In light of the literature published following the troop surge of 2007–08 in Iraq, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa is a timely, necessary tactical guide for junior officers today. While books such as Tom Ricks’ The Gamble and Bob Woodward’s The War Within focus on the political and strategic leaders who shepherded the surge and the change in American strategy towards a counterinsurgency (COIN) in 2007–08, this novella is a prescriptive narrative of counterinsurgency lessons aimed at the youngest leaders deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors, Majors Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert J. Marckwardt, have written, arguably, the most practical book to come out of Iraq yet. As John Nagl notes in the foreword, Jisr al-Doreaa is “a guide to the tactical challenges of [the Iraq] conflict that is sure to become a modern classic.” By combining this new small-unit story with E.D. Swinton’s classic The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, the authors have produced a short must-read for every lieutenant preparing to lead soldiers in COIN operations.

Burgoyne and Marckwardt follow the chapter format and literary devices that Swinton used in Duffer’s Drift. Swinton used the six dreams of LT Backsight Forethought to illustrate 22 fundamental lessons of small-unit tactics learned during the Boer War of 1899–1902. In Jisr al-Doreaa, the authors use the six dreams of 2LT Phil  Connors, an armor platoon leader en route to Iraq, whose zone of responsibility is a combat outpost at a bridge in the town of Jisr al-Doreaa. Like LT Backsight Forethought, 2LT Connors learns from each dream and applies the new lessons in each successive dream. Where Backsight Foresight surrenders to the Boers at the end of each failed dream, young Connors’ failures lead to his relief by his commanding officer. By the fifth dream of each story, the young leader keeps his post, but not without one more painful lesson to apply to the sixth and final dream. This literary device works and is well suited for small-unit leader development.

In Jisr al-Doreaa, dreams one through three read almost like a morality play, but dreams four through six are excellent in creating the context for lessons in the tactics of COIN. At the end of each dream, Burgoyne and Marckwardt add to a cumulative list of steps for small-unit leaders to follow in the COIN environment. Culled from sources that include articles by GEN David Petraeus and David Kilcullen, and the authors’ own experiences, the list of lessons learned forms an effective checklist for a platoon leader to use in planning and executing small-unit COIN missions.

Perhaps the most useful aspect of Jisr al-Doreaa is the illustration of how junior leaders should focus on the population as the center of gravity. In each dream, the success or failure of 2LT Connors depends on how positive his interaction is with the civilians in his zone. When he focuses too much on force protection, his platoon overreacts to a sniper attack by returning fire indiscriminately into a local farmhouse. In the brief but visceral description of the aftermath of screaming family members and dead civilians, the dream becomes a nightmare and cannot end fast enough for Connors. In the midst of his confusion, a media team arrives to record the carnage and put the young lieutenant on the spot just before his commanding officer relieves him of his platoon. Clearly, 2LT Connors and his platoon do not know how to address the local population in the conduct of their mission in this early dream. Conversely, by 2LT Connors’ last dream, Burgoyne and Marckwardt have painted a scenario in which the platoon has increased the security of the people in al-Doreaa through thoughtful engagement with local leaders, the conduct of joint patrols with American and Iraqi security forces, and the integration of the Iraqi Health Ministry into the town’s medical-care support. Just prior to waking from his last dream, 2LT Connors notes that “getting into firefights and raiding buildings is exciting, but creating a lasting stability is real victory.”

While not the complete manual for teaching young officers how to lead soldiers in fighting insurgents among the people, Jisr al-Doreaa is an important tool for developing our military’s young combat leaders. Burgoyne and Marckwardt have provided a great resource for the Army to use as it faces future operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond. In addition, they have created a companion web site with maps, illustrations, learning exercises and discussion boards. All authors’ royalties from Jisr al-Doreaa benefit the Fisher House Foundation, the private-public partnership that supports families of injured American servicemembers. In crafting this book and online resource, Burgoyne and Marckwardt have made a significant contribution to soldiers, present and future.

LTC Jon Scott Logel is a military professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. He served on the Task Force Lightning staff in Multi-National Division-North from 2006–07.