By Col. John M. Collins, U.S. Army retired

Top level strategies are infinitely more complicated than chess, because there are games within games on a global board. There’s no limit to the number of players who may participate singly or form teams. Who’s on which side is often ambiguous, and memberships change without notice. Every player places different values on his own pieces, those of his partners and those of the opposition. Because participants make up rules to suit themselves, many pieces may shift suddenly in unexpected ways. And of course the games never end.

How well do U.S. leaders play strategic games in the 21st century? A quick Cook’s tour of U.S practices in Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Israel and Somalia reveal a few clues within the context of the global war on terrorism.

U.S. Preemptive Policies

Do unto others before they do unto you is the golden rule of preemption. President George W. Bush’s January 20, 2002 State of the Union speech declared that North Korea, Iran, Iraq and their terrorist allies, in that order, “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.” In June 2002 he enshrined preemption as U.S. policy with these words: “The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”

Beating opponents to the punch appeals to warriors in every U.S. military service who believe that preemptive strikes would benefit from surprise, foster freedom of action, put teeth in counterproliferation programs and perpetuate longstanding U.S. preference for fighting wars “over there” rather than “over here.” Delays, they contend, would magnify risks.

Unfortunately, the law of diminishing returns applies, because U.S. armed forces can’t be everywhere at once. Military and monetary costs make priorities mandatory whenever provocative candidates number more than one.

Public support sags when preemptive operations create more problems than they solve. Every case is unique, so the President must consider each threat carefully, then decide whether “doing unto others before they do unto us” is the best way to safeguard this nation’s security.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan, the first preemptive test case, preceded President Bush’s proclamations. The curtain rose on October 19, 2001, when tiny Army Special Forces and Air Force Special Tactics teams contacted CIA reception parties who linked them with Northern Alliance leaders. U.S. forces then attacked Taliban foes who had provided transnational terrorists with safe havens, sustenance and training camps. Space satellites pinpointed targets, laser designators painted them with bull’s-eyes, forward air controllers called in aircraft armed with smart munitions. Organized enemy opposition collapsed 49 days after touchdown.

The bad guys melted across Afghanistan's mountainous southern border into Pakistani tribal areas, where they rested, regrouped, resupplied and retrained; then they mounted ever larger raids from privileged sanctuaries. The American people nevertheless approve sustained operations, because U.S. casualties, force requirements and budgetary costs remain minuscule.

Should we blame Pakistan’s President Musharraf for failure to flush out foreign forces? Probably not. Assassins already have targeted that tightrope walker several times for ties to the United States. Civil war could ensue if he pushes too hard, and his replacement almost certainly would be less supportive of U.S. plans and programs than he has been, despite great personal risks.

Iraq

Many observers from the onset considered preemption a questionable course of action to pursue in Iraq, because the U.S. invasion in March 2003 preceded indications that Saddam Hussein planned to attack anybody, anywhere, any time soon.

All went well at first. Conventional operations toppled that megalomaniac in little more than a month. President Bush proclaimed major combat operations complete less than two months later, but U.S. troops, skilled at traditional combat, were unprepared to respond effectively when irregular warfare unexpectedly erupted in July. He blurted, “Bring ’em on,” but whoever said be careful what you wish for provided good advice. Mandatory courses on counterinsurgency, you see, disappeared from military college curricula soon after the Vietnam War was over. Reams about relevant strategies, tactics and techniques moldered unread on library shelves for the next three decades. U.S. policymakers, as a direct result, still struggle to reinvent a counterinsurgency wheel designed specifically for use in Iraq while forces in the field pay lethal penalties.

Turmoil continues after nearly four years of armed combat, with no end in sight. Internal security is elusive, civilian casualties continue to mount, reconstruction proceeds at a snail’s pace, a viable Iraqi government eludes installation, repetitive military tours are demoralizing and few U.S. forces are left in reserve to cope with contingencies elsewhere.

It was a big mistake to start a war with Iraq, but it would be a far bigger mistake to pull out as we did in Vietnam, because insurgents would use victory over the world’s only superpower as a recruiting tool; transnational terrorists would use Iraqi territory for training grounds and launch pads; formerly friendly nations and subnational groups everywhere would question the United States as an ally; full-scale civil war could permanently splinter Iraq; and the global economy would nosedive if sworn enemies of the United States and its allies corner the market—or close the door—on Middle East oil.

Urgent needs exist for strategies that encourage friendly Iraqis to identify bad guys and help eradicate them. We still swat flies in the kitchen instead of spraying the compost, which requires concerted efforts to eviscerate insurgent undergrounds whose members act as shadow governments at local and national levels, engage in political agitation, make improvised munitions, identify targets, operate clandestine communication networks, terrorize peaceful citizens and collect, then distribute, financial support.

Success depends on timely, accurate intelligence that only courageous citizens can provide. The prognosis at this point is unfavorable, given the small number of U.S. troops who maintain close and continuous contact within Iraqi communities.

North Korea

Preemptive strikes look even less appealing against Kim Jong Il’s belligerent, unpredictable North Korea, which possesses deliverable nuclear weapons. As a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff puts it, “This world has a number of problems which are not amenable to immediate, or even short-term, solutions. Among them, I count North Korea. If North Korea starts a war, North Korea loses—big. If anybody else starts a war on the Korean peninsula, South Koreans and just about everyone else involved also lose—or, at least, have little to gain.”

I presented Congress with several U.S. military options in 1994, but no form of armed combat seemed attractive, because enemy countermeasures looked at least as good as—or better than—ours. That report offered no improvements when recast as an ARMY Magazine article 10 years later (“Nuclear Bees in North Korea,” August 2003). A U.S. first strike using conventional earth-penetrating bombs, for example, could trigger the first nuclear exchange in history, with disastrous results on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone. North Korea possesses only a few low-yield nukes, but it wouldn’t take many to create a catastrophe.

Inaction while Kim Jong Il expands his nuclear inventory and perhaps supplies nuclear weapons to U.S. enemies would only delay, and worsen, any future confrontation.

Iran

Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, belongs to President Bush’s Axis of Evil. Where does this wild card fit into the big picture? Iran helps destabilize Iraq, which teeters on the brink of full scale civil war. Iran provides money, missiles, other materiel and moral support to Hezbollah’s radicals, who recently battled Israel to a standstill from well-prepared positions south of the Litani River in Lebanon. Iran seeks footholds in northeast Africa. Iran’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile delivery programs are maturing more rapidly than originally predicted, given under-the-counter assistance from assorted foreign countries.

Struggles to terminate nuclear proliferation in Iran have been fruitless thus far. Additional leverage obtainable from U.S. political and economic sanctions is scant. The United Nations and the European Union, singly or in concert, could tighten those screws, but probably won’t. Conventional military action seems unattractive, since U.S. armed forces are far too few to accomplish current missions effectively, much less tackle Iran, which covers more than twice as much territory as Iraq and maintains a much stronger military machine.

Preemptive strikes to prevent Iran from deploying nuclear weapons are under active consideration in Washington and Tel Aviv, because decision makers in both capitals say nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran’s radical regime is unacceptable. Israeli incentives intensified recently, when Iran’s president publicly announced intentions to wipe that country off the map. But war with Iran could spread capriciously. Iranian missiles and naval mines might close the Strait of Hormuz to oil tanker traffic. Iranian troops could boil out of the Zagros Mountains to attack vital U.S. and British north-south supply lines that link Persian Gulf ports with distribution centers near Baghdad. U.S. and Israeli leaders, in short, would be well advised to think problems through, from A to Z, before they decide that military power is the most suitable instrument with which to keep Iran from joining the nuclear club.

Israel

Switch now to Israel, which observers believe is a laudable U.S. asset or a perilous liability in the Middle East, depending on their perspectives. My 1973 book entitled Grand Strategy contained this passage: “Zionist leaders proclaimed the new Israel on 14 May 1948. The British Mandate terminated at midnight. Troops from Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq invaded at dawn on May 15. The Levant has not known one moment of real peace ever since.” That statement seems solid as a rock more than three decades later.

My second book about strategy, published four years ago, noted that Israel’s widely acclaimed counterterrorism tactics may be among the world’s best, but repressive counter-terrorism strategies amplify Arab animosities and create terrorists faster than air strikes and hit teams can kill them. Contributory policies that often enjoy active U.S. approval or passive acceptance include illegal construction of settlements in Israeli-occupied territories, autocratic control over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem and reprisals that far surpass Old Testament prescriptions of an eye-for-an-eye, a tooth-for-a-tooth. Severe restrictions on domicile, movement, employment and free speech, plus rights of assembly and association, make Arab inhabitants second-class citizens. Internal security consequently remains an elusive Israeli objective with no solution in sight after ceaseless hot and cold wars, of which conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah are merely the most recent. Both sides already are violating the shaky cease-fire that took effect in Lebanon last August.

Warfare between Israel and its Arab neighbors has global implications. Long-standing U.S. support for Israel, which inflames Islamic public opinion everywhere, makes it almost impossible for the U.S. government to act as an honest broker anywhere in the Middle East and complicates efforts to achieve U.S. political-military objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan or any other Muslim nation.

Somalia

Finally, let’s look at unstable Somalia, where firefights between Task Force Ranger and rabid mobs beholden to fugitive warlord Muhammad Farad Aideed left 18 U.S. troopers dead and nearly 100 wounded in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993. Somali casualties were immensely higher, but our tactical “victory” became a strategic defeat. President Clinton, in response to adverse public opinion at home and abroad, withdrew all U.S. troops before the last day of March 1994, which left lawless Somali chieftains alone to do as they wished without foreign interference.

Militant Muslims now control most of that impoverished nation. The internationally recognized transitional national government, which might best be described as a charade, held its only election in Nairobi, Kenya, where its parliament meets, because it lacks a seat in Somalia. Neighboring Ethiopia, ready, willing and able to perform as a de facto U.S. proxy, began to deploy troops as a counterbalance before the U.S. government said, “Back off,” perhaps to preclude combat between Ethiopia and neighboring Eritrea, which supports Islamic Somalia. Whether Ethiopia will comply remains uncertain.

The stakes are exceedingly high, because if factions that favor transnational terrorism win they could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa, using Somalia as a springboard. That outcome is conceivable, since most Somalis are young, restless, unemployed, heavily armed, illiterate and easily influenced by rabble rousers. The meek surely won’t inherit any part of their earth.

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All the foregoing vignettes in one way or another are part of what commonly is called the global war on terrorism. Not many Americans seem to understand that we’re locked in a thumb-in-the-eye, knee-in-the-groin, decades-long fight to the death with transnational terrorists who pose at least as great a threat to U.S. national security as nuclear-armed communists did during the Cold War. No foreign foe has visited U.S. shores in nearly 200 years, since the last British troops departed in 1815; but cruel, cunning enemies with kitbags full of surprises on September 11, 2001, demonstrated abilities to hit valued targets in our country as well as abroad.

Our cherished lifestyle is eroding. Freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition that the First Amendment to our Constitution guarantees, along with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s freedoms from want and fear, are at risk if the Islamic fanatics prevail. We’ll lose everything we hold dear unless U.S. leaders consistently apply all forms of national power far more effectively than they have thus far to win the global war on terrorism, which essentially is a worldwide war of incompatible ideas.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained the problem and the only acceptable solution perfectly when he addressed the House of Commons on May 13, 1940. “You ask what is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory—victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory there is no survival.”