in general, public approval and support. In each we suffered minimum losses of personnel and materiel and inflicted only minor collateral damage on the civilian populations. In each we paid up front for a capability that avoided the costs of continuing casualties and escalating budget demands. The lesson is there for all to see and understand: It is time to restore our land forces to the war-dominating power they have exhibited in the past at a manpower strength that assures sustainment during a long-term crisis. That number— 100,000—would be a good start.