By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired

May 21 will mark the 150th anniversary of the sack of Lawrence, Kansas, by pro-slavery forces, and May 24-25, the 150th anniversary of abolitionist John Brown’s retaliatory massacre of pro-slavery settlers at Pottawatomie. These violent acts precipitated a period of civil unrest that came to be associated with the name “Bleeding Kansas.” They are of interest because of what they tell us about both the origins of the American Civil War and the hazards of governance in the absence of adequate police powers. The U.S. Army attempted a peacekeeping role, but the limits of its success had significant consequences.

The issue of slavery roiled national politics from the Constitutional Convention on. In 1820 the Missouri Compromise banned slavery in the western territories north of 36 degrees, 30 minutes latitude, but in 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska Bill abandoned strict prohibition in favor of “popular sovereignty.” Soon, impassioned partisans in both the North and South financially assisted settlement in Kansas by those sharing their points of view—in efforts to tip the ballot when slavery came to a vote. This sponsorship was not particularly effective in actually attracting settlers, but the fact that it existed created excitement in the press. When a vote occurred, pro-slavery forces won, largely because of fraudulent ballots cast by Missourians—then a slave-holding state—who jumped the border to participate. Indignant free-soilers formed their own government and claimed a majority of the actual Kansas settlers.

Both sides were heavily armed. Pro-slavery Judge Samuel Lecompte indicted members of the free-soil government for treason. A posse of Missourians and pro-slavery settlers deputized to bring them in swelled to 1,500 men with five cannon. On May 21 these poured into the then undefended town of Lawrence, Kansas. Here they destroyed free-state printing presses, burned a hotel and the residence of the elected free-state governor, looted shops and homes and generally terrorized the local residents. They did not, however, execute the summons of the court.

Among free-soilers outraged by the events in Lawrence numbered the recently arrived John Brown. Brown was fanatic in his opposition to slavery and exercised an almost mesmerizing influence over those closest to him. He was a religious zealot who believed in “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” By his calculations pro-slavery men had murdered at least five free-soilers thus far during the troubles in Kansas. With four of his sons and three others he abducted five pro-slavery settlers from their cabins along Pottawatomie Creek during the night of 24-25 May. None seem to have had anything to do with the earlier killings. Brown nevertheless killed and mutilated them, hacking them to death with broadswords he had brought along for the purpose. He left it to their families to find their remains.
The twin outrages of Lawrence and Pottawatomie provoked a rash of abductions, murders and skirmishes across the territory. Free-soilers got the best of engagements at Palmyra (June 2), Franklin (June 4-5) and “Fort” Titus near Lecompton (August 16). Pro-slavery forces achieved an even bigger victory at Ossawattamie (August 30), killing more than 20 free-soilers, including one of Brown’s sons. Free-soilers came back to even the score at Hickory Point (September 13). This see-saw fighting killed more than 200 and cost more than $2 million in property damages.

The U.S. Army numbered less than 16,000, widely scattered across the West and heavily engaged in Indian issues. In 1857 alone there were 37 combat expeditions against Indians and many more operations not involving combat. Operations against the Sioux and Cheyenne involved troops based in Kansas even as conflicts between free-soilers and the pro-slavery faction progressed. As distracted as they were by other priorities, federal troops offered the only hope for unbiased intercession. Local militia and law enforcement agents had long since taken sides in the quarrel, and many of them already numbered among the combatants.

The commander at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., Col. Edwin Vose Sumner, was a capable soldier brevetted at both Cerro Gordo and Molino del Rey in the Mexican War. He would later command the Union’s II Corps at Seven Pines, Antietam and in other battles. In the Kansas troubles he received mixed reviews from both sides; efforts to be unbiased pleased neither. In part his dilemma stemmed from legal ambiguities. The pro-slavery government was the result of officially sanctioned elections, even if those elections had been heavily tainted by fraud. The free-soil government was more representative of Kansans, but had been established extra-legally. Sumner was called upon to disperse the free-soil legislature even as he tried to intercept Missouri “border ruffians” en route to Kansas and to arrest egregious offenders on both sides. By mid-September federal troops in Kansas were sufficiently numerous and well-positioned to facilitate an end to the ongoing violence.

The Army’s intervention checked immediate hostilities, but provided no resolution. Arrests were sporadic and not particularly consequential. Brown and his cohorts went free and caused trouble again. The perpetrators of Lawrence, guised in a specious cloak of legality, remained at large and lionized by those who shared their views. The aggrieved on both sides believed they had received no justice, whereas vigilantes on both sides believed they alone had imposed it. Identifiable units from as far away as South Carolina had arrived with their own leaders, weapons and resources to participate in the fighting. Money, weapons and supplies had poured in. Federal troops had lacked the capacity and the will to stem this interstate tide of armed men and logistical support until it was too late. Those favoring abolition and the Union became increasingly inclined towards drastic measures to support them, whereas those inclined to defy the Union smugly noted how ineffectual the federal response had been. Precedent was set for civil war. Restraint may be a virtue, but impotence is not.


Recommended Reading:

Carter, Alice E. and Jensen, Richard. The Civil War on the Web: A Guide to the Very Best Sites (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003)

McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: the Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)

Merk, Frederick. History of the Westward Movement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)