Successful General Officer Leadership in World War II

By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired

Our Chief of Staff often speaks of guaranteeing a bench of senior leaders capable of meeting the demands of the 21st century. One of the nation’s greatest success stories has been its mobilization for and conduct of World War II. The Army’s general officer performance was particularly noteworthy. How was it that men theretofore so thinly exposed to modern military technology, large units or overseas cultures ultimately conducted blitzkriegs more dynamic than the far more experienced Germans, led organizations larger and more complex than ever fielded before and effectively governed millions of conquered or liberated peoples?

Postwar Chief of Staff Gen. J. Lawton Collins had a singular answer: “The thing that saved the American Army was the school system.” Built incrementally since the 19th century, the Army school system featured branch, command and staff, and senior staff instruction appropriate to officers at different levels as their careers progressed. This common professional base and standard for competent staff work were invaluable. For the generals of World War II, the schools had provided yet another formative experience. Virtually all taught on interwar faculties within the system, most for a number of years. This, and concomitant reflection and doctrinal development, deepened their appreciation of things they could not at the time experience physically.

Perhaps even more valuable than knowledge per se was experience training and educating subordinates. Once mobilization began in earnest, most training for commanders, staffs and troops occurred within newly organized divisions. These consisted of huge masses of volunteers and draftees led by tiny cadres of experienced soldiers. A 15,000-man new division received about 400 significantly experienced soldiers—evenly split between officers and NCOs. Division staffs had a handful of Leavenworth graduates, and regimental and battalion staffs few or none at all. Seasoned veterans operated several ranks above their prewar experience. Pedagogic experience proved invaluable for division commanders training subordinate commanders and staffs who in turn trained their soldiers. The World War II Army training program was standardized, methodical and progressive—and congenial to those who taught its antecedents in the Army school system.

Faculty experience was no silver bullet. Much taught in the interwar years did not fit World War II demands, and much that would had not been taught. Students and observers, even Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall himself, characterized the interwar curriculum as too rigid, confining and fixated on “the school solution.” It was more likely to guarantee American divisions would be well managed than well led. Fortunately, the general officers of World War II had ingrained habits of reading that positioned them for further intellectual growth. Until 1920 promotion through the rank of major depended upon competitive examinations, and junior officers equated career progression with study and reflection. Mentors reinforced this instinct. Throughout the interwar years it was not unusual for a unit’s officers to spend an afternoon discussing books they had recently read while their NCOs minded the troops. Officers knew they were in a skeletal, underfunded army and read thoughtfully to compensate.

Not all World War II generals were equally successful. Five corps commanders and 16 division commanders were relieved for cause overseas. If one compares their biographies with an equivalent number of demonstrably successful commanders, interesting patterns emerge. The successful and the relieved spent equivalent time as students and faculty in the Army school system. They also averaged roughly the same years of service, troop duty and combat experience (in World War I). The two samples diverge with respect to field grade command time and high level staff time. The successful averaged twice as much field grade command time overall, and three times as much within the last 10 years, as their relieved counterparts. Successful corps commanders had half again as much division command time as relieved corps commanders. The relieved commanders, on the other hand, had about twice as much service on high level staffs.

These statistics can be partially explained by the working mechanics of the mobilization. The Army ballooned in size after 1939 and exploded after Pearl Harbor. This growth catapulted experienced officers through the ranks quickly. Lucky ones acquired field grade command in the three years of growth, development and unprecedented maneuver training that separated the onset of crisis from deployment overseas. These commanders shook off interwar cobwebs and experienced commanding large numbers in a mechanized army. Nothing in the interwar Army could have matched this galvanizing experience. As these commanders gained mastery of command at one level, further Army growth carried them on to another. Meanwhile, less fortunate colleagues were trapped on high level staffs that also grew dramatically, pushing them through the ranks without further troop experience. When these men finally returned to troops, they were very senior officers; their opportunities for practical experience came too little and too late. There were exceptions on both sides of this paradigm, of course.

The World War II formula for general officer success seems to have included appreciable faculty experience, habits of reading and reflection, and recent field grade command. How does this compare with our more recent Army? The uniformly successful division commanders of Desert Storm had about the same years of service and troop duty as their World War II counterparts. They averaged 23 months in combat (in Vietnam) versus four (in World War I), and 42 months of field grade command versus 23. At 58 months they had spent more than twice as much time on high level staffs. They averaged a little more than a year as instructors—almost exclusively in branch schools—less than a third of the time spent by their World War II counterparts. This does not seem to have hurt them much. On the other hand, they fought the war they had prepared for a generation to fight and assumed command of divisions already thoroughly prepared for such a war as well. Had either not been true, the relative thinness of their academic exposure might have mattered more.

Recommended Reading:

Berlin, Robert H. “United States Army World War II Commanders: A Composite Biography,” The Journal of Military History 53 (April, 1989)

Brown, John S. Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1986)

Wade, Gary. World War II Division Commanders (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1983)