I enjoyed Col. Henry G. Gole’s article in the March issue (“The Relevance of Gen. William E. DePuy”). Gen. DePuy’s writings were always interesting.

The picture of the February 1986 ARMY Magazine cover reminded me that my piece in that issue, “Quang Tri Lady,” sealed a job interview, starting my career in public information for the state of Connecticut. (Republication in Front and Center: Heroes, War Stories & Army Life helped land a management promotion.)

Apparently Gen. DePuy and I had at least two things in common—U.S. Army service and publication in ARMY.

Mike Beringer
Orange, Conn.


‘Leading Our Wounded Warriors’

I was distressed to read Capt. Dave Rozelle’s comment that “by God, even if you’re engaged in a firefight, when one of your soldiers is injured, you need to bust your ass to get to the field hospital to see him or her, even if it means turning the battle over to your XO [executive officer]” (“CompanyCommand,” February).

As an 11B10 of many years past, I find this thinking totally unacceptable—bordering on dereliction of duty. The commanding officer’s job is to lead his men in battle. The medics in the rear are ably trained to take care of all his wounded troops’ needs.

As then-Lt. Col. Hal Moore told his men before the battle at Ia Drang, “I shall be the first on the battlefield and the last to leave.” Other than being severely or mortally wounded, there is no reason for the commanding officer to leave the field.

Tom De La Vergne
Springfield, Pa.


Grant and Lee

I appreciate the excellent, balanced review of my book, Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian, which appeared in the April issue. I would simply like to clarify a couple of issues raised by the review.

The review criticizes my “highly biased” analysis of casualty rates and says, for example, that “Grant actually incurred a far higher casualty rate than Lee” in their direct confrontations. My book reveals that in the 1864 Overland Campaign, Lee suffered 50 percent casualties to Grant’s 45 percent; during the war, 20 percent of Lee’s men were killed or wounded to Grant’s 15 percent; and Lee’s total casualties were 209,000 to Grant’s 154,000.

The review refers to my “highly debatable premise that the Union … had the burden of winning the war.” Simply put, as the book states, the South had declared its independence, the North had to destroy that independence, and a stalemate would have been a victory for the South.

The review also criticizes my “strange logic” in blaming Lee for Gen. John Bell Hood’s destruction of the Army of Tennessee. The reason for that blame is that, when consulted by Jefferson Davis, Lee failed to stop the suicidally aggressive Hood’s disastrous appointment to command that army.

All of these and many other Civil War issues are quite debatable—which makes study of that war so fascinating.

Edward H. Bonekemper III
Willow Street, Pa.


The Reviewer Responds:

In the words of Adm. H.G. Rickover, “A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.” I am pleased that author Edward H. Bonekemper III feels my recent review of Grant and Lee: Victorious American and Vanquished Virginian was fairly balanced.

With respect to the specific areas of concern raised by the author, I feel that any discussion of the relative casualty rates between Grant and Lee during the 1864 Overland Campaign ought to include a statement that casualty rates often do not tell the entire story. It is hardly surprising that a force as numerically inferior as Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia would incur a greater percentage of casualties. Because the force directed by Grant was significantly larger than Lee’s, Grant’s casualty rate, as a percentage of his army, was indeed lower, despite the fact that Grant’s numerical casualties were significantly greater than Lee’s during said campaign.

With respect to the burden of winning the war, one can legitimately argue that President Jefferson Davis’ task of maintaining independence against an energetic Abraham Lincoln was an equally daunting task to that imposed on the American President.

Finally, had Lee possessed a crystal ball before Atlanta and Nashville that would have foreseen Gen. John Bell Hood’s destruction of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, I’m sure Lee would have strongly opposed Hood’s appointment. Lee’s choice of commander for the Army of Tennessee was always Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, whom Lee immediately reinstated to that position when Davis appointed Lee as general in chief of the Confederate army in February 1865.

These observations aside, Bonekemper has written an excellent book that will surely generate a great deal of controversy and possibly lead to a scholarly reevaluation of both Grant and Lee.

Col. Cole. C. Kingseed, USA Ret.
New Windsor, N.Y.