By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown
U.S. Army retired

We have read that the U.S. Army threw away the advantages conferred by technology when it became involved in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sneaky insurgents melt amongst the people, become invisible to early detection, and strike at times and places of their own choosing—wherein their odds are at least even. Post-Cold War transformational efforts were allegedly misdirected into technology and have come to naught in the low-intensity conflicts actually fought, as opposed to the high-intensity conflicts envisioned. Such arguments can be used either to illustrate the Army’s resistance to change or to make the case that it should never again take on an insurgency. In fact, the pre-9/11 theory that multipurpose forces capable of fighting big wars can adapt to small wars seems to have been validated. The relative success achieved while fielding less than one American soldier per 1,000 Afghans or 250 Iraqis is historically remarkable and speaks to a considerable qualitative edge even in low-intensity combat.

As a first point, the odds are virtually never even, not even when the enemy chooses the time and place to fight. Whatever the firepower of the American troops first in contact, they are rapidly reinforced with overwhelming fire support. In Vietnam, such an effect was achieved by a vast network of artillery firebases, each of which itself became a target and required elaborate defenses of its own. As late as Operation Desert Storm, precision-guided munitions were far too expensive to be cost-effective against the fleeting targets low-intensity conflict was likely to produce. Satellite-based global positioning systems changed that, allowing adaptations to cheap “dumb” bombs that turned them into highly precise Joint direct attack munitions. In January, the New York Times reported a modest operation wherein a contingent of 150 American soldiers on the outskirts of Baghdad pulverized hastily encountered opposition with 40,000 pounds of bombs in less than 10 minutes—with no apparent collateral damage or civilian casualties. This story is not particularly unusual or newsworthy. Overwhelming firepower and elegant precision can be as invaluable in low-intensity conflict as they are in high-intensity conflict. They are not available by happenstance. Thoughtful experimentation, adaptation and design brought together satellites, airframes, advanced munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, communications and ground soldiers in a network capable of precluding future Little Bighorns, Isandhlwanas or Dien Bien Phus.

The Information Age Army that has emerged since the Cold War is not just about firepower, of course. In Desert Storm, a major fraction of our casualties resulted from fratricide, and headquarters often lost track of their rapidly moving units in the swirl of battle. Improved battlefield awareness became a mantra for reformers, and digitized communications became the method. Blue Force Tracking has proven invaluable in low- and high-intensity combat alike, as have vast amounts of other information immediately available through digital networks: tailorable maps adjustable for scale, satellite photography, intelligence updates, technical manuals, field manuals, weather reports and so on. Much of this information originates in official channels, but much does not.

The web site http://companycommand.army.mil is but one example of the energy whereby soldiers push the envelope with respect to information-sharing technologies.

Networked information sharing has become so ubiquitous within our armed forces that it goes virtually unnoticed, but from time to time operational results are spectacular enough to inspire comparisons with previous years. During Muqtada al-Sadr’s 2004 uprising, for example, the situation in Kut deteriorated so rapidly that a Stryker battalion from Mosul—more than 300 miles and two cultural divides away—was hastily dispatched to assist. Rolling out with zero notice, the Stryker-borne infantrymen downloaded maps, graphics, orders, intelligence and other relevant information while speeding down the highway through the darkness. They arrived situationally aware and attacked from the line of march. This capability is redefining our notion of “reserve.” A generation ago, a reserve was a major unit kept idle while waiting for something to happen. Now a reserve is a hasty accumulation of lesser units not particularly busy at the time. The resultant mosaic can be made to work because of the professional caliber of our soldiers and because information technologies allow us to rapidly integrate everyone into the battlefield situation and the chain of command.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and our immediate adversaries attempt to compete with us in the Information Age. They, too, promulgate guidance, situational awareness and propaganda through electronic means—albeit over the far more vulnerable Internet. We play cat-and-mouse games with respect to the tactics, techniques and procedures of booby traps, suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and much else as each side alerts its colleagues to the latest developments. Insurgents speed video feeds to Al Jazeera and other outlets they consider useful for propaganda, and they have picked up on the cellular phone as a highly flexible means of communication. Given our capacity for electronic warfare, the use of such assets implies some risk of detection. This further underscores the lead we have established for ourselves in the Information Age.

It is also noteworthy that while harnessing revolutionary digital technologies we have also furthered our advantage with respect to evolutionary technologies: lasers, night-vision devices, Kevlar armor, avionics, automotives, fire controls, plastics, lighter metals, improved medicines and medical techniques. From the Korean War through Desert Storm, one in four casualties died. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ratio has been one in 10.

Critics acknowledge our technological advantage; some even admit that much of it has proven useful and relevant in low-intensity combat. Most believe that the post-Cold War transformation has been myopically focused on high-intensity combat, however, and that our supposedly multipurpose forces are totally unprepared for insurgency. With the singular—and significant—exception of sufficiently available linguists, I disagree.

One does not have to surf long in the blogs, reading lists and web sites frequented by our soldiers to uncover a significant appreciation of counterinsurgency.

Whatever our shortcomings in Afghanistan and Iraq, qualitative disadvantage has not been among them. Were we operating with the technology of a generation ago at the force ratios we are now, our losses would be tenfold. Our multipurpose forces are, in fact, prepared for multiple purposes. Sadly, not all of our challenges have a military solution. We can facilitate, but we cannot unilaterally make a nation of either Afghanistan or Iraq; only the Afghans and Iraqis can do that.


Recommended Reading:

Boot, Max, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today (New York: Gotham Books, 2006)

Donnelly, William M., Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007)

Reardon, Mark J., and Charlston, Jeffery A., From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at War (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007)