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Army Magazine >> Army Magazine Archive >> ARMY Magazine - December 2005 >> LETTERS Email this... Email    Print this Print


LETTERS
12/01/2005

ARMY EDUCATION
Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen’s article “Army Education” (August) accurately describes my experiences as a battalion commander in a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) organization. Annually, the required and authorized slots on my tables of distribution and allowance decreased. Even with these degradations, my on- hand personnel never approached my authorizations. TRADOC developed a monthly status report, based on the unit status report, to describe to the senior levels of the Army the challenges TRADOC battalions operated under. I was never above the lowest level of rating for personnel.

The greatest example of the challenge was in our small group program for the Captains Career Course. In my tenure we struggled to keep majors for mentoring the Captains Career Course. The only way we could do this was with three Marine majors, four International officers and two Army majors. What signal were we sending to our captains when we could not even provide Army instructors to coach and mentor them in their career course?

The only thing I’d like to amplify is that the decision to cut short education occurs even at the War College level. Several of us were taken out of the course to go to Iraq. While I am sure the professional development we received in Iraq was outstanding, the fact is that we did not graduate from the War College. As the Army gets larger, we need to ensure that we are increasing the training side as well.

COL. BRIAN BOYLE
Grafenwoehr, Germany


WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
The M1028 may be new for today’s tankers, but a direct fire anti-personnel round is not a new capability (Soldier Armed, “M1028 120 mm Canister Round,” November). Gunners of A/2-320 Field Artillery (FA) fired the 105 mm M546 APERS-T (beehive) for the first time in combat in Vietnam in November 1966. Arguably its most famous use was on December 25, 1966, in defense of Landing Zone (LZ) Bird. S.L.A. Marshall’s book Bird relates how Col. William F. Brand, then Red Team 6, had alerted his unit about the beehive just that day. That night, the gunners of B/2-19 FA needed to fire only two beehive rounds, each containing 8,000 steel flechettes, to decimate a large North Vietnamese Army infantry formation. The Americans then massed other tube and aerial rocket artillery fires to break the back of the attack on LZ Bird.

Direct-fire rounds not only kill everything in their path, but they also paralyze remaining enemy combatants and give our warriors the edge, not to mention a huge psychological advantage. Soon Stryker crews will have them, too. Perhaps the standard fire order for all should be those electrifying words from Redleg history, “Beehive! Beehive! Beehive!”

LT. COL. STU MCLENNAN, USA RET.
Fort Hood, Texas


UNIT DESIGNATIONS
I want to thank Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired, for his article “Unit Designations in Our New Modular Army” (November). It is the best description of a confusing force development issue that I have read. However, and I mean no disrespect to Gen. Brown, why can’t we just call UAs (units of action) and UEs (units of employment) what they really are? The way I understand it is that they will be battalions, groups, regiments/brigades, divisions, task forces, corps and armies with unit designations just as always. Most of those organizations had never been limited by fixed tables of organization and equipment anyway, so making them modular is not really new. They have always varied in the number of subordinate units organic, assigned and attached as authorized by modified tables of organization and equipment and local orders.

The Army has unnecessarily complicated the issue by calling the new units UAs and UEs to indicate the new “transformed” Army. I can see that many hours of instruction will now be required to teach soldiers what we really mean when we talk about the number of UAs and UEs required for an exercise or operation. We risk confusing ourselves as well as our allies. I can just imagine the look of confusion on a foreign officer’s face, or even one of our own, when he is told to expect a UEx at his airfield to support an operation. Would it not be better to tell that person to expect an airborne brigade or a light division rather than have to go through a long explanation as to what the UEx really consists of in that particular situation? Ever since the days of Napoleon, we have understood what regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies are. Just because we call them UAs and UEs in a new modular Army does not really change what they are.

LT. COL. THOMAS D. MORGAN, USA RET.
Steilacoom, Wash.


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