CAPTIVATING ANALYSIS OF OIF COMBAT OPERATIONS
On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen and David Tohn. Naval Institute Press. 540 pages; charts; photographs; index; $34.95.
Reviewed by Col. Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army retired

According to Gen. Tommy R. Franks, On Point is far more than a campaign history of Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to the former Central Command commander, this hard-hitting book is unique in its analysis of America’s “first truly joint combat operation with the services successfully integrated in the battlespace to a degree of mutual support and cooperation that would have been impossible five years ago.”

Commissioned by former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki to provide a quick, thorough review that examined the Army’s performance in the war, On Point is a snapshot in time, written and edited by three Army officers as soon after the conclusion of combat operations as possible. Ably compiled by a team of officers formed under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Mark O’Neill, deputy director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Army G-3, and Col. Jim Greer, director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, On Point is dedicated to the American soldier who has served on point for the nation since June 14, 1775.

The writers divide the book into three general parts that examine each phase of the operation and offer suggestions for future combat. Part one consists of a broad introduction that analyzes how the Army prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Col. Gregory Fontenot and his team of writers posit that the Army that won in Iraq in 2003 was different from the Army that won in Kuwait in 1991. The Army managed its growth and evolution over that time to create the force that spearheaded the assault on Baghdad. Not surprisingly, the operational environment in which the Army performed in 2003 was more, not less, complex than that in which all the services had traditionally assumed they would operate.

Equally fascinating is the second section of the book that focuses on the ground campaign through the end of major offensive operations. To their credit the authors balance large unit actions with the individual soldier’s story. These individual stories, such as SSgt. Dillard Johnson’s description of an assault on a Ba’ath Party police station and a fedayeen training barracks, provide a detailed discussion of combat at the ground level. Equally captivating is the authors’ final story by a wounded National Guardsman, who insisted that his name be withheld because he did not “feel his experience was exceptional—or even noteworthy.” The Guardsman described how he ignored his wound and kept fighting until his convoy was out of harm’s way.

On Point’s final section provides a superb analysis of some of the campaign’s implications. By far the most useful part of the book, this section focuses on the central question of what the events of spring 2003 tell us about the conduct of warfare in the 21st century. Included in the assessment are the implications for future command and control, combined arms operations, joint integration and support, deployment and sustainment, and information and knowledge.

The authors correctly opine that the four-month interval between the conclusion of military operations and the completion of the first draft of this manuscript prohibits the development of fully supported conclusions. Thus, the observations based on the available data do not result in conclusions, but are merely suggested as implications. More detailed work also needs to be done to understand the full implications of the operation, and the authors suggest a number of areas that merit further examination. These include a more thorough examination of coalition logistics, more scrutiny of special operations forces, and additional observations of tactical fights by junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

Written by Army officers, edited by Army officers, On Point has both the strengths and weaknesses associated with official military texts and manuals. Intended for a professional military audience more than the general public, this book is replete with military acronyms and terminology with which most civilian readers would be totally unfamiliar. The authors’ familiarity with the subject, however, makes the book indispensable reading for the current generation of military leaders.

Fortunately, the authors provide a military glossary and a complete order of battle for the Combined Forces Land Component Command as of May 1, 2003, to enhance the lay reader’s comprehension. Regrettably, the poor quality of the maps and photography seriously detract from what is otherwise an excellent text. Far too many maps are totally illegible and lack sufficient detail to have any use. It is hoped that the second edition of On Point will correct this shortcoming, because this is a story that deserves to be told and to be told well.

The definitive history of Iraqi Freedom will take years of thoughtful analysis and scholarly research to write, but On Point is an important initial step in understanding the conduct of joint/combined operations in the 21st century.

COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant.


VIVID, FLAWED MUDDY BOOTS REPORTING
Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground. Robert D. Kaplan. Random House. 421 pages; maps; glossary; index; $27.95
Reviewed by Col. Alfred H. Paddock Jr., U.S. Army retired

Robert Kaplan, long-time correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, has written the first in a series of books about his travels with the American military. His purpose is to show how U.S. Army Special Forces detachments and a few Marine contingents undertake “the mechanics of security commitments worldwide.” In doing so, he focuses on the lives of mid-level NCOs and officers stationed in remote areas abroad. Over a period of two years, his odyssey takes him to Yemen, Columbia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Fort Bragg and Camp Lejune, N.C.

Kaplan’s muddy boots reporting is the strength of his book. His depiction of Army Special Forces and the Ma-rines at ground level is excellent. The individual character sketches are vivid and provide readers with an informed snapshot of selected military units.

This reviewer, however, has a number of concerns with the book, beginning with its title. Kaplan tells of looking at a map in the Pentagon of the five area commands that encompass the world, thinking, “How could the United States not constitute a global military empire?”

Aside from the affront to political sensitivities of allies and adversaries that may result from this unfortunate description of our commitments abroad, I have difficulty understanding how a map of U.S. area commands and small groups of military personnel deployed in countries throughout the world constitutes imperialism—a basis for influence, perhaps, but not imperialism as usually understood: territorial acquisition by a sovereign power, such as the colonization practiced by Great Britain well into the 20th century.

Similarly, anyone who has ever been assigned to an infantry company certainly understands the term, “grunt,” and perhaps Marine infantry also respond positively to the word. In my tours with three separate Special Forces groups, however, I never heard personnel use the word to describe themselves. A Special Forces Operational Detachment A (ODA) is not an infantry squad.

Then there are Kaplan’s missteps with Special Forces history and terminology. Indeed, it is puzzling that, in a 421-page book largely devoted to Special Forces, he provides less than two pages on their origins—and that contains historical errors. He states, for example, that “U.S. Army Special Forces traced their origins to the World War II-era Jedburgh teams who were dropped behind enemy lines in Nazi-occupied France, and Detachment 101, which operated in Burma.”

While the Jedburghs were an important part of Special Forces legacy, the principal model for the original Special Forces Operational Detachment, Regiment, (forerunner to the ODA) was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Group. This 15-man unit contained the personnel specialties included in the operational detachment, regiment, which itself was a 15-man unit. (Later the ODA consisted of 12 men.) Kaplan’s sole documentation for this assertion is Aaron Bank’s self-serving memoir. A related example of poor history is this statement: “In sum, Special Forces needed a dramatic return to its roots, in which small American commando teams made up of Eastern European immigrants had bonded with indigenous forces behind enemy lines in Nazi- and communist-occupied Europe.” These OSS units were not commando teams; in fact, the term “commando” applied only to the British commandos. In addition, OSS operational teams also contained native-born U.S. Army personnel. They conducted guerrilla warfare with indigenous forces.

Kaplan’s loose application of the term commando is seen in his statement that “SOCOM [Special Operations Command] comprised … the various Army Special Forces groups, the 75th Ranger Regiment, Navy SEALS, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons, a provisional Marine detachment, and other commando-style units.” SOCOM also includes psychological operations and civil affairs organizations, which are hardly commando-style units. In fact, the term inaccurately describes Special Forces. Their missions are considerably broader than the direct action operations implied by the term “commando.”

The author’s misrepresentation of Special Forces history also applies to the Vietnam era. His use of Richard Shultz’s book The Secret War Against Hanoi as a template for Special Forces activities in Vietnam is inaccurate. Shultz’s book focuses primarily on MACV-SOG’s covert operations in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. While some Special Forces personnel served in SOG (including this reviewer), a much larger number participated in other counterinsurgency missions, like the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program initially started by the CIA in the early 1960s with the support of Special Forces A-Detachments.

Most troubling is the author’s misleading use of basic terms like “unconventional warfare (UW)” and “counterinsurgency.” A bit of history is in order. The original mission of the 10th Special Forces Group in 1952 was to infiltrate behind enemy lines to conduct UW; that is, to organize and employ indigenous personnel in guerrilla warfare. The Army planned to infiltrate this new organization in Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. UW remained the raison d’etre for Special Forces until the early 1960s, when they took on the additional mission of counterinsurgency. Because Special Forces possessed the training necessary to work with foreign personnel in UW, they became the primary option available to provide counterinsurgency assistance to indigenous forces before the introduction of conventional forces. The distinction between unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency is clear. It is not, however, in Kaplan’s book.

The training, advisory and civic action activities recently employed by Special Forces in the Philippines is another classic case of counterinsurgency. Yet here is how the author describes this activity: “UW entailed not only commando-style raids but softer techniques like the humanitarian work on Basilan Island in the Philippines that helped root out Islamic insurgents.”

Kaplan also misuses the two terms with respect to the Marines: “And yet they shared something vital, something which deeply attracted me: the history and traditions of Special Forces and the Marines were in counterinsurgency and unconventional war.” This is inaccurate. The Marines have a rich history in counterinsurgency, but not in UW.

One of the key themes of Kaplan’s book is that America is better served by deploying smaller units abroad for “imperium maintenance.” These are “small, light and lethal units of soldiers and Marines, skilled in guerrilla warfare [that] could accomplish more than dinosauric, industrial age infantry divisions.” This is another fundamental misinterpretation of basic terms. Conventional Army soldiers are not skilled or trained in guerrilla warfare; that responsibility falls only to Special Forces. Conversely, the Marines are not trained or skilled in guerrilla warfare. They are magnificent fighting forces who have conducted counterinsurgency—as have Special Forces.

The author also believes that Special Forces should deemphasize unilateral direct action activities to embrace “their indig brothers” (a suggestion with which this reviewer agrees). He states that this idea was not exclusively his, but originated in comments by Maj. Gen. Geoff Lambert, former commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Actually, many people had expressed this concern long before Lambert and Kaplan, among them most importantly, Lt. Gen. William Yarborough, U.S. Army retired, commander of the Army’s Special Warfare Center during Kennedy’s presidency. A U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) team conducting a study in 1979 on roles and missions of Special Forces and Rangers interviewed Gen. Yarborough extensively. He emphatically expressed his concern about using Special Forces in unilateral direct action missions. The SSI team agreed, and this became a major finding in their study. The reader will know by now that I have some major concerns with Imperial Grunts. The title, which is supposed to be a unifying thread in the story, is unfortunate and inaccurate. The author’s grasp of Special Forces history is suspect, as is his understanding of basic concepts and terminology. Kaplan is at his best in describing the life of individual soldiers and marines deployed abroad. He is an acute observer. Clearly he was impressed with Special Forces personnel (“I was beginning to love these guys”). If the reader wants a travelog and well-written narrative about Special Forces and Marine personnel, read this book. Otherwise, pass it up.

COL. ALFRED H. PADDOCK JR., USA Ret., served three combat tours with Special Forces in Laos and Vietnam and commanded a psychological operations battalion and group. He holds a master’s degree and doctorate in history from Duke University and is the author of U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Revised Edition).

A DEFINITION OF ISSUES AND PLEA FOR U.S. STRATEGY IN IRAN
Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States. Ilan Berman. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 218 pages; map; charts; notes; index; $24.95.
Reviewed by Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, U.S. Army retired

Ilan Berman, author of Tehran Rising, is vice president for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council, and adjunct professor of international law and global security at the National Defense University. Berman offers two purposes for his book: to define the challenge that Iran poses to the United States and to provide the makings of an American strategy toward the ancient land, which he believes to have been absent in recent years. He argues that “by breaking up the old order in neighboring countries, the United States has given the Islamic Republic unimagined opportunities to influence the region.” He goes on to assert that there is “little sign” that Iran has scaled back its sponsorship of terrorism, especially that of Hezbollah, operating against Israel.

With respect to nuclear weaponry, Berman points out that there are two methods of building bombs: by employing enriched uranium and with the use of plutonium. Iran, he asserts, is using both. Iran’s programs date back to the time of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and while they may have slipped into the background when the Shah was deposed, they were rapidly resuscitated when Iraq launched its attack on Iran in 1980. China, it seems, was the principal provider of the necessary technology. Strategic encouragement was provided later by North Korea when it demonstrated with its own weapons programs that it could preempt American strategy. In Berman’s view, Iran was seeking a measure of parity with Israel and the United States, but he suggests that it may also slip into a role of supplier to other Islamic states.

Not only might other small states be interested, but larger and more important ones, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, may become even more interested. Berman fears that the Middle East could be drifting toward a period of dominance of long-range nuclear weapons systems. He sees the Iranians developing an anti-Western “axis,” including Syria, Lebanon and possibly Egypt and the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq. Under such a regime, the United States would find the region far less hospitable than in the past. For its part, Russia is not enthusiastic about a nuclear armed Iran, but it continues, rather mechanically, to help it down the path.

Paradoxically, Iran actively backed Christian Armenia in the post-Cold War period against mostly Muslim Azerbaijan. But the Azeris are hostile to Turkey, which is a NATO and U.S. ally. Such complications could arise throughout the former southern Soviet states, and even within Russia itself, if left unchecked. Iran could provide aid and comfort to separatists in such troublesome areas as Chechnya. Berman suggests that to avoid this, Russia has reached a “quiet understanding” with Iran for the time being, that the latter will not meddle in Russia’s “near abroad,” in return for Russia’s nuclear technology. Also, Iran is probably Russia’s most important market for military equipment. Berman cites estimates that some 70 percent of Russia’s income from foreign military sales comes from Iran. In recent years, Russia appears to have slipped from a fundamentally anti-Iranian posture to one which tends to be rather pro-Tehran.

And there are others. The former Soviet state of Armenia appears to be building closer ties to Iran, both in the counterterrorism field and through military exchanges. More important, according to the author, even Turkey may be drifting closer to the Iranian orbit.

Berman salutes President George W. Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address in which he listed Iran as one of three states of a modern “axis of evil.” He faults the President, however, for losing moral courage with inaction against Iran. Berman shows his strategic disposition in his criticism of the U.S. administration’s declaration of support for Iranian “democracy,” and its tendency to make a distinction between Iraq and North Korea on the one hand, and Iran on the other. He views Iran as a spoiler of American policy in the greater Middle East.

In his final chapters, Berman suggests a “start of a strategy” for the United States in dealing with Iran. The most urgent matter he describes is preventing an Iranian nuclear breakout. While he explores possible avenues for military strikes against Iran (with a preference for a route over Turkey), he expresses relief that the time for such action has not yet arrived. His immediate formula consists of stiffening international counterproliferation measures; reviving Gulf defense measures; engaging new allies—especially Russia; and preparing for the development of an opportunity to bring the regime in Tehran to an end. He emphasizes that these measures should be undertaken in a comprehensive manner—not incrementally. The latter approach, he believes, would be “downright dangerous.”

In his final chapter, Berman laments that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has all but abdicated public diplomacy for engaging the outside world. He pleads for a new national strategic direction, additional resources and a serious commitment to winning the battle of ideas in the larger war on terrorism. To this point he may well hold most of his readers with him. It is exactly here, however, that some may diverge. Most public surveys indicate that there is a growing voice of dissent among the American people who, having tired of the length of the war in Iraq and the casualties sustained, seek closure of that enterprise by one means or another.

Berman’s final argument is not generous with the dissent. In his view there is no better place to continue the President’s campaign in the Middle East than Iran. He writes, “The overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran is good for America and good for the Iranian people.” However one may be attracted or repelled by his final judgment, many readers are likely to feel enriched by learning what the volume provides on the very real problems of the region.

MAJ. GEN. EDWARD B. ATKESON, USA Ret., Ph.D., is a senior fellow at AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare. He has written four books and more than 100 articles on military affairs.