Lt. Col. Mike Burke’s review of Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad (February) inaccurately indicates there was an avoidance of urban combat to secure Iraq’s “smaller cities” during the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom operations. The author states that “though the smaller cities could be bypassed during the campaign from Kuwait to the capital, that city had to be invested and held.” While the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) did bypass the “smaller cities” like An Najaf, Al Hilah and Karbala, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) did not. The Screaming Eagles fought to the center of each of these significant urban centers and secured them before the fall of Baghdad.

Maj. Patrick Daniel
Melbourne, Fla.


THE U.S. MILITARY ON THE GROUND
Thanks to Col. Alfred Paddock for his insight and clarification on the genesis of U.S. Special Forces and their history in his review of Robert Kaplan’s recent book, Imperial Grunts. Clearly, it is important to accurately understand these facts as we comprehend the way ahead for our Special Forces and the employment of this prized asset in the years ahead.

I also understand Col. Paddock’s concern with the title, but I think we must consider the impression of the world and our own public and media when U.S. forces are forward deployed to fight a global war. It is easy to see how our efforts can be twisted into an impression of territorial imperialism instead of a forward security policy and humanitarian effort, and we must continually assure and prove to our allies and the world at large our honorable and noble intentions.

Beyond these concerns, as Col. Paddock remarks, the muddy boots depiction of forces at ground level is excellent, and I would focus on this recommendation of the book as a well-written narrative about our forces on the ground, not pass the book up based on some of his other issues with it.

For those seeking to learn more about our soldiers in the field and their daily challenges, Mr. Kaplan has done an excellent job portraying the fitful dilemmas of operating in Third World areas where many national governments are challenged by local chieftains, warlords, their own corruption, criminals and crushing poverty.

He also helps us better understand our forces’ challenges dealing with local culture, languages and the predicaments of the local population in the face of threats to their lives and livelihood while trying to determine which side will be able to secure their welfare in the long run.

Through examining the daily operations of the forces on the ground, we can better understand the challenges of fighting a counterinsurgency, of defeating the enemy while policing the area of operations to provide security for the local population and our own forces. Every day, U.S. forces must understand how to balance the risk of aggressively attacking the enemy and possibly losing forces, with the need to secure their own people and resources, sway public opinion in our favor, build local infrastructure and win over the local, national and world media.

Mr. Kaplan’s narrative helps us understand the complexity of the problems our forces face on the ground and think about possible solutions to better prosecute our global war on terrorism.

I look forward to further reports and thoughts from Mr. Kaplan as he surveys the force engaged at the front lines of the global war on terrorism.

Jonathan J. Negin
Fort Irwin, Calif.


KUDOS
I would like to extend my sincere appreciation for Gen. Frederick Kroesen’s frequent articles in the “Front & Center” section of Army Magazine. They are, in every respect, consistently outstanding. When Army arrives, I turn first to Gen. Kroesen’s contributions. His writings are laden with solid facts presented in a logical and persuasive manner, with no trace of strident advocacy.

We can hope that the Army, the DoD leadership and Congress pay close attention this year to the force structure arithmetic suggested by Gen. Kroesen’s article in the January issue of Army. We are, I believe, now staring into a barrel of coat hangers, trying to find a logical and relatively linear path to higher strategic ground. We need Gen. Kroesen’s understanding and his articulate presentations more than ever.

In a broader sense, I would also like to express appreciation for AUSA’s exceptionally effective representation of our Army to the administration, Congress and the public at large, as well as providing proven and trusted information pathways within all elements and echelons of our Army.

Lt. Gen. Charles W. Dyke, USA Ret.
Chevy Chase, Md.


BRAC 2005
The Army’s ongoing Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 effort is critical to the Army’s transformation, and will improve the way our soldiers fight, work and live. BRAC 2005 will enable the Army to become a more relevant and ready expeditionary force as a member of the joint team while enhancing the well-being of our soldiers, civilians and family members living, working and training on our installations.

The Army developed a rigorous, comprehensive, progressive and auditable analytical process to ensure compliance with BRAC law, including requirements for fairness and analytical honesty. Military value was the primary consideration. As such, the Army based all of its recommendations on a meticulous military value analysis of installation capabilities using certified data provided by Army installations. Army’s senior leadership, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and DoD components and agencies coordinated and integrated their efforts throughout the entire BRAC analysis and recommendation development process. The Government Accountability Office and the Army Audit Agency performed independent audits, and senior Army and OSD officials conducted policy and legal reviews. Consequently, the Army’s analytical process led to a set of recommendations and solutions that will better satisfy the Army’s operational and functional objectives.

As a result of this rigorous process and hard work, the BRAC Commission and the President approved 95 percent of the Army’s recommendations. The recommendations will enable the Army to close 13 active Army installations and six leased sites, and realign 35 installations. The recommendations also close 176 U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Centers and construct 125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers, and enable state governors to close more than 200 Army National Guard facilities and move those units into one of the newly constructed Armed Forces Readiness Centers. BRAC 2005 actions affecting Army installations are far more extensive than the recommendations affecting Army installations in all four previous BRAC rounds combined and are expected to create recurring annual savings of more than $2 billion when including the savings generated by the return of forces from overseas.

Through BRAC 2005, the Army is streamlining and optimizing the value of installations by significantly reducing their cost of ownership. This facilitates transformation, joint operations and joint business functions; accommodates rebasing of overseas units within the integrated global presence and basing strategy; and divests the Army of accumulated installations that are no longer relevant and are less effective in supporting a joint and expeditionary Army. The Army is taking great care to successfully coordinate the incredible number of moving parts in this transformation while avoiding unnecessary costs and turbulence to soldiers, civilians and family members.

Change is an uninvited guest for many. BRAC 2005 creates improvements for people, forces, quality of life and infrastructure. It enhances the lives of soldiers, civilians and family members while enabling the Army to reshape the infrastructure supporting our warfighters as they defeat the unconventional and asymmetric threats of the 21st century.

Craig E. College
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
Infrastructure Analysis
The Pentagon